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PREFACE
The Advanced EVA System Design Requirements study was a twelve
month effort to identify specific criteria regarding Space Sta-
tion EVA hardware requirements by analyses of EVA missions,
environments, operations, procedures, and Space Station and 8TS
interfaces. The study began in 3anuary of 1985 and was completed
in January, 1986.
This final report has been prepared in accordance with the State-
ment of Work for the subject study, contract NA89-17299, and
contains the data and analyses from which ali the study results
were derived. A separate Executive Summary report has also been
prepared for distribution as determined by the contract monitors.
The study results are intended to provide information and guide-
lines in a form that will assist NASA program managers in evalua-
ting and substantiating EVA system requirements to support a
productive EVA capability for the Space Station Program.
Questions and coA,Bints regarding this study or the material
contained in this document should be directed tom
Michael RouenlEC3
EVA8 Study Technical Monitor
N&SA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas 77058
(713) 483-6193
(or)
Thomas 8. Woods
EVA8 Study Manager
McDonnell Douglas_tronautics Company - Houston Division
16055 Space Center Blvd.
Houston_ Texas 77062
(713) 280-1649
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SECTION 1
Introduction and Study Overview
Introduction
The purpose of this document is to report on the technical work
accomplished on the Advanced Extravehicular Activity System Study,
Contract NAS-9-17299. The study was performed to define and
establish design requirements and criteria for the Space Station
Advanced Extravehicular Activity System (EVAS) including crew
enclosures, portable life support systems, maneuvering propulsion
systems, and related EVA support equipment. The study considered
EVA mission requirements, environments, and medical and physiolo-
gical requirements, as well as operational, procedures and trai-
ning issues.
1.1 Team Organization
The MDC EVAS Study Team was organized to take advantage of a
unique mix of experience and expertise in defining and deve-
loping EVA systems, as well as in planning and conducting succes-
sful EVA operations. (Figure 1-1). The Houston Division of the
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company provided overall study
management and expert task leadership dedicated to incorporating
in this study all the relevant lessons learned while helping NASA
develop and exercise the NSTS EVA capability which has been so
spectacularly demonstrated in recent years. To this invaluable
understanding of EVA operations were added the skills and expe-
rience of the Huntington Beach division of MDAC (for physiology,
productivity, system integration and compatibility with Space
Station architecture); the Hamilton Standard Division of United
Technologies (for life support system technologies); ILC-Dover
(for crew enclosure, materials and ancillary equipment); and
Martin Marietta (for maneuvering propulsion technologies].
Corporate EVA experience bases dating back to Gemini IV were thus
applied to the purpose of defining EVA system requirements for
the Space Station.
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FIGURE 1-1
TEAM ORGANIZATION
1.2 Study Organization
The methodology chosen for this study was a
approach of survey_ analysis_ synthesis and
in Figure 1-2.
classic Phase A
definition as shown
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STUDY ORGAN I ZAT i ON
The primary activity was organized into three major tasks corres-
ponding to the contract Statement of Work (SOW). From numerous
sourcis_ the EVA Requirements Survey_ Task 1, attempted to iden-
tify and quantify all the routine and contingency EVA mission
requirements For assembly, servicingl maintenance_ and repair_ oF
satellites and attached payloads, as _11 as for the Space
Station itself. Using the identified mission requirements as one
of several inputs_ EVAS Baseline Design Requirements and Criteria
- Task 2v analysed numerous environmental, physiological,
man/machine, operational and hardware considmrations to identify
specific design requirements for systems that _uld maximize
human productivity in EV_. In Task 3, Space Station EVA Require-
ments and Interface Accommodations, we identified the EVAS inter-
faces and EVA peculiar accommodations and support requirements to
be incorporated into the SS systems and architecture. The de-
tailed Work Breakdown Structure (NBS) is illustrated in Figure 1-3.
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1.3 Key Issues and Drivers
_p=r__ --_J_..° =y=emm_...... requi _=m=_.-...-.._-_=-_.,- _--_-_,,=_,,-_=t_,,=l=_.........=_ = v, ===,,_=u_-_
in the ensuing sections of this report. There were several
issues and driving considerations developed in the course of
the study that affected more than one system and which combined
with some unique characteristics of the Space Station to effect
many of the EVA design considerations.
1.3. 1 Space Station Characteristics
When compared to previous programs, the Space Station crews will
be routinely on-orbit for far longer periods, and the vehicle
itself and many of its systems will be there virtually indefini-
tely. From this factor alone were derived several other key
characteristics of the Space Station.
0 ORGIT STAY TIME GREATLY INCREASED OUER PREUIOUS PROGRAMS
0 OPERATIONAL TEMPO RELATIUELY GENIGN
0 MISSION PLANNING MORE LONB TERM. LESS PRE-MISSION DETAIL
0 TRAINING MORE GENERIC, MORE TASK-ORIENTED, LESS MISSION
SPECIFIC
0 ON-ORGIT TRAINING REQUIRED FOR PROFICIENCY IN CONTINGENCY/
EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
0 LONG US SHORT TERM PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS AND ENUIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
FIGURE 1-4
UNIQUE SPACE STATION CHARACTERISTICS AFFECTING EVA
The tempo of operations will be relatively benign with regard to
meeting most mission objectives in critical time periods. For
instance, an EVA task that takes longer than anticipated can be
rescheduled for completion in the next planned EVA event. This
takes advantage of the more permanent nature of the manned presence
than that afforded by the STS and also alleviates the potentially
deleterious effect of less mission specific training available to
SS crews. Mission planning itself will be more of a long-term
nature on the ground with much less pre-mission daily detail than
is required for Shuttle. For the same reasons, and due to the
wide variety of EVA mission requirements, pre-mission training
will enphasize development of the generic EVA skills that will be
required to accomplish them. On-orbit EVA training opportunities
will also be utilized to compliment limited ground simulations
with an abundance of on the job training to achieve true profi-
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ciency. Additional on-orbit training requirements in emergency
procedures and off-nominal EVA systems operations are required by
the length of crew cycles and by the need to maintain proficiency
in safety critical areas.
While much has been learned about adapting man to the orbital
environment, there are new, different, and perhaps unknobln risks
associated with long term exposures. The statistical pr_bability_
however small, of a hazardous event or exposure occurring to a
crewman takes on a whole new meaning when the opportunities are
significantly increased. Thus, for Space Station there is spe-
cial emphasis on such areas as bends risk, radiation exposure,
and micrometeroid protection.
1.3.2 Key EVA Design Issues
With the considerations expressed above and with the key applica-
ble lessons learned from the STS EVA experience, several issues
emerged from the many considered in the study as having pervasive
effects on EVAS design requirements. (Figure 1-5).
0 EUAS MAINTAINABILITY
0 EUAS TECHNOLOGY READINESS
0 EUA LSS UOLUME US EUA TIME AUAILABLE
0 SUIT PRESSURE/CABIN PRESSURE RELATIONSHIP AND PRODUCTIUITY
EFFECTS
0 EUA CREW AUTONOMY
0 INTEGRATION OF EUA AS A PROGRAM RESOURCE
0 STANDARDIZATION OF TASK INTERFACES
FIGURE i-5
KEY EVA DESIGN ISSUES
Maintainability is far and away the most important issue in EVAS
design and the main reason why the STS EMU will not satisfy SS
requirements.
Technoloqy Readiness and risks associated with advanced EVAS
technologies must be carefully considered in evaluating their
benefits to EVA productivity. An assessment of technology readi-
ness for the EVAS is provided in Section 4 of this report.
EVA LSS Volume vs EVA Time Available. There are several factors
combining to drive the EVAS to an overall larger volume. While
the STS constraints on volume are not expected to exist for Space
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Station, this growth could be controlled by taking advantage of
the Station's ability to provide dependent life support capability(i_e_ via umbi!ica!s) at remote worksites.
Suit Pressure/Cabin Pressure Relationship and Productivity
Effects. Operating space suits at the pressure levels attendant
to a sea level cabin with minimum prebreathe means that unless
there is significant improvement in the glove technology the
crewman will bear the brunt of having to perform manipulative
tasks with very stiff hands. Recent tests have provided insuffi-
cient quantifiable data to back up this key feed back from our
system operations. Further development efforts must concentrate
on getting the technology up and/or the suit pressure down.
EVA Crew Autonomy is an issue which was found to affect many
areas of the EVAS and the SS EVA interfaces and accommodations.
To maximize the overall productivity of the crew they need to be
provided with all the resources to operate independently from the
ground, as well as to allow the EVA crew to operate independently
from the IV crew. This issue affects EVAS design, including
reliability and maintainability aspects, the Data Management
System, the Communications System, provisioning, and training and
makes a strong case for implementation of IVA automation and EVA
robotics.
Integration of EVA as a Proqram Resource is no less important
than integration of other SS user services such as heat transfer,
power distribution, pointing accuracy or data handling. This
program appears well on its way to achieving this critical per-
spective and it must be maintained during the SS development.
Finally the Standardization of Task Interfaces must be promoted
to increase EVA productivity, enhance the probability of mission
success and reduce the overhead burdens associated with perfor-
ming EVA. If EVA is to be relied upon for SS assembly, maintenance,
servicing, and repair and as a resource to be applied to user
needs, then properly designed work interfaces are required.
1.4 Organization Of This Report
Sections 2 thru & and Appendices A, B, and C of this report
contain the results of the work performed under this study con-
tract.
Section 2 EVA Mission Requirements summarizes the results of the
EVA requirements survey. For clarity and understanding it des-
cribes some of the intermediate results achieved in the process
of developing the time phased SS EVA mission model which provided
the scope for evaluating the technical issues in later sections.
This section also identifies the support equipment requirements
derived from the mission survey and the g=n=_ _J_ task requi_e
ments.
In Section 3, an overview of SS EVA operations is presented.
This material describes a typical EVA scenario in order to set
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the stage for the EVAS descriptions to follow as well as to tie
together some of the operations-related systems concepts which
were developed in the course of the study.
Section 4 covers the major effort of the study, the definition of
the Advanced EVA Systems Baseline Design Requirements and Criteria,
Task 2 of the contract statement of work (SOW). As required by
the Data Requirements Description, the specific EVAS design
requirements are also contained in Appendix A. If no requirement
is stated, none is implied.
In Section 5 are presented the requirements definitions for the
Space Station/EVAS Interfaces and EVA Accommodations, SOWTask 3.
These requirements are also contained in Appendix B. This material
is essentially the same as previously reported as required in DR3
of the contract.
In Appendix C are compiled various tables of supporting data
which were either developed in the course of the study, or the
results of other relevant studies or research. They are provided
as more complete reference material than that which is discussed
in the body of the report. This section also includes a bibliog-
raphy of references consulted in the study and considered useful
to readers of this report.
To assist the reader in tracing the study results to various SO_
tasks, a cross reference is provided in Table I-1 below.
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TABLE 1-1
SOWto FINAL REPORTCROSS-REFERENCE
...... SOW
SECT TITLE FINAL REPORTSECTION<S)
3.1 EVA REQUIREMENTSSURVEY
3.1.1 Greater Detail 2.1
3.1.2 Prioritized Listing 2.2
3.1.3 Assessment Around DB 2.3
3.1.4 ID Ancillary Equip 2.4
3.1.5 Satellite Serv Tasks 2.1,
3.1.6 DOD EVA Requirements 2.5
App C
3.2 EVAS BASELINE DESIGN REQUIREMENTSAND CRITERIA
3.2.1 Orbiter I/F Reqts 4.9
3.2.2 Technology Survey Areas 4.0.2.6
3.2.2. 1 High Pressure Suit 4.0.2.1, 4.8. 1
3.2 2. _ Rapid Don/Doff 4 8. _
3._._.9 3 Hi Mobility/Long Term
Comfort 4._. i, 4.8.-_
_.._.2.4 Data Disp, Stor, Cmd 4.5, 4.8.4
3.2. _.5 Hard Struc Thermal Insu 4.8.5
-_.-_.6 Component Modularity 4.0.2.1, 4.8.6
3.2.9.7- On Orbit Fit/Resizing 4.3. _,_ 4.8 7.
3.2.2.8 Auto Service & Checkout 4.8.8
3.2.2.9 Auto Thermal Control 4.8.9
3.2.2.10 Controlled Effluent EMU 4.8.10
3.2.2.11 Basically Regen EMU 4.8.11
2 9 12 Mech End Effector 4 8.12
. ._.
2.2.1_ Generic Work Sta, Restr 4.8.13
=. 2 2. 14 MMU C&W Interface 4 5, 4 6, 4.8. 14
3.2.3 Issues For Consideration Throughout Sections 3, 4, and 5
3.2.4 EVAS Systems/Requirements and Concepts
3.2.4.1 EVA Man/Machine and Physiological/Medical
3.2.4.1.1 duty cycles 3.0, 4.0.2.5
3.2.4.1.2 optimize duration 3.0, 4.0.2.5
3.2.4.1.4 human capabil. 4.0.1
3.2.4.1.5 integ. >2 cm 4.4
3.2.4.1.10 percep, acuity 4.5.2
3.2.4.1.13 radiation toler. 4.2.1
3.2.4.1.14 pets. hygiene 4.7
3.2.4.1.15 waste mgmt 4.7.2
3.2.4.1.16 EMU waste mgmt 4.7.2
3.2.4.1.17 food, water 4.7.1
3.2.4.1.19 biomed data 4.4, 4.5
3.2.4.1.21 medical care 4.7.3
Requirements
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TABLE 1-1
SOWto FINAL REPORTCROSS-REFERENCE(CONTINUED)
...... SOW
SECT TITLE FINAL REPORTSECTION(S)
_.4.2 Mission Operations Requirements
_._2.4.2.1 ops scenario defn 3.3
3.2.4.2.2 EVA length 3.3.2, 4.0.2.5
3.2.4.2.3 EVA work period 3.3.2, 4.0.2.5
3. _ _ 3 2, 4.0.2 5.4.2.4 optimize duration . . .
3.2.4.2.5 prop capability 4.6
3.2.4.2.6 SS repair ops m._i, _._ .2, 4.6
3.2.4.2.7 work station ops 3.3.2, 4.6
3.2.4.2.8 EVA rescue capab. 4.6
3.2.4.2.9 EVA w/o resupply 5.4
3. _.4.2.10 resizing reqts 4.3.2
3.2.4.2.11 logistics reqts 5.4
3.9_.4. _.12 maintainability 4.0.-.? 1
. 3.3, 3.5, 5.63.2.4.2 13 servicing
3._._ 4.2.14 cleaning/drying 5.6
3.2.4.2.15 data mgmt 3.5.3, 4.5
3.2.4.2.16 c & w, checkout 4.5
3.2.4.2.17 communications 4.4
3.2.4.2.18 contam. (by EVAS) 4.8.10
3. 9_.4._._ 19 decontamination App B
3.2.4.3 EVA Hardware Requirements
3.2.4.3.1 EVA tools 2.4
3.2.4.3.2 restr/work sta. 4.6, 5.7
3.2.4.3.3 communications 4.4
3.2.4.3.4 propulsion 4.6
3.2.4.3.5 propulsion system 4.6
3.2.4.3.6 exter, config 4.1, 4.2, 4.6
3.2.4.3.7 guidance & contrl 4.6
3.2.4.3.8 EMU/MMU/spt I/F 4.6
3.2.4.3.9 rescue equip 4.6
3.2.4.3.10 operational life 4.6, App A
3.2.4.3.11 worksite I/F 4.6, 5.7
3.2.4.3.12 sharp corn/impact 4.2.2, 4.6
3.2.4.3.13 meteoroid debris 4.2.2
3.2.4.3.14 radiation envir. 4.2.1
3.2.4.4 EVA Procedures and Training
3.2.4.4.1 simulators, tng 3.4
3.2.4.4.3 computer modeling 3.1, 4.5
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TABLE i-1
SOW to FINAL REPORT CROSS-REFERENCE (CONTINUED)
3.3 Space Station EVA Requirements and Interface Accommodations
3.3.1Atmos. Composition/Press.
3.3.2 Communications
3.3.3 Data Management
3.3.4 Logistics
3.3.5 EVA Safety
3.3.6 Impact on EVA Cm autonomy
3.3.7 Space Station Interior
3.3.8 Space Station Exterior
3.3.9 Space Station Airlock
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
Section 3, 4.0.2.3
5.6
5.7
5.8
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SECTION 2
MISSION REQUIREMENTS SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
In order to establish requirements for any type of system, it is
first necesary to determine precisely what that system will be
called upon to do. For the Space Station EVA System, the missions
which the EVAS must support and the tasks it must perform provide
that information. If any significant variation in these misions
or tasks occurs with time, that time dependency must be established
and accounted for. These objectives were accomplished in this
portion of the Advanced EVA Systems Study. The approach and
results are presented below.
2.1 MISSION AND TASK DETAIL
The study was begun by establishing as much detail as possible
about the missions and tasks of the Space Station EVAS. This
effort was hindered to some extent by the paucity of reliable
information about missions which are 7 to 15 years in the future.
Design details were usually sketchy or totally non-existant and
quite often the viability of the actual mission was in doubt.
Still, enough information existed to derive mission requirements
for the Station EVAS.
Several different sources of information were consulted in the
search for requirements. For detail on payload servicing mis-
sions Langley Data Bases dated March 1984 and May 1985 were
consulted. These data bases began in 1991 and 1992, respectively,
with the implied assumption that Space Station Initial Operatio-
nal Capability (IOC) would occur on that initial date. While
actual IOC is still unknown_ the information derived from the
Langley Data Bases should still provide reasonable estimates if
referenced to IOC rath_ than a specific calendar date. As many
as possible of the principal investigators or payload sponsors
listed in the data bases were questioned. From the latest,
perhaps more accurate_ Langley Data Base it was determined that,
of the 324 total missions, 141 would require some sort of EVA
support. These were a mixture of domestic and foreign payloads.
All American sponsors were contacted to verify and update the
data in the data base. Generally it was found that the informa-
tion was a sponsor's "best guess" at a very early date on what
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might fly. A supplement to the above data was a McDonnell
Douglas study, the Space Station Customer Accommodation Study
(MDC H1300), which provided some early detailed information on
selected payloads before release of the current Langley Data
Base.
For initial information on Space Station assembly, maintenance,
and repair tasks the Space Station Reference Configuration Des-
cription and the Space Station Phase B Request For Proposal were
consulted. Later, more detailed analyses were available from the
McDonnell Douglas Space Station Phase B study organization.
Using the initial data on likely missions for the Space Station
EVAS, a list of generic missions was generated which it was
believed would describe the things the EVAS would be required to
do and which would, by simplifying the analyses and reducing the
data-to a manageable size, give a clear picture of those EVAS
requirements. Fifteen such generic missions were identified.
Table 2-1 lists them and provides further detail on each mission.
Time estimates were made for each generic mission and these
estimates were used to estimate times for each of the missions
derived either from the Langley Data Bases or other Space Station
documentation. This process was repeated as new mission data
became available, and the Generic 15 Missions were updated as
required on the basis of such new data. It should be noted that
no significant updating was required as newer or more detailed
data became available, indicating that the Generic 15 were both
truly generic and complete.
TABLE 2-1
GENERIC EVA MISSIONS
TIME
1. ALIGNMENT OF XMITTER/RECEIVER ELEMENTS 0.5 HRS
.
3.
A.
B.
C.
D.
F.
OPTICAL ALIGNMENT TASKS
RF ALIGNMENT TASKS
THOSE REQUIRING EXTRA TOOLS
THOSE DESIGNED FOR EVA
FREE-FLYER BASED
DEPLOY/RETRACT SOLAR ARRAY
A. MANUAL DEPLOY/RETRACT OF LINEAR STRUCTURE 0.25 HRS
B. CONTINGENCY DEPLOY/RETRACT 0.25
TRUSS STRUCTURE CONSTRUCTION 0.1HR/
TRUSS ELEMENT
A. ASSEMBLY OF TRUSSES TO FORM BOX STRUCTURE
B. ASSEMBLY OF TRUSSES TO FORM FRAME STRUCTURE
C. ASSEMBLY OF TRUSSES FOR SUPPORT POLES AND ASSEMBLY
FIXTURES
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TABLE 2-1
GENERIC EVA MISSIONS (CONTINUED)
m
m
m
m
Gi
SATELLITE SERVICE TECHNOLOGY
Am
B.
C.
D.
E.
Fm
8.
H.
I.
Jm
K.
CONNECTOR CHANGEOUT (ELECTRICAL AND FLUID)
HINGE REPAIR
MECHANICAL ACTUATOR REPAIR
THERMAL INSULATION MANIPULATION
IMPACT DAMAGE REPAIR
I STRUCTURAL
II RADIATOR
III SOLAR PANELS
FLUID LINE REPLACEMENT
ELECTRICAL LINE REPLACEMENT
TELESCOPE MIRROR REFINISHING
ELECTRONIC COMPONENT REPLACEMENT
I BLACK BOXES NOT DESIGNED FOR EVA
II PORTIONS OVERLAP WITH I
III INDIVIDUAL COMPONENT REPLACEMENT
(SENSORS_ DCB'S, PCB COMPONENT)
INSPECTION
CABLE ROUTING
LARGE MODULES MANIPULATION
0 MODULES > 1M**3v >250 KG
Am
B.
C.
D.
TRANSPORT
FINE POSITIONING
SECURING
EVA COMPATIBLE DESIGNS
SMALL MODULE MANIPULATION
0
0
MODULES < 1M**3_ <250 KG
OTHERWISE_ SAME AS LARGE MODULE MANIPULATION
LARGE MIRROR CONSTRUCTION
AI
B.
SUBSET OF 5 OR 6
MIRROR SUPPORT MAY FORCE SPECIAL HANDLING!
I.E., MIRROR ELEMENTS MUST BE PLACED ON
INTERIOR OF PARABOLA
CONSUMABLES RECHARGE VIA MODULE TRANSPORT
Am
B.
SUBSET OF MEDIUM SIZE MODULE MANIPULATION
MODULES (TANKS) ARE EMPTIED_ NOT CHANGED
I REQUIRE SPECIAL HANDLING
TECHNIQUES/EQUIPMENT
II TEMPORARY LINE ROUTING
TIME
2 HRS
2 HRS
2 HRS
0,25 HR
1HR
2 HRS
2 HRS
1 OR 4 HRS
1 OR 4 HRS
MULTIPLE DAYS
5 HRS
0.5 HR/SITE
75 FT/HR
1HR EACH WAY
0.25 HR EACH
WAY
0.1HRITRUSS
0.25 HAl
ELEMENT
1 HR
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TABLE 2-1
GENERIC EVA MISSIONS (CONTINUED)
o ORBIT LAUNCH OPERATIONS
All
Bll
C.
BOOSTERS/SATELLITE/LAUNCHER
I STORAGE
II ASSEMBLY
III CHECKOUT
SOLID AND LIQUID PROPELLANTS
REUSEABLE OTV'S
I REFURBISH/REFUEL
II ASSEMBLY/CHECKOUT
lOll SATELLITE OPERATIONS
0
0
<250 KG_ FREE FLYERS
WITHIN 1KM OF STATION
A. DEPLOY
B. RETRIEVAL
C. OPERATION
11. SPACE STATION RADIATOR CONSTRUCTION (FROM ORBITER)
Am
B.
C.
SUBSET OF LARGE MODULE MANIPULATION (>1M**3)
HANDLING ELEMENTS WITH SENSITIVE SURFACES
HANDLING OF LONG, THIN STRUCTURES
12. ORBITER SUPPORTED LARGE MODULE MANIPULATION
13.
Aw
B.
C.
TRUSS STRUCTURE MODULE HANDLING
HABITABILITY MODULE HANDLING
SUPPORTED ONLY BY ORBITER
ORBITER SUPPORTED TRUSS CONSTRUCTION/DEPLOYMENT
A. ASSEMBLY
B. DEPLOYMENT
14. RADIATOR CONSTRUCTION-FULL UP SPACE STATION
A/
B.
SAME AS 11_ NO ORBITER
TASK EXECUTION DIFFERENT
15. EVA RESCUE
All
B.
Cm
RETURN DISABLED CREWMAN TO INTERIOR OF STATION
RETURN OF STRANDED FREE-FLYING ASTRONAUT TO
STRUCTURES OF STATION
TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL FROM DISABLED STATION
TO ORBITER OR VICE-VERSA
TIME
1HR
16 HRS
4-8 HRS
16 HRS
24 HRS
1HR
1HR
AS REQUIRED
3 HRS/PANEL
0.5 HR
0.1 HR
0.1HR/TRUSS
3 HRS/PANEL +
1HR OVERHEAD
0.3 HR/
CREWMAN
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Rs noted above, the Seneric 15 Missions were used to estimate EVA
time required for each of the identified missions. These esti-
mates were then summed to arrive at estimates of EVA time re-
quired per year for customer support. Figure 2-1 presents the
results of this process.
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Figure 2-1
Total EVA Mission Manhour Requirements for the Space Station Program
As the figure indicates, our analyses yield the information that
a minimum of slightly more than 1000 manhours of EVA time per
year will be required at Station IOC and that within two years
approximately 4500 manhours of EVA time will be required per
year. There are two problems with this estimate. First, it
includes polar missions which probably will not be supported with
EVR from the Station. Second, it includes many missions which
have only a very low probability of flying. To address these
problems, a ranking as to firmness, to be discussed in further
detail below, was applied to the list of missions to determine
which missions had a high and which missions had a low probabili-
ty of flying. The missions were ordered on a scale from 1 to 5
with a 1 indicating a mission that was certain to fly and a 5
indicating a mission which would almost certainly not fly. R new
sum of EVA manhours required per year was generated, this time
including only those missions with a firmness rating of 1, 2, or
3 plus 20 percent of the time required for those missions with a
firmness of 4. Results are presented in Figure 2-2.
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Figure _-_m
Estimated EVA Manhour Requirements Considering Firmness Ratings
Finally, all polar missions were removed from the estimates,
,-..yielding times as presented in Figure _ 3
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Estimated EVA Mission Manhour Requirements for Space Station Core
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As indicated, 346 manhours of EVA time are estimated to be re-
quired in the first year of Space Station operation, increasing
to a maximum oT i_13 manhours required in the seventh year of
Station operation. Two cautions go with these estimates. First,
these are only estimates, heavily dependent on guesswork about
missions as far as fifteen years in the future. Second, related
to the first caveat, a "tail-off" phenomenon exists after the
third year of Station operationl indicating that few experimen-
ters and payload sponsors wish to guess about events so far in
the future. This yields what is probably a false tail-off in
required EVA hours in the latter years covered by thm estimates
and causes such estimates as exist to consist heavily of firmness
4 missions, yielding a further reduction due to our weighting
procedure.
Space Station construction time estimates were derived by assig-
ning times based on the Generic 15 Missions to construction tasks
and plans presented in the Space Station Reference Configuration
Description (3SC 19989) and to tasks and plans developed by MDAC
Phase B Space Station personnel for the dual-keel configuration.
The RCD scenario with associated time estimates is shown in Table
2-2 while the dual-keel scenario, with time estimates, is presmnted
in Table 2-3. While Station construction may have significant
impacts on Space Shuttle EVA support requirements, it does not
seem to drive Space Station EVAS requirements, except to the
extent of possibly driving the point at which the Station airlock
is brought up for assembly with the rest of the Station. Other-
wise there is insufficient data to properly integrate SS constru-
ction with the time phased SS EVA mission requirements.
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TABLE 2-2
SPACE STATION ASSEMBLY EVA HOURS
FLIGHT 1
1) ERECT BERTHING STRUCTURE, INSTALL PORT
- 12 STRUTS X 0.1HR
- 1 LARGE MODULE MANIP.
2)
3)
4)
INSTALL RADIATOR PANELS
- 2 PANELS X 3.0 HRS
INSTALL MRMS
- 2 LARGE MODULE MANIP. X 0.5 HR
CHECKOUT MRMS
FLIGHT 2
1)
2)
3)
4)
TOTAL
ERECT KEEL EXTENSION BAYS
- 92 ELEMENTS X 0.1 HRS
- 1 LARGE MODULE MANIP. (MRMS)
INSTALL RADIATOR PANELS
- 1 PANEL X 3.0 HRS
ATTACH KEEL EXTENSION PACKAGE TO RAILS
- 1 LARGE MODULE MANIP. (MRMS)
ATTACH KEEL PACKAGE TO TRANSVERSE BOOM
FLIGHT 3
1) ATTACH HM1 TO KEEL
2)
TOTAL
INSTALL AIRLOCKS
- LARGE MODULE MANIP. X 2 X 0.5 HRS
FLIGHT 4
ATTACH NEW MODULE
MOVE AIRLOCK
INSTALL UPPER KEEL
- LARGE MODULE MANIP.
1)
2)
3)
TOTAL
TOTAL
MDAC
1.2
0.5
6.0
1.0
0.5
9.2
9.2
2.0
3.0
2.0
0.5
16.7
1.0
RCD
O. 67
4.33
1.67
0.5
7.2
2.79
0.51
3.65
1.0
7.95
2.67
0.0
2.67
2.65
0.0
2.17
4.82
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TABLE 2-2
SPACE STATION ASSEMBLY EVA HOURS (CONTINUED)
FLIGHT 5
1) INSTALL SOLAR ARRAY PACKAGE
- 2 X LARGE MODULE MANIP.
2) ATTACH NEW MODULE
FLIGHT 6
1) ATTACH NEW MODULE
FLIGHT 7
1) ATTACH NEW MODULE
MDAC RCD
(MRMS) 4.0 5.07
1.0 0.25
TOTAL 5.0 5.32
TOTAL
TOTAL
IN ADDITION, 42 MORE RADIATOR ELEMENTS MUST
BE INSTALLED BETWEEN FLIGHTS THREE AND FIVE,
INCLUSIVE, FOR A TOTAL OF 21 ADDITIONAL HRS
SPREAD OVER THOSE FLIGHTS.
IOC TOTAL (HRS)
21.0
59.4
2.58
2.58
3.57
36.6
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TABLE 2-3
EVA MANHOURS REQUIRED FOR DUAL KEEL POWER TOWER CONSTRUCTION
9 FOOT DEPLOYABLE
FLIGHT 1
1) INSTALL RADIATOR PANELS
- POWER SYSTEM (1 PANEL)
- OVERHEAD
- GIMBAL, BOOM INSTALLATION
2) ATTACH PACKAGE TO TRUNNIONS
- 1 LARGE MODULE MANIPULATION (SRMS)
3) INSTALL DEPLOYMENT RAILS
4) ATTACH OUTBOARD ARRAYS
- 8 STRUTS (0.2 MHRS/STRUT)
- 1 LARGE MODULE MANIPULATION (SRMS)
5) OBSERVATION/INSPECTION TASKS (3 MIN/BAY)
- ALL AUTO DEPLOY SEQUENCES
- INSPECT 21 DEPLOYABLE BAYS
6) UTILITY TRAYS (45 TRAYS)
- 5 TRAYS (1.0 MHRSITRAY)
TOTAL
FLIGHT 2
1) INSTALL MRMS
- 2 LARGE MODULE MANIPULATIONS (SRMS)
- ATTACH MANIPULATOR BOOM
- CHECKOUT
2) ATTACH KEEL PACKAGES TO TRANSVERSE BOOM
- 2 LARGE MODULE MANIPULATIONS (MRMS)
- 16 STRUTS
3) OBSERVATION/INSPECTION TASKS
- INSPECT 32 DEPLOYABLE BAYS
4) INSTALL RCS MODULES
- 1 MODULE (5.0 MHRSIMODULE)
5) UTILITY TRAYS (45 FT TRAYS)
- 2 TRAYS
- 1 LARGE MODULE MANIPULATION (MRMS)
TOTAL
&.O
2.0
2.0
5.0
u
23.6
1.0
1.0
4.0
1.6
5.0
23.8
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TABLE 2-3
EVA MANHOURS REQUIRED FOR DUAL KEEL POWER TONER CONSTRUCTION
? FOOT DEPLOYABLE (CONTINUED)
FLIGHT 3
1) ATTACH MODULE TO STRUCTURE
- 8 STRUTS
- CONNECT UTILITIES
2) INSTALL RCS MODULES
- 1 MODULE (5.0 MHRSIMODULE)
3) UTILITY TRAYS (45 FT TRAYS)
- 5 TRAYS
- 1 LARGE MODULE MANIPULATION (MRMS)
4) INSTALL RADIATOR PANELS (1.0 MHRSIELEMENT)
- MAIN (7 ELEMENTS)
- OVERHEAD
TOTAL
FLIGHT 4
1) ATTACH UPPER & LOWER BOOM PACKAGES
- 2 LARGE MODULE MANIPULATIONS (MRMS)
- 16 STRUTS
2) OBSERVATION/INSPECTION TASKS
- INSPECT 13 DEPLOYABLE BAYS
3) UTILITY TRAYS (45 TRAYS)
- 2 TRAYS
- 1 LARGE MODULE MANIPULATION (MRMS)
4)
5)
5.0
23.1
0.7
INSTALL ANTENNA BOOMS & ANTENNAS
- 12 STRUTS 2.4
- 2 SMALL MODULE MANIPULATIONS (MRMS) 2.0
- DEPLOY BOOMS (2) 1.0
- MOUNT/ALIGN ? ANTENNAS (1.0 MHRS/ANTENNA) 9.0
(1.0 MHRS/ELEMENT)
TOTAL
INSTALL RADIATOR PANELS
- MAIN (6 ELEMENTS)
- OVERHEAD
TOTAL
FLIGHT 5
NO PLANNED EVR'G
TOTAL
FLIGHT 6
NO PLANNED EVA'S
31.4
0.0
0.0
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TABLE 2-3
EVA MANHOURS REQUIRED FOR DUAL KEEL POWER TOWER CONSTRUCTION
? FOOT DEPLOYABLE (CONTINUED)
FLIGHT 7
1) INSTALL RADIATOR PANELS
- POWER SYSTEM (1 PANEL)
- OVERHEAD
- GIMBAL, BOOM INSTALLION
2) REMOVE FLT 1 DOCKING MECHANISM
- 1 LARGE MODULE MANIPULATION (MRMS)
3) ATTACH OUTBOARD ARRAYS
- 1 LARGE MODULE MANIPULATION (MRMS)
- 8 STRUTS
4) CONNECT TRANSVERSE BOOM HALVES
- 1 LARGE MODULE MANIPULATION (MRMS)
- 8 STRUTS
5) OBSERVATION/INSPECTION TASKS
- INSPECT 19 BAYS
6) UTILITY TRAYS
- 1 LARGE MODULE MANIPULATION (MRMS)
- 5 TRAYS
TOTAL
FLIGHT 8
1) ATTACH KEEL PACKAGES TO TRANSVERSE BOOM
- 2 LARGE MODULE MANIPULATIONS (MRMS)
- 16 STRUTS
2) OBSERVATION/INSPECTION TASKS (3 MIN/BAY)
- INSPECT 31 DEPLOYABLE BAYS
3) INSTALL RCS MODULES
- 2 MODULES (5.0 MHRSITRAY)
4) UTILITY TRAYS (45 FT TRAYS)
- 4 TRAYS (1.0 MHRSITRAY)
- 1 LARGE MODULE MANIPULATION (MRMS)
5) ATTACH MODULE SUPPORT STRUCTURE (AFT)
- 16 STRUTS
- 8 STRUTS (MODULE #3)
6) INSTALL RADIATOR PANELS (1.0 MHRSIELEMENT)
- MAIN (16 ELEMENTS)
- OVERHEAD
TOTAL
6.0
2.0
3.0
1.0
29.2
1.6
10.0
4.0
2.0
16.0
2.0
47.6
2-12
TABLE 2-3
EVA MANHOURS REQUIRED FOR DUAL KEEL POWER TONER CONSTRUCTION
? FOOT DEPLOYABLE (CONTINUED)
FLIGHT ?
1) ATTACH MODULE TO STRUCTURE
- 8 STRUTS
- CONNECT UTILITIES
2) ATTACH UPPER & LONER BOOM PACKAGES
- 2 LARGE MODULE MANIPULATIONS (MRMS)
- 16 STRUTS
3) OBSERVATION/INSPECTION TASKS (3 MINIBAY)
- INSPECT 14 DEPLOYABLE BAYS
4) UTILITY TRAYS (45 FOOT TRAYS)
- 8 TRAYS (1.0 MHRSITRAY)
- 1 LARGE MODULE MANIPULATION (MRMS)
5) INSTALL RADIATOR PANELS (1.0 MHRS/ELEMENT)
- MAIN (4 ELEMENTS)
TOTAL
FLIGHT 10
1) INSTALL ANTENNA BOOMS & ANTENNAS
- 12 STRUTS
- 2 SMALL MODULE MANIPULATIONS
- DEPLOY BOOMS (2)
- MOUNT/ALIGN 9 ANTENNAS
2) INSTALL RADIATOR PANELS (1.0 MHRS/ELEMENT)
- MAIN (10 ELEMENTS)
TOTAL
FLIGHT 11
1) ATTACH MODULE TO STRUCTURE
- 8 STRUTS
- CONNECT UTILITIES
2) INSTALL RADIATOR PANELS (1.0 MHRSIELEMENT)
- MAIN (15 ELEMENTS)
TOTAL
FLIGHT 12
NO PLANNED EVA'S
TOTAL
IOC TOTAL (MHRS)
1.6
0.5
0.7
4.0
24.0
2.4
1.0
1.0
9.0
10.0
24.4
15.0
17.1
0.0
241.2
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Station EVA maintenance requirements were derived in part from
ongoing Phase B studies of on-orbit maintenance requirements.
Estimates of ORU quantities were made for each SS work package,
including allocations of both IVA and EVA ORU°s. Estimates of
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) of I0,000, 20,000, and 30,000
hours were then assumed in order to determine the frequency of
required maintenance activity if all systems were operated to
failure. The Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) for a properly designed
EVA ORU was then defined to be one hour which resulted in the
unscheduled maintenance requirements shown in Figure 2-4.
2.2
2
1.B
1.61°4
5"o
1
SS MAIN. MHRS REQUIRED FOR PMC
MTTIq: L='VA=I MHR; IVA=I MHR
1
0.8
0.6
0.4.
0.2-
0
10000
EVA MHRS
20000
MTBF
IVA MHR5
30000
CORRECTIVE SCHED. GRAND CORRECTIVE 8CKED. GRAND CORRECTIVE
, ..... I0000 ...... ) TOTAL , ..... 20000 ..... > TOTAL c..... 30000 .....
WP ORU'S EVA IrA TOTAL EVA IVA TOTAL EVA IVA TOTAL
NO NO
1 800 188 249 437 800 937 94 124 218 800 718 63 83 146
2 878 362 403 764 878 1639 181 201 382 878 1287 121 134 288
3 780 197 459 655 750 1408 98 229 328 780 1078 66 153 218
4 _78 295 33 328 375 703 147 16 164 375 839 98 11 109
SCHED. GRAND
TOTAL
800 646
878 1130
780 968
378 484
2800 I042 1144 2184 2500 4684 820 870 1092 2800 3892 348 38! 728 2800 3228
Figure 2-4
Total Eva Manhours Required for ORU Replacement
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A second estimate was performed with MTTR defined as three hours.
Th_ results are shown in Figure z-_.
4.5
SS MAIN. MHR5 REQUIRED FOR PMC
MTTR: EVA-,,3 MHRS; IVAml MHR
10000
EVA MHRS"
20000
MTBF"
IVa MHR '¢
30000
CORRECTIVE
,..... I0000 ..... )
IfP NO EVA IVA TOTAL
NO ORU'S
1 500 563 249 812 800 1312 282
2 878 1088 403 1488 878 2363 842
3 780 890 489 1048 780 1789 298
4 378 888 33 917 378 1292 442
SCHED. GRAND CORRECTIVE SCHED. GRAND CORRECTIVE SCHED. GRAND
TOTAL ,..... 20000..... ) TOTAL ,..... 30000 ..... , TOTAL
EVA IVA TOTAL EVA IVA TOTAL
2800 3123 1144 4268 2800 6766 1861
124 406 500 906
201 744 878 1619
229 824 780 1274
16 459 378 834
188 83 271 800 771
362 134 496 878 1371
197 183 349 780 1099
295 11 306 378 681
870 2133 2500 4633 1042 381 1422' 2800 3922
Figure 2-5
Total Eva Manhours Required for ORU Replacement
The number finally chosen to allocate yearly for EVA maintenance,
however, was based on estimating an average of One hour per EVA
ORU per year to reflect the use of scheduled or planned EVA
maintenance to enhance SS maintainability overall. Until system
definition and development proceeds much nearer to completion,
and a more accurate determination including actual failure histo-
ry can be made of systems maintenance requirements, the alloca-
tion of 1192 EVA manhours yearly is a very realistic estimate for
SS maintenance requirements.
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Total required EVA manhours per year were estimated by combining
the above Station maintenance hours with the payload EVA mission
hours presented in Figure 2-3. The result is presented in Figure
2-6.
EVA REQUIREMENTS -- SS CORE (MDAC)
2.B
2.8
2.4.
2.2
1
O.B-
0.8-
0.4.
0.2
TEAR
EVA USER MSN _S
EVA ORU' S mINT.
EVA TOTAL I_RSIYR
EVENTS/YR
EVA HHRS/WK
EVA _s/IrK
92 93 94. 95 98 97 98 99
YEARS
17"71 MSN MHR5 [_ ORU'S MHR5
92 93 94 95 96 97
346 229 700 617
I
O0 01
98 99 O0 O1
552 842 1812 852 562 674
1192 1192 1192 1192 1192 1192 1192
1809 1744 2034 2704 1744 1784 1866
181 146 170 225 146 147 186
35 34 40 52 34 34 36
3 3 4 8 3 3 3
1192 1192 1192
1538 1421 1892
129 119 158
30 28 37
3 3 4
Figure 2-6
Total EVA Missions Plus ORU Manhours
It shows that a minimum requirement of about 1400 manhours
per year in the neighborhood o_ IOC grows to a requirement for
approximately 2700 manhours per year at IOC + 6. Compare this
with the Functional Requirements Envelope (FRE) defined by NASA
in a letter dated 23 May 1985 and presented in Figure 2-7.
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EVA REQUIREMENTS -- SS CORE (FRE)
:::
0.4.o.:
92 93 94. 95 98 97 98 99 00 01
"_-AR5
MSN MHRS _ ORU'S MHRS
_AR
_A USER HSN I_RS
_A ORU' S MJ, INT.
EVA TOTAL HHRS/YR
ZVmlTS/YR
EVA _Rs/lrK
EVA Z'v'_TS/irk
92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01
412 368 462 509 810 915 1504 780 820 794
1192 1192 1192 1192 1192 1192 1192 1192 1192 1192
1604 1560 1654 1701 2002 2107 2692 1972 2012 1986
134 130 138 142 167 176 225 165 168 166
31 30 32 33 39 41 52 38 39 39
3 3 3 3 4 4 5 4 4 4
Figure 2-7
Total EVA Missions Plus ORU Manhours
The FRE corresponds closely to our estimates and either should
suffice to define EVA manhour requirements given current knowledge.
The most significant preliminary conclusion to be drawn from our
EVA manhour requirements data (or the FRE) is that, even with the
stated caveats, the required amount of EVA will far exceed that
which could be provided by the current Shuttle EVAS. In fact, it
quickly approaches EVA crew physiological limits as defined both
by the RCD and by past (Shuttle) EVA experience. This will be
discussed further, below.
2.2 MISSION PRIORITIZATION
As noted above, all customer support missions were prioritized
with respect to firmness of the mission, that is, the probability
that it would actually fly. These estimates of firmness were
derived from conversations with the mission sponsors, in general,
and were usually either equal to a firmness of 3, indicating a
funded misssion in very early stages of development, or a 4,
indicating a customer with a mission, no money, but with some
chance of obtaining money. Some priority 1 and 2 missions were
also noted, indicating operational missions or those scheduled
for launch.
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Missions were also prioritized according to maturity, that is,
maturity of technology required to support that mission. The
prioritization was once again on a scale of from 1 to 5 with a 1
indicating a low level of technological maturity, hence high risk
and much required development, and a 5 indicating operational
technology with no particular (technological) risk associated
with it's use.
Originally, the intention was to sum the above two prioritiza-
tions for each mission to arrive at a single paramater to be used
in ranking the missions from top to bottom. A mission with a low
combined priority number would thus receive the greatest atten-
tion since it had the highest probability of actually occuring
but required the greatest technology development. The lack of
firmness in the mission estimates rendered the contemplated
process useless since most missions had such a low (4 or some-
times 3 rating_ probability of flying. Resources should not be
allocated to missions which may never fly. The dilemma of re-
source allocation was resolved when the mission analyses and
particularly the Generic 15 Tasks were assessed with respect to
our existing data base of EVA knowledge.
2.3 ASSESS REQUIREMENTS AGAINST AN EXISTING DATA BASE
The Space Station EVAS requirements were compared on a task-by-
task basis with current Shuttle EVAS capabilities. The general
conclusion was that all requirements were well within the capabi-
lities of a suited crewmember to perform. That is, no specific
EVAS hardware requirements or capabilities were driven by the
information on missions and tasks which were obtained. Thus, any
reasonable crew enclosure and life support system would probably
provide the crewmember with the capability to perform any single
identified EVA task.
Difficulties arose, however, when the EVAS capabilities were
considered in light of likely 90 day mission models consisting of
many EVA tasks arranged in some probable time schedule. Two
basic problem areas were identified.
First, EVA operational impacts to Shuttle flights could not be
tolerated on the Space Station. This was particularly true in
the case of three specific impacts. The frequent large pressure
changes in cabin atmosphere incurred as a normal part of Shuttle
EVA°s could not be tolerated on the Station with its sensitive
scientific experiments. Similarly, all Station operations could
not be driven by EVA support requirements as they are on the
Shuttle. EVA must be a routine, minimum impact part of day-to-
day Station operations, not a special case requiring maximum
attention from all hands. Finally, the heavy task-specific pre-
launch training encountered in preparing Shuttle crews for EVA
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tasks Nil1 not be possible for Station crewmembers. Too many
nominal and far too many contingency tasks are possible during
the caur_ n4 A 9n flay m'i_4_ n 4- ..... .; ,';__11.. _----- --............. w mH,=,--aTA,--aA_y l.r m-n for_ Lhem on
the ground prior to flight. These operational impacts, then,
require different handling on Space Station than they did on
Shuttle.
The second major difficulty arising from considering the entire
EVA mission model instead of just individual tasks is the problem
of EVAS maintenance. Currently, all EVA equipment undergoes a
maintenance cycle after every flight. For most equipment this
involves an extensive tear-down, test, and component replacement
with subsequent reassembly and complicated test and certification
for re-flight. Such procedures are not possible on the Space
Station due to time, personnel, operational, and material limita-
tions. A stronger emphasis on maintainability in the design
philosophy is thus called for, leading to an EVAS which requires
very little maintenance per hour of operation, fails in a safe
manner when it does fail, and which can be easily and quickly
repaired or serviced when required.
The actual hardware impacts associated with these findings will
be discussed in depth in Section 4 of this report, but the above
considerations constitute the drivers for the requirements embo-
died therein.
2.4 ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS
Partly as a result of the assessment of EVAS requirements against
an existing database of EVA experience and knowledge, and partly
as a result of a dedicated analysis effort based on the Generic
15 Missions and the various mission models, a list of approxima-
tely 120 pieces of EVA ancillary equipment was derived. Table 2-
4 lists the ancillary equipment as it is currently defined.
While this list is felt to be reasonably complete, it will, no
doubt, undergo further refinement as Space Station systems them-
selves become more refined and should in any case be a dynamic,
continually evolving list.
Two broad categories of equipment, Generic Equipment and Special
Equipment were included in the list. Generic Equipment would be
provided as a normal part of the EVAS in standard equipment/tool
kits, arranged most likely into a nominal tool kit and supplemen-
tary kits. Special Equipment would be provided by individual
payload sponsors as required to s_vice their particular pay-
loads, assuming that equipment from the generic kits would not
suffice.
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TABLE 2-4
ANC ILLARY EQU IPMENT
GENERIC ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT
TOOLS
POWER TOOLS
MANUAL WRENCHES
SOCKET SETS
FORCEPS/PLIERS
SCREWDRIVERS
SCREW EXTRACTOR
NUT HANDLER
ALLEN WRENCHES
HAMMERS
TORQUE WRENCHES
SAW WITH DEBRIS COLLECTING BAG
NIBBLER - POWER OR SHEAR
CABLE CUTTERS
BOLT CUTTERS
SURFACE COATING APPARATUS
PAINTING
MIRROR REFINISHING
DRILL AND BITS
WELDING/SOLDERING/BRAZING EQUIPMENT
THERMAL BLANKET CUTTING DEVICE
TUBE CUTTER
PORTABLE HEATER
TUBE BENDERS
SANDER/LARGE GRINDER
SMALL GRINDER
FILES
PRYBAR
GEAR PULLER
RIVET GUN
"AIRCRAFT LINE" CUTTER
LINE SPLICING KIT
CONNECTOR TOOLS
ALIGNMENT AID
CONNECTOR PULLER
PIN STRAIGHTER
DIAGONAL CUTTERS
DE-GAUSSER
CONNECTOR REPLACEMENT KIT
(FOR ELECTRICAL, FLUID LINES)
ELECTRICAL SPLICING KIT
WIRE STRIPPERS/CUTTERS
PIN REPLACEMENT KIT
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TABLE 2-4
RNCILLARY EQUI PMENT (CONTI NUED)
RESTRAINTS/HANDLING AIDS
FOOT RESTRAINT & POSITIONER
PAYLOAD RETENTION DEVICE
RESTRAINT STRAPS
MANIPULATOR FOOT RESTRAINTS
ATTACHABLE/DETACHABLE TETHER POINTS
ATTACHABLE/DETACHABLE HANDRAILS
TETHERS
MODULE TRANSPORT DEVICE
EQUIPMENT TRANSFER BOOM
TEMPORARY STOWAGE FIXTURES
"CAPTURE NET" FOR TUMBLING SATELLITIES
STRUCTURAL CLAMPS & BRACES
GUIDE RAILS FOR POSITIONING
MATERIALS
GUY WIRES
ADHESIVE TAPE
THERMAL INSULATION KIT (BLANKETS & SPRAY-ON)
THERMAL COVER REPLACEMENT KIT
SUN SHADES FOR TANKS
GASKET & SEAL MAKING KIT
TIE WRAP KIT
CABLE RESTRAINT TAPE
ID TAGS FOR CABLES
STRAIN RELIEF MOUNT EQUIPMENT
TEFLON TARE
POTTING COMPOUND
ACCESSORIES
TOOL BOARD
GARBAGE BAGS
LIGHTS - HELMENT & FLOODLIGHTS
COVERALL/APRONS & GLOVE PROTECTORS
MAGNIFIER
CARRYALL BAG
CLOTH WIPES/RAGS
"DROP CLOTH" FOR WELDING/INSTRUMENT PROTECTION
CONTAMINATION CLEANUP KIT
HEAT SINK
2-21
TABLE 2-4
ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT (CONTINUED)
SENSORS
INSPECTION/CRACK DETECTION EQUIPMENT
"DYE PENETRANTS", X-RAY
UV LIGHTS
BORE SIGHTS & INSPECTION MIRRORS
TV CAMERAS_ HELMET & PORTABLE
VIBRATION & THERMAL SENSORS
STILL CAMERAS
LEAK DETECTOR
ELECTRICAL TEST INSTRUMENTS
SPECIAL ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT
TOOLS
WALDOES FOR RADIOISOTOPE HANDLING
SPECIFIC MODULE SERVICING TOOLS
JAM JACK
LINE PURGE KIT
GASKET & SEAL MAKING KIT
TOXIC SUBSTANCE FILL KIT
FLUID SAMPLE COLLECTION KIT
RESTRAINTS/HANDLING AIDS
SATELLITE FSS W/TURNTABLES PLUS POWER & MANUAL CRANKS
HANDLING FIXTURES (FOR RADIATORS,ETC)
GRAPPLE DEVICE FOR SATELLITE PICKUP
MATERIALS
SPACE QUALIFIED "LOCTITE '°
LUBRICANTS
JOINT UNFREEZER "LIQUID WRENCH"
STRUCTURAL/MECHANICAL REPAIR KIT
INCLUDING COMPOSITES REPAIR KIT
EPOXIES
STRUCTURAL FITTING REPLACEMENT
FABRIC PATCH KIT
ALIGNMENT MAKER
VENT LINES/PORTABLE PLUMBING
LINE CAPS
LEAK PATCH KITS
CLEANERS
SPRAY ON
PREPREG
WIPES
ELECTRICAL INSULATION MATERIAL
SENSORS
ALIGNMENT INSTRUMENTATION
(FOR OPTICS, ANTENNASv ETC)
HYDRAZINE/TOXIC SUBSTANCE DETECTOR
PRESSURE GAUGES/PRESS INTEGRITY CHECK KIT
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It should be noted that the ancillary equipment list currently
contains both off-the-shelf hardware and hardware requiring va-
rious amounts of development...n_--_=,, =- significant portion of
such hardware development consists solely of making an otherwise
off-the-shelf item compatible with EVA operations. As a general
guideline in EVA operations design, it is desirable to minimize
new hardware development by avoiding the use of Special Equipment
and by maximizing the use of the Generic Equipment already pro-
vided. However, the primary emphasis should be on minimizing
all loose equipment (Generic or Special) by proper design of the
subject equipment's interface with the EVAS. For instance, use
of captured butterfly latches on access ports is much to be
preferred over the use of bolts or screws requiring wrenches or
screwdrivers. While wrenches and screwdrivers are very much off-
the-shelf equipment, the butterfly latch dispenses with all loose
equipment (insofar as it's own operation is concerned) and is
therefore better than bolts and screws requiring tools to operate
them.
2.5 DOD EVA REQUIREMENTS
DOD EVA requirements were coordinated through the USAF Space
Division in E1Segundo, California. The DOD has no current mis-
sion specific EVA requirements but it is expected that such
requirements will arise in the future. Instead, the DOD has
expressed twelve "concerns" which it believes must be addressed
by the EVAS in order for it to be usable on defense-related
missions. These twelve concerns are detailed in Table 2-5.
Eleven of these concerns are already included as considerations
in the Space Station EVA study. The twelth concern - an expres-
sed desire for a two minute EMU don/doff capability - is not a
requirement for the Space Station EVAS. If this is an actual DOD
requirement, it may necessitate a separate crew enclosure design
and possibly a separate life support subsystem design from that
envisioned for the Space Station. It was suggested that this
capability for rapid don/doff might be used in conjunction with a
transatmospheric vehicle for scramble and launch from a conven-
tional runway. If this is so, it should be noted that the Space
Station EMU has no requirement to bear multiple-g loading and may
be unsuitable for such activities.
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TABLE 2-5
DOD SPACE SUIT ISSUES STATEMENT
MOBILITY
GLOVE/SUIT MOBILITY AND TACTILE SENSITIVITY MUST BE
SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED
MAINTAINABILITY
THE SUIT SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF USE ON EXTENDED DURATION
ORBITAL MISSIONS, TO INCLUDE EASE OF MAINTENANCE AND
RAPID RESIZING
RADIATION PROTECTION
EVA CREW MEMBERS SHOULD BE OFFERED AT LEAST THE SAME
PROTECTION AGAINST RADIATION AS THE CREW MEMBERS WHO
REMAIN INSIDE
STATIC CHARGING HAZARD
SUITS MUST BE RESISTANT TO THE EFFECTS OF SUDDEN
ELECTROSTATIC DISCHARGES ENCOUNTERED IN HIGH
INCLINATION ORBITS AND NOT BE SUBJECT TO STATIC
CHARGE BUILDUP
IMMEDIATE EVA CAPABILITY
NEITHER AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF REDUCED CABIN PRESSURE NOR
PROTRACTED PREBRETHING SHOULD BE REQUIRED PRIOR TO EVA
CONTAMINATION
THE EVA SYSTEM SHALL NOT BE A SOURCE OF CONTAMINANTS
SIZING
RESIZING SHALL BE RAPID AND SIMPLE AND SHALL BE
ACCOMPLISHED VIA MINIMUM OF COMPONENT SIZES
HEADS-UP DISPLAY {HUD)
THE EMU SHOULD BE EQUIPPED WITH A HEADS UP DISPLAY FOR
PRODUCTIVITY ENHANCEMENT
MICROMETEOROID PROTECTION
PROTECTION FROM MICROMETEORIOD IMPACTS SHOULD BE AN
INHERENT FEATURE OF THE SUIT
COMFORT
THE SUIT SHOULD PROVIDE TEMPERATURE, HUMIDITY, FIT AND
FUNCTIONAL COMFORT
CONTINGENCY TRANSLATION AIDS
A CONTINGENCY TRANSLATION AID AS AN INHERENT SUIT FEATURE
FEATURE COULD CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCTION OF THE NEEDS FOR TETHERS
DONNING AND DOFFING
SPACE SUITS FOR DOD MISSIONS SHOULD BE DONNABLE IN LESS
THAN TWO MINUTES
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CONCLUSIONS
The central conclusion of the mission requirement survey is that,
while mission data base detail is insufficient for accurate
determination of specific task requirements, all EVA mission
requirements can be described in terms of the Generic 15 EVA
Missions. Because of this, it is felt that the capability to
accomplish the 15 Generic EVA Missions is mandatory and should be
the focus of future work until such time as greater mission
specific detail is available.
A second key conclusion is that, while individual tasks can be
accomplished by any suited crewmember, the current Shuttle EVAS
would not be satisfactory when examined in the light of the
overall mission model. Current EVAS impacts on shuttle opera-
tions could not be tolerated on the Space Station, both in the
area of EVA operations and in the area of EVAS servicing and
maintenance. Therefore, a much improved EVA System must be pro-
vided for the Space Station.
A final conclusion, based on the overall mission model, is that,
while a two man EVA crew will suffice for the first years of
Space Station operations, within four to six years of Station IOC
a four man EVA crew will be required.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The EVAS should be designed so that EVA time is crew limited,
not hardware limited.
2. The capability should be developed to perform all 15 Generic
Missions including development of all Generic Ancillary Equip-
ment.
3. The EVAS must be maintainable on-orbit with continuous
operations for 90 days on a 50X duty cycle as a minimum.
4. All payload sponsors should be made familiar with the 3SC
10&15A document and be encouraged to to use it in their design
efforts. For time estimate purposes, they should be made fami-
liar with the Generic 15 Missions.
5. All payload sponsors should be provided with a Generic Tool
Kit description and a Specialized Tool Kit description. They
should be encouraged to use a design requiring minimal loose
equipment with such equipment as required being chosen from the
Generic Tool Kit if possible. They should be encouraged to
identify any required specialized tools as quickly as possible.
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SECTION 3
EVA OPERATIONS OVERVIEW
INTRODUCTION
In order to develop realistic design requirements_ a general
understanding of EVA operations is necessary. EVA by its very
nature provides the flexibility to change the way we operate in
space on a day-to-day basis_ but certain functions are required
to be performed regardless. The following discussion covers what
we believe to be the key elements of any EVA operation from a
mature Space Station. The details are, of course_ subject to
change as the design and operating philosophy mature_ but these
key elements will remain in one form or another.
3.1 PLANNING/SCHEDULING: EVA tasks to be performed are sched-
uled by the master crew scheduling system, along with any other
CIV) tasks to be performed for a particular day. Tasks are
prioritized according to criticality, proximity to one another,
launch windows, etc., then a group of tasks is selected to be
performed in the course of an EVA event. EVA is nominally sched-
uled to be conducted during the 9 orbits/day which do not pass
through the South Atlantic Anomaly in the Van Allen radiation
belts. At least two crewmembers on each shift have been trained
to perform EVA, allowing mission planners maximum flexibility.
3.2 EVAS HARDWARE: Each EVA crewmember normally is assigned an
Extravehicular Manned Unit (EMU) consisting of a Life Support
System and Crew Enclosure, and is responsible to insure that all
required checks have been performed on his unit prior to EVA,
whether manually or automatically. On-orbit resizing capability
is required in order to permit changes in crewmember/EMU assign-
ment, changes in sizing preference, and maintainability (modu-
larity_ of the EMU crew enclosure joints, but resizing is not
normally accomplished on a routine basis. Four complete EMUs
(1/crewmember, 2 crewmembers/shift) will provide the flexibility
and redundancy needed to support the number of EVA hours predic-
ted.
3.3 TYPICAL EVA SCENARIO: Table 3-1 presents a typical EVA
timeline with events and event times listed. Major divisions of
the EVA scenario/timeline are discussed in greater detail below.
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3.3.1 PRE-EVA: The EVA crewmember dons his cooling garment and
waste collection device(s) in his personal quarters, much as a
workman on earth decides when he gets up whether to wear work
clothes or a business suit for a particular day's activities.
The day's mission is reviewed among the crew and/or ground sup-
port personnel. Checks equivalent to preflight inspection of an
aircraft are performed on the EMU. These checks consist primari-
ly of confirmation of completion of servicing (battery recharge,
C02 media regeneration or replacement, heat sink regeneration or
recharge, and oxygen recharge) s followed by a visual inspection
of the hardware. Each EMU has an associated "logbook" in the
Station Data Management System (DMS) which keeps track of accumu-
lated time on the EMU components as well as any minor anomalies
which do not preclude system operation, but may possibly cause
degraded performance of one or more subsystems. This "logbook"
is also reviewed as a part of the checks. Functional checks are
performed in conjunction with system donning and activation,
assuming no major maintenance has been performed since the last
use. If any of these checks reveal a condition which cannot be
corrected on the spot, the EVA is postponed unless it is time-
critical, in which case a spare EMU is utilized for that particu-
lar EVA event, with the failed unit being restored to an opera-
tional condition in one duty cycle or less (approximately two
days initially, one day or perhaps even one shift as the tempo of
operations picks up in later years).
3.3.2 EVA: The conduct of the EVA consists of some amount of
overhead--translation to worksite, trash stowage, etc.--and per-
formance of some combination of the generic EVA tasks/missions
identified in section 2 for a total time at reduced pressure up
to 7 hours, with up to 6 hours of that being dedicated to useful
EVA tasks. (An additional hour of reserve capacity is available
from the Life support System, but this capability is not normally
used except in an emergency.) Translation requirements can be
satisfied by a number of approaches (hand-over-hand, propulsion,
"dumbwaiter" or trolley concepts, etc.); flexibility can be most
enhanced by not precluding any of these methods. For example, a
trolley is likely the most efficient means of translation along a
keel, while access to solar panels or the like for inspection,
and especially rendezvous with/retrieval of free-fliers will
require some sort of maneuvering propulsion. Upon arrival at the
worksite, restraint is required for the crewmember and for any
tools or other ancillary equipment in use. Permanent worksta-
tions will be provided in areas of intensive EVA activity, proba-
bly along with Station services such as power, hardline communi-
cations, and cooling. Some sort of portable, temporary worksta-
tion will be required which attaches to most any part of the
Station, probably to the truss structure9 for use in areas which
do not have prepared worksites.
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3.3.3 POST-EVA: After repressurization of the airlock and EMU
doffing, the crewmember initiates recharge and perform_ a visual
inspection of the EMU. The recharge systems located in the
airlock automatically shut off upon completion of the recharge.
Optionally, this recharge can be accomplished by module replace-
ment to enable rapid turnaround of the EVAS.
TABLE 3-1
EVA TIMELINE
ITEM TITLE DURATION
B 15
C 30 (2)
A PRE-BRIEF AND EQUIP PREP (INCL. 60 MINUTES
RECHARGE VERIFICATION)
SUIT DONNING, CHECKOUT & PURGE(5)
PREBREATHE(2) AND COMMUNICATIONS
CHECKS
D (ENTER AIRLOCK) CLOSE HATCH 2
E DEPRESS AIRLOCK (INCL. LEAK CHECK) 10
F OPEN OUTER HATCH 2
G EGRESS AIRLOCK 2
H TRANSLATE TO EQUIP STOWAGE 5
I UNSTOW EQUIPMENT, CHECKOUT 15
J FEVA TIME AVAILABLE TO USERS(&) 7 360 MINUTES
L J
RESTOW EQUIPMENT
(E8 MISCELLANEOUS STO TRASH)
TRANSLATE TO AIRLOCK
ENTER AIRLOCK
CLOSE HATCH
REPRESS AIRLOCK
DOFF SUITS
STOW EQUIPMENT, INITIATE
RECHARGE
K 15
L 10
M 5
N 5
0 2
P 5
Q 15
R 3O
NOTES:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
1
TOTAL
528
#
I
iiJ.iI
NOTE
ALL TIMES IN MINUTES TO BE MULTIPLIED X 2 FOR MAN-MINUTES
WITH POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF ITEMS A & R.
PREBEATHETIME VARIABLE, DEPENDS ON EMU OPERATING PRESSURE.
TOTAL TIME AT REDUCED PRESSURE IS 481MIN (8 HRS)
(INCLUDES ADD'L TIME ON 100% 02 WHICH TOTALS 8.55 HRS).
TOTAL GENERIC OVERHEAD TIME/EVA EVENT IS 168 MIN (81MIN +
87 MIN) (2.8 HRS).
OXYGEN PURGE WILL BE PERFORMED TO NORMOXIC LEVEL (NOT
NECESSARILY 100% 02).
SIX HOURS/MAN IS CONSIDERED DELIVERABLE FOR USERS, SS MAINT., ETC.
T
NOTE
4
NOTE
4
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3.4 TRAINING CONCEPTS
Considering the sheer number of EVA hours required annually and
the necessity of devising operational techniques and procedures
between infrequent Shuttle flights, the impact of extensive
mission-specific ground training associated with STS EVA clearly
cannot be tolerated for Station operations. The following
training philosophy is therefore recommended.
3.4.1 GENERIC TRAINING (ground): EVA crewmembers receive
training roughly equivalent to that provided for STS flights
without a planned EVA. This is currently broken into two
distinct areas:
0 System operation fundamentals such as activation and
troubleshooting of the Primary Life Support Subsystem
CPLSS), donning/doffing of the Space Suit Assembly (SSA),
and activation, piloting techniques and troubleshooting of
the Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU). Normal servicing and
maintenance tasks are taught as a logical outgrowth of this
training.
0 Performance of certain identified contingency EVA tasks
required for safe return of the Orbiter after a given set of
failures. Corrective actions for these failures, however
credible, provide practice in the required basic skills such
as position maintenance, translation, teamwork, and tether
protocols, as well as familiarization with mobility
limitations associated with pressure suits.
3.4.2 TASK SPECIFIC TRAINING: This training will be conducted
on-orbit, primarily by the use of OJT. Unusually complex tasks
may require special augmentation via video/CAI presentations, but
for the most part rely on an awareness of EVA considerations
during the design of the component/payload or during mission
planning to enable application of generic training to the
particular task.
3.4.3 RECURRENT TRAINING: Emergency procedures and system
refresher training will need to be conducted regularly in order
to ensure maximum crewmember proficiency and safety. This is
partially a subset of task-specific training, in that rescue of
an incapacitated EVA crewmember, for instance, differs only in
criticality, not in task performance, from the translation of any
large object or module. System emergency procedures training
could best be accomplished by use of the EVAS DMS in concert with
the Station DMS to simulate various system failures.
3.5 MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS
On-orbit maintenance of the EVAS is, for all practical purposes,
completely new ground for the U. S. space program. The
relatively short duration of missions to date, along with the
relatively small number of EVA hours required and the philosophy
that EVA is a backup to other methods of mission accomplishment,
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have relegated on-orbit maintainability to the status of an
unnecessary luxury, one that we could ill afford in an era of
decreasing NASA budgets_ With the dependence expected to
rightfullybe placed on EVA for mission accomplishment in the
Station environment, on-orbit maintainability ceases to be a
luxury and becomes instead an absolute necessity. Incorporation
of maintainability features in the EVAS at the outset not only
increases the probability of success for any payload exterior to
the pressurized compartments of the Station, but provides a
built-in capability to upgrade the system as will inevitably be
required after well-meaning (and in all likelihood, necessary)
budget cutting at the front end of the program forces acceptance
of a less than optimum initial configuration. This issue is
discussed in more detail in 4.0.2.1 MAINTAINABILITY.
3.5.1 SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE: For STS, scheduled maintenance has
consisted of approximately 3000 hours of ground turnaround
between each mission. This will have to be reduced to no more
than annual refurbishment of systems, and ideally to repairing
only inoperative components. There is no apparent reason why the
hardware should not continue to operate indefinitely, just as
aircraft continue to provide reliable service after many years of
operation.
3.5.2 UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE: Provisions will have to be made
aboard the Station to troubleshoot the EVAS and to isolate
failures to the ORU level. Definition of this level is premature
at this point, as it is circularly dependent on system design,
which in turn depends on ORU level definition. This iterative
process is best accomplished during the preliminary design phase.
Considerations will include tool requirements for disassembly of
components, cleanliness requirements, crew training, and many
others. As a general rule, design of any system should not
preclude any subcomponent being designated as an ORU unless this
unnecessarily complicates design or increases cost (procurement
or operations).
3.5.3 MAINTENANCE DOCUMENTATION:
The Documentation System ("logbooks") has access terminals at all
maintenance locations (primarily the airlock).
The EVAS components (crew enclosure, life support system,
propulsion system, and support equipment) are subdivided into
ORUs, at which level all maintenance documentation will be
recorded.
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The data compiled on the ORUs will be:
o Date of initial use
o Operating hours since last maintenance
o Maintenance performed/date/operating hours
o Performance capability
BREEN = Spec or better
AMBER = Degraded but adequate for use
RED = Terminate use till ripaired
o Comments relative to ORU performance.
o Next scheduled maintenance
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SECTION 4
EVAS BASELINE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS AND CONCEPTS
INTRODUCTION
4.0.1 BACKGROUND
The basic configuration of the EVAS is driven by the environment.
That is, any configuration developed will have to provide life
support environmental protection, and probably propulsion.
The configuration and system sizing are driven by operational _
considerations. The intent of this portion of the study was to
provide traceability of design requirements to these operational
considerations. This proved to be a much more difficult task
than we originally thought, and research indicates that this has
traditionally been the case at this stage of a program.
0 For Space Station, the missions listed in the Langley
Mission Data Base are ill-defined (understandably so
considering their level of maturity_.
0 Similar studies for STS predicted one or two EVAs a year.
As seen in 1984 and 1985, these predictions turned out to be
much lower than what was actually conducted, primarily because
the flexibility and utility of EVA was recognized and applied,
often on short notice, with a near-perfect success rate.
0 For Skylab, these studies predicted a total of about 28
hours of EVA, then the actual numbers turned out to be
approximately triple that. Again, the flexibility and
utility of EVA was responsible for many unforeseen mission
enhancements as well as the initial saving of the Skylab
vehicle itself.
It has been shown then that the advantage of manned EVA is not
expressed as some quantifiable number, but is primarily the pre-
sence of man9 enabling the following tasks to be performed more
efficiently than with present-day machines:
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0
0
0
0
Sense/detect minimum amounts of visual and acoustical
stimuli
Recognize interpret patterns of light and sound
Improvise and use flexible procedures
Store large amounts of information over long periods and
recall relevant facts at appropriate times
Reason inductively
Exercise judgment
4.0.2 KEY ISSUES
In trying to maximize the advantage from having a man present, we
must enhance his flexibility at every opportunity. In doing
this_ several issues come to light. They issues cross functional
lines and as such will be discussed as overall EVAS issues.
4.0.2.1 MAINTAINABILITY: Modularity and accessibility of EVAS
components may not in itself be the most important factor in
design_ but when one considers the flexibility and capability
provided_ they move immediately to the top of the priority list.
0 Provides for ORU removal and replacement as required by
the RFP and by an analysis of the sheer quantity of EVA
required between resupply.
0 Allows for growth by individual subsystem or component
upgrades:
o The area of most concern with respect to technology
readiness is the development of pressure suit gloves which
can operate at the higher pressures anticipated for Space
Station EVA operations while still providing acceptable
mobility. The interface between the gloves and the suit
arms has long been standardized and as such permits easy
incorporation of any concepts developed. This example could
apply equally well to the various large suit joint
development programs by deciding early to standardize the
interfaces. (The design of each particular joint should be
determined by the Phase B/C/D contractor.)
o While regenerable C02 removal system technology may
very well have problems achieving the required level of
maturity in order to be incorporated in the EVAS at IOC_ the
logistics advantages leave little doubt that provisions
should be made for its eventual incorporation. This would
consist of allowing sufficient volume clearance in the Life
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0Support System and standardizing interfaces--inlet, outlet,
_--_ ...... _- _..... "ing, L--_ ....A,,=_,_,,,=,,_=_u,,, _uuA _uw_r----u_Heen the _VM_.....LSS and
whatever C02 removal system is employed.
o Regenerable heat storage/rejection systems are
relatively simple by comparison to C02 removal, but they
still require more volume than a sublimator of equal
capacity. Advances in this technology will probably result
in components of lesser mass and volume for the same
or increased capability. If a conductive interface is
provided from the heat transport system to the heat sink,
upgrading the system would be as simple as replacing a
defective module, or inserting a freshly recharged module to
allow EVA with short turnaround.
Allows temporary fall-back position in the event of funding
cuts or technical problems in any of the advancing
technologies mentioned by simply incorporating current
technology (LiOH, sublimator, gloves, etc.).
4.0.2.2 DEGREE OF SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTEGRATION: This issue
is closely related to maintainability and frequently competes
with it. In most cases, it seems that maintainability is the key
issue and should take priority.
NOTE: This applies to the functional breakdown, not necessarily
the physical arrangement. For instance, in all likelihood, the
communications system will be located in a backpack, but will _
have no functional interface with the LSS also resident in the
backpack.
The most appropriate functional breakdown appears to be:
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Life Support--discussed in section 4.1
Environmental Protection--discussed in section 4.2
Mobility--discussed in section 4.3
Communication--discussed in section 4.4
Data Management--discussed in section 4.5
Propulsion--discussed in section 4.6
Crewmember Support Functions--discussed in section 4.7
4.0.2.3 AUTONOMY: Autonomy of the EVA crewmember from the
Station and of the Station from the ground carries a host of
benefits to productivity, along with some challenges to maintain
safety and reliability of the crewmembers and systems.
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Generally, autonomy of the EVA crewmember from the Station re-
lieves the IV crewmember of his traditional EVA support role,
increasing his productivity by freeing him to perform other
(unrelated) tasks.
Autonomy of the Station from the ground reduces cost and manpower
expenditures associated with providing real-time ground support.
It also eliminates orbit track dependence to enable ground commu-
nications coverage during EVA, allowing operations schedulers to
plan EVA for the time optimum to the task and crew schedule.
4.0.2.4 ACCEPTABLE PHYSIOLOGICAL (BENDS) RISK: Much has been
said in recent months about what constitutes acceptable cabin/EVAS
pressure combinations. Unfortunately, the fact remains that
little is known about the phenomenon of altitude bends other than
it seems to be related to the ratio of alveolar nitrogen partial
pressure to final EVAS pressure. One study even suggests that
intermediate prebreathe times (less than 3 hours) have no practi-
cal effect on ppN2 in the connective tissues normally responsible
for limb bends, with 4-5 hours required to achieve complete
protection. This is because the blood flow through these tissues
is intermittent, not continuous as with muscle and other tissues.
Even less is known about the long-term effects of regular expo-
sure to pressure changes over the course of years. Because of
the lack of hard data in this area, the risk should be minimized
to the point of excluding the possibility of bends during nominal
EVA operations. For the sea level pressure selected during the
Phase B RUR process, this would mean an EVAS pressure > 65 kPa
(9.5 psi).
For productivity's sake, suit pressure and cabin pressure should
both be as low as possible commensurate with fire hazards, exper-
iment requirements, etc.
Regardless of the cabin pressure and ppN2/p(EVA) ratio selected,
zero prebreathe should be the operational baseline, again for the
sake of productivitys but primarily because any other prebreathe
requirement depends on analysis which is inexact at best.
4.0.2.5 NOMINAL AND MAXIMUM LENGTH OF EVA: Consideration was
given to physiological and psychological, operations, and hard-
ware design considerations in defining these requirements. An-
ticlimactically, the capabilities and constraints listed in the
Phase B RFP and Reference Configuration seem to be as nearly
accurate as any we were able to develop through literature
searches, human factors analyses, and interviews with past EVA
crewmembers. Table 4-1 shows the recommended requirements.
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TABLE 4-1
:u_ Hna_:_ D=DIITDCMCMT: =rid EVAS :VCTCM n=:Tr_-ka
SCHEDULING/PLANNING MAXIMUM
CONTINGENCY DAILY MAXIMUM
LOGISTICS PLANNING
6 hours available to users per
crewmember per EVA event
3 EVA events per week
(human limits)
8 hours total EVA per crewmember
(recommended hardware limit
includes reserve capacity--i.e.,
only contingency life support
functions are left after 8 hours
of nominal EVA)
3 two-man EVA events per week until
further definition of mission
requirements is available
4.0.2._ ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY: Many areas of EVAS design and
operations stand to benefit greatly from high technology programs
under way by NASA and industry. However, we must not lose sight
of the fact that the program is committed to permanently man a
Space Station (including the EVAS) within budget, which elimi-
nates use of Space Station funds to advance technology for its
own sake. Thorough analysis is being performed by a number of
organizations, including this study, to identify needs and requi-
rements! we must use this analysis to assist in properly priori-
tizing advanced technology programs for the Space Station era to
best use the limited funds available. A discussion of specific
technology areas and recommendations is in Section 4.8.
4.0.3 SUMMARY
It appears that the correct approach to defining EVAS design
requirements is not to try to trace the design requirements to
specific mission requirements, but to strive to provide the
maximum flexibility in order to enable future operations plan-
ners, design engineers_ and most of a11 EVA crewmembers to apply
the advantages of human presence with minimum restrictions. The
remainder of this section will be based on this premise.
4-5
4.1 LIFE SUPPORTREQUIREMENTS
The Life Support System (LSS) must provide pressurization, pres-
sure control, breathing oxygen, atmosphere revitalization, and
thermal control to support a crewmember in Low Earth Orbit (LEO)
space vacuum during performance of tasks identified in Section 2.
KEY ISSUES:
The following issues apply to all LSS subsystems.
REDUNDANCY: Volume and weight constraints have traditionally
precluded extensive application of redundancy in EVA systems
design. Relaxation of these constraints to some degree for the
Space Station suggests that this philosophy be reexamined. For
instance, it may be prudent to provide two or more primary oxygen
systems instead of a backup (not redundant) secondary oxygen
system.
In any case, no single, credible failure should result in the
loss of a critical function (though it may possibly result in
function degradation and/or premature termination of EVA). For
this discussion, critical functions consist of all life support
functions, environmental protection, mobility, and possibly (de-
pending on particular mission profile) communication, data man-
agement, and propulsion.
VOLUMEVS. TIME AVAILABLE: While a smaller LSS volume will
always increase EVA productivity by some amount, the dimensions
are not the absolute constraint they were for STS (i.e., require-
ment for the STS EVAS to fit through the Shuttle interdeck access
passage), allowing incorporation of a larger volume backpack for
Station if required.
Alternatively, operation of the EVAS at the higher suit pressures
contemplated reduces overhead time associated with each EVA event,
and therefore could allow decreasing EVA time available (volume)
without significant penalty.
These options should be traded by the Phase B contractors to
determine the optimum duration for EVA, but from a purely produc-
tivity standpoint it appears that the additional volume required
is well worth the operational flexibility gained from extending
potential EVA time available, so productive EVA time should not
be limited to less than 6 hours without recharge (does not in-
clude system time requirements for generic overhead or contingency
reserve. See Table 4-1).
4.1.1 PRESSURIZATION/PRESSURE CONTROL REQUIREMENTS
The most important single function provided by the EVAS is main-
tenance of pressure consistent with physiological requirements.
This means that the pressure must be maintained at a level high
enough to minimize possibility of decompression sickness without
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requiring much (ideally, zero) prebreathe. At the same time,
ppU2 must not exceed established oxygen toxicity limits and total
suit pressure must allow for adequate suit mobility. The range
of physiologically acceptable pressures ranges from 26 kPa (3.7
psi) of pure oxygen to 101 kPa (14.7 psi) of air. With the Space
Station Program decision to baseline the cabin at 101 kPa (14.7
psi), we feel the best compromise between mobility and decompres-
sion sickness prevention is to nominally operate the EVAS at 66 kPa
(9.5 psi), with an initial pp02 of 22 kPa (3.2 psi). Capability
should be provided for on-orbit adjustments of this pressure down
to 30 kPa (4.3 psi) to allow increased mobility/tactility with
prebreathing. The pressure would then be maintained by introducing
02 to make up for metabolic use and leakage. As shown in Figure
4-1 below, this results in a slow buildup of oxygen partial
pressure during the course of EVA, but a survey of experts in the
field indicates that these pp02 profiles represent a minimal
danger to the EVA crewmember considering the limited exposure
(6-8 hours, three times a week).
7O
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FIGURE 4-1
02 BUILDUP USING A PASSIVE TWO-GAS PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM
Loss of pressure produces an immediate life-threatening situa-
tion; as such, same level of redundancy is mandatory. The most
logical approach is one similar to the Shuttle vehicle which uses
two automatic, parallel, redundant systems along with the capabi-
lity of manually manipulating the configuration. A simple, re-
liable backup could then be provided which would permit the
crewmember to manually regulate the pressure as long as the LSS
has pressurant available. See Figure 4-2.
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PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM
Complete loss of one of the automatic systems would no doubt
require the termination of the EVA due to operational considera-
tions, but would not endanger the crewmember.
4.1.2 BREATHING OXYGEN REQUIREMENTS
Breathing oxygen must be provided to support six hours of produc-
tive EVA, plus two hours of overhead reserve, plus contingency
return to a pressurized module within 45 minutes with a leak rate
of 6 kg/hr (approximate flow rate through a Shuttle EMU DCM purge
valve with a back pressure of 66 kPa).
Storage of this oxygen at 6 MPa (900 psi) as in the STS primary
oxygen system would require an exorbitant amount of volume. At
the same time, the 40 MPa (6000 psi) used in the STS Secondary
Oxygen Pack is best avoided due to safety and processing con-
terns.
By storing the oxygen at an intermediate pressure such as 20 MPa
(3000 psi), volume of such a system can be kept to roughly the
combined volume of the primary and secondary oxygen systems of
the Shuttle EMU. This is roughly the pressure and volume used in
most modern SCUBA systems, whose technology is too mature to be
dismissed out of hand.
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4.1.3 ATMOSPHEREREVITALIZATION REQUIREMENTS
The LSS must control C02, humidity, odor, and particulates to
acceptable levels.
C02: The logistics advantages of regenerable systems make their
eventual inclusion highly desirable, so provisions should be made
to not preclude solid amine or electrochemical regeneration sys-
tems. Standard interfaces will easily enable the use of LiOH
(much smaller volume) in the interim if necessary.
HUMIDITY: Depending on the C02 control media selected, this may
or may not be a separate concern. For example, the Solid Amine
module also serves as a desiccant. Until such an approach is
selected, however, the humidity removal system should be treated
separately in keeping with the philosophy espoused in 4.0.2.2,
DEGREE OF SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTEGRATION. This will probably
mean at least provisions for condensation and mechanical (centri-
fugal) humidity removal as in the Shuttle EMU.
ODOR: Odor is best controlled by use of activated charcoal in a
replaceable filter module. This module is envisioned to be a
subcomponent of the C02 removal module. If LiOH is used, the
filter is changed after each EVA along with the LiOH. If a
regenerable system is used, the charcoal bed will need to be
changed out separately on a regular basis, or regenerated using
a separate system.
PARTICULATES: Employ a mechanical filter module in the same
manner as the odor filter, possibly as a combined module.
4.1.4 THERMAL CONTROL REQUIREMENTS
The system must collect, then store and/or reject metabolic,
system-generated, and environmental heat loads. Sufficient LSS
volume should be allocated to permit use of a Phase Change Module
(PCM), with a conductive interface to the heat transport system
which does not preclude use of a sublimator in the interim.
Post flight comments from several EVA crewmembers recently have
indicated that a heating capability would be desirable in addi-
tion to the cooling provided. Since the Station environment is
generally colder than the Shuttle payload bay environment, addi-
tional study should be performed by the Phase B contractors to
ascertain the correct values for environmental heat loads, and if
favorable, consideration should be given to allowing heat to leak
out of the crew enclosure, then transport excess LSS heat to the
crew enclosure instead of transporting it from the crew enclosure
to the LSS for storage/rejection.
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4.2 ENVIRONMENTALPROTECTION
In order to allow for effective EVA operations from the Space
Station, the EVA crewmember must be protected from the surroun-
ding environment:
0 RADIATION: The EVAS must provide adequate radiation
protection to allow the EVA crewmember to remain within
total exposure limits for Space Station. Section 4.2.1.
0
0
MECHANICAL DANGERS: The EMU must provide reasonable
protection against micrometeoroids, space debris, and
impacts with sharp corners and edges. Section 4.2.2.
ATOMIC OXYGEN: The EVAS must protect itself from the
material degradation effects of atomic oxygen. Section
4.2.3.
0 STATIC CHARGING: The EVAS must protect itself and the
crewmember from static charging effects. Section 4.2.4.
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4.2.1 RADIATION
Space radiation is a key factor in the consideration of EVA
operations from the Space Station. The majority of the radiation
exposure accumulates during vehicle passage through the South
Atlantic Anomaly (SAA). Figure 4-3 shows the location of the
anomaly in the southern hemisphere between South America and
South Africa. The isodose lines represent equal particle flux in
terms of protons per square centimeter per second at a represent-
ative altitude.
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FIGURE 4-3
LINES OF EQUAL DOSE RATES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC ANOMALY
The flux gradient is steep and Figure 4-4 illustrates the time
history of orbit traces in the anomaly and shows the radiation
dose to an astronaut's eye, the limiting exposure factor. The
chart is for the indicated altitude and wall density at the
period of maximum radiation activity - Solar minimum.
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FIGURE 4-4
RADIATION DOSE TO THE EYE OVER TIME
Astronaut exposure depends on the orbit altitude, shielding from
Station materialsv the duration of the astronaut's time in orbit,
and most importantly - the amount of atmosphere above the Sta-
tion. Atmosphere effects are governed by the solar cycle. Maxi-
mum atmosphere heating and expansion occurs at the time of maxi-
mum solar activity due to solar radiation absorbed in the atmos-
phere. This condition provides the maximum "free" radiation
shielding - that which comes from the atmosphere. The residual
atmosphere removes and limits the lower edge of the Van Allen
radiation belt, but it also increases the Station's drag. Thus,
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higher altitudes are necessary during solar maximum conditions.
Canversely_ at minimum salar activi_y_ the atmosphere cools and
contracts so that more radiation reaches the Station/Astronauts.
Shielding is provided by the modules, tunnels, nodes, and airlock
structures during IVA and by the EVA suit materials when outside
the Station and is needed primarily during passage through the
SAA. Figure 4-4 illustrates the radiation exposure bursts asso-
ciated with passage through the anomaly and the radiation drop-
off outside the anomaly, e.g. it changes by three orders of magni-
tude or more.
Table 4-2 shows the aluminum equivalent protection of the current
Shuttle EMU. Analysis performed in association with the McDonnell
Douglas Phase B Space Station contract indicate these shielding
levels to be more than adequate if EVAs are scheduled around the
SAA.
TABLE 4-2
ALUMINUM EQUIVALENT PROTECTION OF CURRENT SHUTTLE EMU MATERIALS
MATERIAL COVERINGS
ARMS & LESS
DENSITY THICKNESS
(gms/cm**2) (in.)
THERMAL MANAGEMENT
GARMENT (TM8)
RESTRAINT
BLADDER FABRIC
LIQUID COOLED
VENTILATION GARMENT (LCVG)
TOTAL
0.091 0.053
0.035 0.020
0.039 0.0295
0.165 0.1025
APPROX. ALUM. EQUIV. _0.2
UPPER TORSO
TMG
FIBERGLASS SHELL
LCVB
TOTAL
0.091
0.354
0.039
0.484
APPROX. ALUM. EQUIV. _0.5
EYE SHIELD
HELMENT (BUBBLE)
PROTECTIVE VISOR
SUN VISOR
CENTER EYESHADES
SIDE EYESHADES
TOTAL
0.182
0.182
0.190
0.067
0.238
0.859
APPROX. ALUM. EQUIV. _0.9
0.053
0.075
0.0295
0.158
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.125
0.375
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Timeline analysis, Figure 4-5, indicates no problem in scheduling
around the SAA, since the worst case still has > 8 consecutive
hours of non-SAA exposure for one shift or the other.
If operations are to be extended to polar and/or GEO, increased
radiation shielding will be required. GEO is the harsher of the
two and as such would be the driver for shielding requirements.
We feel that to impose this shielding requirement on the EVAS
Nould unnecessarily restrict nominal Station EVA operations by
causing the EMU to be too cumbersome and massive, and so recom-
mend that the problem be solved by applying prudent operational
philosophies, such as limiting time of exposure to these high-
risk areas and considering the total (IV + EV) dose, not just the
EV dose.
The Langley Mission Data Base used for this study does not iden-
tify any requirements for GEO EVA capability, but other studies
have examined this capability and have postulated mission times
as long as a month. If this is considered reasonable, the mini-
mum total shielding requirement is an average of at least 2
g/cm**2 of AI.
A different radiation problem concerns possible degradation of
the EVAS by ultraviolet radiation (UV). Analysis indicates the
only sensitive area of the Shuttle EMU to be the polycarbonate
(Lexan) of the helmet. A UV-resistant material would be one
solution, but in light of the excellent optical and pressure-
retention characteristics of polycarbonates (such as Lexan),
a more likely approach is to provide an on-orbit replaceable
protective visor, which would absorb the UV effects and thus
protect the polycarbonate visor. This protection scheme is used
on the Shuttle EMU, except the visor requires significant techni-
cian support for replacement.
Recommended radiation-related requirements are:
o All non-emergency EVAs are scheduled around the SAA.
o Time in high-risk profiles is minimized--polar, 8EO, SAA.
0 The Space Station EMU-crew enclosure provides at least the
radiation protection of the Space Shuttle EMU Space Suit
Assembly for all areas of the crewmember°s body.
O Provide an easily replaceable protective visor to shield the
EVAS helmet from UV radiation.
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FIGURE 4-5
TIMELINE ANALYSIS
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4.2.2 MECHANICAL DANGERS
Mechanical dangers may be divided into two basic categories;
micrometeoroid/space debris, and sharp corners/edges.
According to "Natural Environment Design Criteria for Space Sta-
tion Definition and Preliminary Design" (NASA Technical Memoran-
dum TM-8&460), space debris is the "driver". It is also less
understood than micrometeoroids, but work is continuing to define
it. The requirement should be to meet, at a minimum, a 95%
probability of safety as stated in the Technical Memorandum.
Survivability data based on the current micrometeoroid and space
debris model and the ZPS space suit are presented for reference
in Table 4-3, which shows probabilities of not receiving a leak-
causing impact. These probabilities are based on 936 hours of
use (approx. one year) and the current micrometeoroid/debris
models. When this data is extrapolated to provide a ten-year
projection, as shown at the bottom of the table, we see that the
ZPS suit materials, by themselves, cannot meet the 95% criteria.
In fact, the ten-year probability is closer to 80%.
Tests indicate that shielding the materials with a fabric layup
similar to the Thermal/Micrometeoroid Garment (TM8) used on the
Shuttle EMU can substantially decrease the probability of an
impact causing a leak. Thus, regardless of the joint design
selected, the crew enclosure will require the addition of a
protective fabric layer.
Sharp corner/edges requirements involve safety from puncture or
other damage for the EVAS operating around the Space Station.
Two points are pertinent: the Shuttle EMU and MMU will be used
in the Space Station vicinity (especially during assembly), and
any Space Station EVAS should be required to be at least as
resistant to impact as the Shuttle EMU and MMU. Taking these two
points into account, NASA Document JSC-10615A requirements for
sharp corners/edges should be used as an initial baseline and be
considered minimum requirements.
A manned EVAS with maximum consumables should survive an impact
with a stationary object at a velocity of .6 m/s (2 ft/s) with
only cosmetic damage.
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TABLE 4-3
MICROMETEOROID/DEBRISPUNCTURE
(Probability of no leak for 936
HAZARD ASSESSMENT
hours of operation)
SUIT ELEMENT
LOWER LEGS
UPPER LEGS
LOWER ARMS
UPPER ARMS
AREA MATERIAL THICKNESS PROBABILITY
m**2 cm (400 km)
0.17 6061-T6 0.47
0.03 6061-T6 0.47
0.05 6061-T6 0.47
0,03 6061-T6 0.47
ANKLES 0.10
KNEES 0.25
THIGHS 0.08
ELBOWS 0.19
WAIST 0.16
SHOULDERS 0.08
GLOVES 0.16
BOOTS 0.22
LAMINATE 0.07
LAMINATE 0.07
LAMINATE 0.07
LAMINATE 0.07
LAMINATE 0.07
LAMINATE 0.07
LAMINATE 0.07
LAMINATE 0.07
SHOULDERS 0.16 ST. STEEL 0.08
THIGHS 0.38 ST. STEEL 0.08
HARD UPPER TORSO 0.55
HELMET 0.25
FIBER GLASS 0.19
LEXAN 0.19
PROBABILITY
(500 km)
0.999978 0.999981
0.999995 0.999996
0.999993 0.999994
0.999997 0.999997
0.998757 0.998784
0.996908 0.996976
0.999019 0.999041
0.996677 0.998526
0.997299 0.998090
0.998950 0.998972
0.998834 0.998077
0.997233 0.997294
0.999920 0.999943
0.999851 0.999871
0.999920 0.999864
0.993467 0.993525
CUMULATIVE
CUMULATIVE
NOTES: 1.
2.
PROBABILITY FOR ONE YEAR (1)
PROBABILITY FOR TEN YEARS (2)
One year probability based on
probabilities
Ten year probability based on
raised to tenth power
0.976166 0.979116
0.785663 0.809732
product of all
one year probability
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4.2.3 ATOMIC OXYGEN
According to "A Consideration of Atomic Oxygen Interactions with
Space Station" (AIAA-85-0476), Shuttle EMU materials are not
particularly reactive to atomic oxygen with the exception of the
po!ycarbonate of the helmet.
The requirement should be to use these existing materials where-
ver possible and to replace them only with materials of equal or
greater resistance.
The helmet polycarbonate erosion problem could be solved if a
more atomic oxygen resistant replacement material were to be
found. However, as stated in section 4.2.1, the visor materials
provide excellent optical quality and pressure retention, so a
more likely solution is the use of an easily replaceable protec-
tive visor. This would also provide needed protection from UV
radiation and mechanical wear and tear. Thus, the replacement
visor is likely the best solution.
4.2.4 STATIC CHARGING
Static charging of the Space Station EVAS does not appear to be a
problem for the orbits considered for the Space Station (400 to
500 km and 28.5 degree inclination). During the first rendezvous
operations in the Gemini programv all attempts to measure the
charging effects resulted in off-scale low readings. EVA has
been performed from the Shuttle from approximately these and less
benign (57 deg) orbits with no problems encountered.
Since the Space Station EVAS may well have to support EVA opera-
tions in both polar and, eventually, geosynchronous orbits; sta-
tic charging must be considered.
"Testing EVA Equipment for Polar Orbit Operations" (SAE 851330)
states that levels of charging do not present a direct threat to
the crewmember. However, it does reach levels that could affect
sensitive electronic equipment in the EMU and EEU. The require-
ment, thereforev is to shield and ground all EVAS electronics in
order to not preclude their eventual use at polar inclinations
and eventually at GEO altitudes. Also, a proper ground path must
be provided between all EVAS components (EMU to EEU, arms to
gloves, etc.) in order to preclude buildup of such a charge in
the first place. As with aircraft refueling operations, a ground
strap or cable should be the first thing to make contact with any
item which has a possible charge with respect to the EVAS.
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4.3 MOBILITY AND ANTHROPOMETRICSIZING
Mobility and anthropometric sizing are related issues in crew
enclosure design. Mobility involves the range of motion, torques
involved in motion, and clearances needed for motion in operating
the EMU-Crew Enclosure. Anthropometric sizing involves the range
of crew size to be accommodated by the crew enclosure.
Mobility considerations produce a requirement for an anthropomor-
phic suit with maximum torque and minimum range equivalent to a
Shuttle EMU at 4.3 psi.
Range of crew size to be accommodated should be specified so as
to fit the largest possible percentage of the target population
with the minimum number of components. Attempts to fit some
arbitrary range of male and female percentiles for STS resulted
in a system which cost far too much, compromised fit for all but
a few, and ultimately failed to fit the specified range due to
the technology required to build gloves for the small end of the
anthropometric range while retaining sufficient mobility to allow
the crewmember to perform useful tasks.
4.3.1 MOBILITY
Mobility of the crew enclosure involves ranges of motion of the
crew enclosure joints, torques required to achieve these ranges,
and clearances required for the complete EMU.
A ma_or consideration in establishing and meeting the mobility
requirements for the EVAS is whether the crew enclosure is to
remain anthropomorphic or is to evolve into a semi-anthropomorphic
(man-in-a-can) or a fully non-anthropomorphic (pod-like) shape.
Semi- and non-anthropomorphic crew enclosures offer some advan-
tages such as packaging of LSS components and some relief from
custom sizing requirements. However, they do not provide the
crewmember with the capability to quickly and efficiently adapt
to the variety of tasks and required physical orientations to
work interfaces as does the fully anthropomorphic suit. Although
pressure suits are certainly an encumberance and they decrease
crewmember productivity when compared with shirt-sleeve performa-
nce, observations of experienced astronauts and test subjects
during orbital EVA and/or underwater neutral-bouyancy exercises
show that all the human motor skills are continuously utilized to
the maximum for maneuvering, positioning, stability, reacting
work forces/torques, etc. This is consistent with the findings
of commercial undersea diving advocates who, with strong profit
motives, have developed advanced anthropomorphic diving systems
with the goal of achieving the manipulative ability of an ambient
pressure system (such as SCUBA). As long as the goal of EVA
systems remains to get the human astronaut as close to the work
interface as possible so he can apply his natural skills and
abilities to productive endeavors, advancing the technologies
required for anthropomorphic space suits should continue to be
emphasized, even if this requires a reduction of efforts aimed at
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semi- and non-anthropomorphic systems development. Similar to
the diving systems, our goal should be to attain shirt-sleeve
mobility.
Clearance required far an anthropomorphic EMU will vary with
specific design. Figure 4-6 presents an example using dimensions
of the ZPS suit and an estimated LSS volume of 183 liters
(6.4 ÷t**3).
A
SUIT DIMENSIONS SIZE RANGE
5TH PERCENTILE
FEMALE
A - HEIGHT
B - MAXIMUM BREADTH AT ELBOWS
(ARMS DOWN)
C - MAXIMUM BREADTH AT ELBOWS
(ARMS FOLDED OR UP)
D - MAXIMUM DEPTH WITH LSS
143.3 (56.4)
66.0 (26. O)
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM DIMENSIONS
E - HEIGHT
F - BREADTH
G - DEPTH
107 (42)
61 (24)
28 (11)
FIGURE 4-6
DIMENSIONS FOR ADVANCED EMU
cm(in)
95TH PERCENTILE
MALE
191.8 (75.5)
84.8 (33.4)
66.0 (26. O)
68.6 (27. O)
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4.3.2 OANTHROPOMETR IC S IZINB
Operationally, the approach to establishing a policy for anthro-
pometric sizing should be to fit the largest percentage of the
target population_ with cost considerations (design and procure-
ment) suggesting the minimal possible number of different size
components.
The selection of a target population will be affected by the size
and strength of the individuals and the ability to build crew
enclosure components to fit the individual. For example_ the
ability to build gloves for individuals with small hands is
limited. For purposes of this study_ it is felt that operational
productivity and flexibility would be most enhanced by the selec-
tion of the total population (men and women) as the target popu-
lation.
A list of key sizing dimensions has been developed_ and a series
of target points within the population selected. A grouping of
sizing philosophies was then tested against them. The following
definitions are necessary to understand the philosophies:
Accommodate = Size the crew enclosure such that at its largest or
smallest it will fit the specified percentile.
Optimize = Size the crew enclosure such that at the middle of its
size range it will fit the specified percentile.
The top number in each box in Table 4-4 is the range (in centime-
ters) accommodated by each philosophy for each critical dimen-
sion. The bottom number represents the percentage of the total
population accommodated. By selecting the proper combinations of
options a crew enclosure sizing option that will fit the largest
percentage of the total population can be derived.
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SIZING
_ P,ItC_EQUALITYTABLE 4-4
PREDICTIONS--CURRENT SSA W/HORIZONTAL CLOSURE
TT TCRITICAL ACCOMMODATE OPTIMIZE OPTIMIZE 0P..M.ZE ACCOMMODATE
DIMENSION 95%MALE TO TO TO 5%FEMALE
(OPTIMUMFITTOLERANCE) 50%MALE 50%TOTAL 50%FEMALE
POPULATION
CHESTBREADTH 12.9-14.4in. 12.2-13.7in. 11.2-12.7in. I0.3-11.Bin. 9.5-11.0in.
(_0.75in.) 14% 33% 66% 44% 8%
INTERSCYE-MAX 23.5-25in. 22-23.5in. 20-21.5in. 18.8-20.3in. _7.3-1B.8 in.
(I0.75in.) 2% 16% 4!% 29% 10%
CHESTCIRCUMFERENCE 41.1-43.1in. 37.7-39.7in. 35.6-37.6in. 34-36in. 3:.I-.4._c.
(_+1.0in.) 3% 20% 281 237, 18%
SHOULDERCIRCUMFERENCE47.2-50.2 in. 42-45 in. 41.9-44.9 in, 37.9-40.9 in, 36.5-3g.5 in,
(±1.5in.) 4X 48% 49% 17% 4%
ELBOWTOWRIST I0,5-II.5in, 10.1-11.1in. 9.6-I0.6in, B,7-9,7in, B.3-9.3in,
(!0.5in.) 241 46% 5BX 241 IOX
ELBOWTO ELBOW 39.4-40.4in. 36.9-37.9in. 35.B-36.Bin. _ = _ o in. -.n0_7,_v,:,l t-.,J_l t
4 "I
_+0.5in.) 4% ,8,, 241 4% 47,
CROTCHHEIGHT 35.2-36.2in. 33-34in. 31.1-32.1in. 28.8-29.8in. 26.8-27.8i_.
,2_ 22% 12X I%(_0.5in.) 2% ' _
KNEEHEIGHT 18-21in. 18-21in. 17-20in. 15.6-18.6in. 15.8-18.Bin.
(_!.5in.} 651 65% B5% 54X 6!X
ACROMIALHEIGHT 5B,9-60.9in. 56.2-58.2in. 54,1-56.1in. 50.9-52,9in 48.4-50,4in.
(_1.0in.) 4% 21% 34X 15% 2%
VTD(TORSOLENGTH) 24.7-25.7 in. 23,2-24.2 in,
(+ 0.5 in.)* 7X 30%
* VTDOR"TORSOLENGTH'_SULTSAREFORREF,ONLY
22.7-23.7in. 22,1-23.1in, 20.8-21.8in.
37X 28X 9X
It should be noted that actual sizing optimization is very design
specific. The example given is for the current Shuttle suit.
The optimum sizing would be achieved by selecting the critical
dimension ranges, in line with a reasonable number of components,
that will fit the maximum reasonable range of the population.
This problem would be eased considerably by selection of a
closure technique other than horizontal plane; for instance, 3SC
and ARC rear-entry concepts allow a considerably larger range of
fit for a given torso size.
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On orbit sizing and maintenance can be achieved by use of Ortman
couolinos. Figure 4-7. This _i!! al!_ easy r=slzln_ .... ,.=_=
suit components into ORUs.
__ C;rculM Wimform in
Diameter A ---_ _-- • Circular Tunnel
__ Axial Force__
End on Wire ' End of Wirefofm
Outer Ring Milled Slot
try
la_ion in the Ptme of the Wimform
FIGURE 4-7
ORTMAN COUPLING
OItqGIN4LPPlGEIS
OP XOeR QUALITY
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4.4 COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS
In order to satisfy the goals of flexibility and autonomy, commu-
nication requirements far exceeding those levied on previous EVA
systems will need to be met. Fortunately, this is an area where
the commercial sector has made great strides in recent years;
witness the state of the art in miniature sound systems, microp-
rocessors, and video equipment.
Background:
The STS EVAS provides for full duplex voice communications be-
tween two EVA crewmembers, the Orbiter, and Mission Control. This
is accomplished by a conferencing system of UHF-AM transmitters
and receivers on the EVAS and Orbiter, tied through the vehicle
communications system to the air-to-ground (A/S) transceiver
aboard the vehicle (very similar to the system employed for
Apollo lunar EVA). Figure 4-8 shows the nominal mode of opera-
tion, which requires one transmitter and two receivers to be
powered within each EVAS and aboard the Orbiter. More than two
crewmembers can only be accommodated by giving up the duplex
capability as shown in Figure 4-9.
An additional capability of providing an EKG signal for downlink
to Mission Control is achieved by adding a 1.5 kHz subcarrier to
the UHF signal. This has recently been augmented to allow time
multiplexing of EVAS LSS parameters with the biomed signal, a
system which not only eliminates a portion of the EKG signal, but
provides a minimum insight into the operating health of the LSS,
since the low frequency utilized by the data subcarrier is only
capable of sending a complete data stream approximately once/minute.
4.4.1 VOICE COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS
For obvious operationa1_aSo_ull duplex voice capability is
required between all_pa_tieS_i_c _ll times during EVA. This
includes EVA crewmembers Cup to at least four and possibly more),
any or all IV crewmembers, and ground personnel. EVA crewmembers
need to be able to deselect any distracting communication, but
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Orbttercomfsystem
E_J
>mode
S
-.--.,---- Votce and data (continuous)
I II Votce only (keyed)
Auto relay
S-band _ S-band/UHFXPOR ground station
FIGURE 4-8
NOMINAL (FULL DUPLEX) COMMUNICATIONS DURING STS EVA
Mode
Orbiter UHF ..... Simplex voice link
I
I,. ,]1_--_ ..... _ UHF onlyground station
• As ms_8_Usc_besck_asdssin_c_/m_-t_frec_mcycn_,_mg
• No btoeed data ....
• No auto relay between EV and ground
- _ ct%,-_mlbers probably w111 not hear ground
• Ground will not hear EV crelubers
FIGURE 4-9
OFF-NOMINAL (SIMPLEX) COMMUNICATIONS CONFIGURATION AVAILABLE FOR
ACCOMODATION OF >2 CRENMEMBERS DURING STS EVA
that party needs to be able to get through even when deselected
by using a "call-up" capability.
It is envisioned that this voice signal Nill be digitized, then
multiplexed with the data signal, thus becoming a subset of data
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communications requirements. As such, the requirements will not
be discussed here, but in Section 4.4.2
4.4.2 DATA COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS
In order to minimize crew time expenditure, the function of
tracking and recording system and biomedical data should be
automated to the maximum extent possible. The most straightfor-
ward way to accomplish this is to send a data stream from the
EVAS to the Station Data Management System (DMS), which will
record and analyze it, alert the crew to anomalies, and make
recommendations as to course of action to be followed. This does
not include simple C & W functions such as out-of-limits or low
consumables alerts. These will be handled by the EVAS DMS and
are discussed in section 4.5.2.
Data transfer from the Station DMS to the EVAS will be required
as a means to reduce dependence on paper checklists which must be
developed and transported to orbit for each unique task--a massive
logistics impact. This would also imply that some data transfer
would be required from the EVAS to the Station to enable commands
to display the Station data base information. An ill-defined but
very possible additional requirement for data transfer from the
Station to the EVAS is to enable system commands to be transmit-
ted (for instance, control inputs to an unmanned propulsion
system).
The most obvious approach to allow more than two crewmembers to
pass such data between themselves and the Station is to allot a
discrete two-way digital channel to each crewmember, then have
the Station communications system distribute signals as approp-
riate, much like the digital voice distribution network aboard
the Shuttle. This would normally by accomplished via RF link,
but could use hardwire in special circumstances; i.e., contingen-
cies, RF sensitive instruments, overload of RF spectrum, etc.
4.4.3 VIDEO COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS
Video requirements are the most difficult to quantify of the
communication requirements, but frequently are the most valuable
by a large margin--to a remote observer, a picture is frequently
worth several thousand words. Preliminary concepts for Station
video involve digitizing the video signal from the EVAS, then
multiplexing this with the normal data stream. While this cer-
tainly meets the operational requirements, tying up a broadband
data channel continuously during EVA is very inefficient in its
use of the limited frequency spectrum. A more reasonable ap-
proach might be to use Station CCTV (hardline) for nominal EVA
video, augmented by UHF or S-band analog video on the occasions
that require full-motion TV from the perspective of the EVA
crewmember. Still pictures--"freeze-frame"--would be available
via the nominal two-way data link at all times for transmission
of diagrams, schematics, close-up view of worksite, etc. at a
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rate of around one picture per second without using the broadband
signal required for high-resolution full-motion digital v4a=_
4.5 DATA MANAGEMENT
The primary requirements for the EVAS Data Management System
(DMS) are to maximize:
0
0
0
O
EVA crewmember safety
EVA and IVA crewmember productivity and, therefore, mission
SUCCESS
Level of reliability and maintainability both for design and
operation
Capability for expansion and upgrade as new tasks and
technologies are developed.
Requirements for the EVAS DMS will be broken down into three
functions:
0
0
0
Input/Output (I/O) Data Handling--Section 4.5.1
Systems Management--Section 4.5.2
Applications Programs--Section 4.5.3
The EVAS DMS will be composed of software and firmware resident
in a hardware microprocessor and shall interface directly with
the EVAS, the EVA crewmember, and the EVAS Display System, and
indirectly (through the EVAS data communication system) with
other data management systems external to the EVAS (primarily the
Space Station Information and Data Management System (IDMS)).
4.5.1 I/O DATA HANDLING
The I/O Data Handling function integral to the EVAS DMS shall
provide the EVAS DMS those interfaces necessary for systems
management, data reception and transmission_ and command and
control. See Table 4-5.
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TABLE 4-5
I/O DATA HANDLING INTERFACES
INTERFACE INTERFACE TYPE I/O
EVA Crewmember Voice I
Mechanical Sw. I
Audio 0
EVAS Display Data
Video
EVAS Systems
(including EEU)
DATA TYPE
Voice recognition
Analog, discrete and/or
digital
Voice synthesis/alarms
0 Analog and/or digital
0 Analog and/or digital
Biomed data I
Systems data I
Commands 0
I/G
I/O
EVAS Communications Data
Video
Analog and/or digital
Analog and/or digital
Discrete
Digital
Analog and/or digital
To service these interfaces, the IIO Data Handling function will
require the capability of voice pattern recognition (applicable
only to the EVA crewmember interface), receipt of digital and
analog data, and transmission of digital data. The technologies
necessary to perform these tasks are presently in existence.
To increase the productivity and efficiency of the EVA and IVA
crewmembers while simultaneously optimizing EVA crewmember safety
and system reliability, I/O Data Handling shall include the tasks
and features discussed below.
To provide for future growth and the necessary flexibility to
handle the various data types (status information, command and
control, caution and warning, and freeze frame pictures) envi-
sioned for EVAS operations, I/O Data Handling shall require the
capability of transmission and receipt of serial, variable
length, alphanumeric data strings on a synchronous and asynchro-
nous basis.
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EVAS DMS PROTOCOL STRUCTURE
(ACTUAL BIT ASSIGNMENTS AND TOTAL LENGTH TBD)
1
2
3
I
I
I
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
I
I
23
24
25
I
I
I
I
I
I
48
i
i
1
START BIT
PARITY BIT
ADDRESSING
CRITICALITY
LENGTH OF DATA STRING
DATA TYPE (COMMAND, STATUS, ETC.)
TBD
SYNCH BIT
DATA
FIGURE 4-10
SAMPLE EVAS DMS DATA STRING
Additionally, due to possible loss or mutation of data during the
communications process and its possible impact on crewmember
safety and mission success, the I/O Data Handling shall perform
validation tests on all data received via the data communications
system. The severity of the validation test imposed upon re-
ceived data will depend on the criticality of the data to crewme-
mber safety and mission success. This criticality will be ob-
tained primarily from header words on all data strings. The
protocol structure used to determine criticality will also eva-
luate and provide information on data string addressing, length,
type, and architecture.
Since the bi-directional data communications capability between
the EVAS and the Space Station is critical to EVA mission success
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and crewmember productivity, and impacts EVA crewmember sa÷ety,
I/O Data Handling shall transmit a "keep-alive" signal on a
synchronous basis to the Space Station. The loss of this "keep
alive" signal will indicate failure of data transmission capabi-
lity and will instruct the EVA and IVA crewmembers to initiate
appropriate corrective action.
At present, the design and architecture of the EVAS resident
microprocessor and its associated memory are not sufficiently
defined to identify possible impacts to the EVAS DMS I/O Data
Handling capability or to determine the level of sophistication
available to such a system. It is envisioned that I/O Data
Handling will be significantly dependent upon the EVAS resident
processing capabilities to satisfy the requirements imposed upon
it.
4.5.2 SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT
The Systems Management function of the EVAS DMS shall perform all
EEU and EMU Systems data accumulation, evaluation, and manipula-
tion tasks and those EEU and EMU systems operations automated by
design to maximize the safety and productivity of the EVA crewme-
mber. Additionally, the Systems Management function must be
available for autonomous EVAS operations to preclude a communica-
tions or like failure from jeopardizing the EVA crewmember.
The Systems management function will be further divided into four
operating systems each of which will interface with the others
but shall not be dependent upon the others to operate. These
four operating systems are:
0
0
0
0
Monitoring and Control
System Operations
Displays Management
EEU Guidance and Control
Also, to support EVA crewmember productivity and system efficiency,
Systems Management shall perform all information and data manage-
ment operations while concurrently making the most efficient use
of memory. Memory management features shall also be required
within the Systems Operations.
o Monitoring and Control will be responsible for sampling all
biomed, EMU, and EEU instrumentation and the delivery of this
data to I/O Data Handling for transmission to the Space Station,
to Systems Operations, or to Displays Management. Some Caution
and warning capabilities may also be included in the Monitoring
and Control function but will be limited in scope to those para-
meters sampled by it. All EVAS and EEU command and control
operations shall be via the Monitoring and Control functions.
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EVaS SYSTEMSEMU !EEU
HELMETIMOUNTED
DISPLAY SYSTEM
EVAS DHS
o I/0 DATA HANDLING
o APPLICATIONS PROGRAHS
o SYSTEHS H/_I/_EPENT
o APPLICATIONSPROGRAHS
EVA
CREVIMEHBERS
o SPACE STATION IDI'lS
o OTHERDPISSYSTEHS (TBD)
FIGURE 4-11
EVAS DMS INTERFACES
o System Operations will be responsible for the determination
of EMU and EEU systems health and mission status_ and all caution
and warning functions derived from these.
o Displays Management shall be required to process all
necessary data and/or pictures for use by the Helmet Mounted
Display (HMD). Requirements for the HMD will be broken into
hardware and display design.
o HMD hardware design must minimize power requirements
while providing an easily readable display which does not in
trude on the crewmembers" normal vision. This suggests that
a heads-up display may not be the optimal solution_ rather a
display just belo_ or above the normal line of sight. Light
levels should be in accordance with accepted industrial and
MIL-SPEC standards for similar displays. Collimation should
be adjustable from close-up to optical infinity. The capa-
bility to recall prior displays is desirable.
4-31
o In design of the displays, first a selection must be
made between visual and auditory information transmittal.
Any message which is short, simple, and/or time-critical
should be presented aurally. If the information is to be
presented visually, the choice becomes pictorial (video,
graphics, etc.), symbolic (words, dials, digital parame-
ters), or some combination (flowcharts, schematics, etc.).
The following guidelines are based on the perception acuity
of the EVA crewmember and should be taken into account:
0
0
0
0
0
0
The content should be limited to what is necessary to
perform specific actions or make decisions.
The information should be displayed only to the
necessary precision.
The format should be in a directly usable form, so the
operator does not need to transpose, compute, interpo-
late, or translate into other units.
Redundancy in displayed information should be avoided.
Failure of a display or display circuit should be
immediately apparent.
Unrelated information (e.g., trademarks) should not be
displayed on a panel face.
o EEU Guidance and Control is another required operation.
Further discussion on it can be found in section 4.6.
4.5.3 APPLICATIONS PROGRAMS
Applications programs necessary to support the operations and
functions defined in sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 shall be wholly
resident in the EVAS. To maintain a high level of system
reliability and EVA crewmember safety, only those application
programs determined to be non-critical to EVAS operations or EVA
crewmember safety will be permitted software-only residency, the
rest shall require firmware.
Additionally, all program standards and specifications defined
for these Applications Programs shall whenever possible be the
same as those used for the Space Station IDMS. The use of like
standards for the Space Station IDMS and EVAS OMS will provide
for a high level of reliability and ease of upgrade in the future.
Also, standardizing the crewmember interface to these programs
between the Station and the EVAS will minimize crew training
requirements. It is recognized that this interface cannot be
completely standardized when the programs have different func-
tions, but a goal should be a level of standardization similar to
that found between various applications programs within the new
generation of integrated software packages for personal computers.
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4.6 PROPULSION REQUIREMENTS
The Generic Fifteen EVA Missions identified in Section 2 and the
potential accident profiles developed in support of task 3.2.3.7
(Appendix C) were analyzed to determine those missions either re-
quiring or benefiting from EVA maneuvering propulsion. Five
missions were so identified and analysis of these missions yielded
basic hardware requirements for an MMU-class vehicle subsequently
termed an Extravehicular Excursion Unit (EEU) and also require-
ments for an OMV-class vehicle termed a Tug. The latest Langley
Data Base material on Space Station payload service requirements
was analyzed to determine maneuvering propulsion sorties required
per year and related logistics requirements were derived. While
the only hard requirement for EEU use was for EVA crewmember re-
scue, it was apparent that an EEU would be very useful for many
other tasks and would provide great flexibility in mission oper-
ations.
Based on the assumption that maneuvering propulsion will be pro-
vided, we proceeded to develop hardware requirements. Various
propulsion techniques were examined as were alternate methods of
propellant storage. On-orbit servicing and maintenance require-
ments were examined in some detail since the current MMU has only
minimal on-orbit servicing capabilities and is virtually impos-
sible to maintain on-orbit. External configuration of propulsion
hardware together with interfaces with other equipment were examined.
Guidance, navigation, and control of the EEU class vehicle was
examined at length. The above analyses are discussed at greater
length below. Propulsion hardware impacts on Space Station interior
and exterior are discussed in section 5.6 and 5.7 of this report.
4.6.1 MISSION ANALYSIS
The Fifteen Generic Missions identified in the Mission Require-
ments Survey were examined to determine those missions that
either required or that would benefit from maneuvering propul-
sion. Five such missions were identified, constituting all or
part of five of the Generic Missions. They are:
0
0
0
0
0
Translation to Space Station Worksites
Translation to Free Fliers
Space Station or Free Flier Inspections
Module and Equipment Transfers
EVA Crewmember Rescue Operations
These missions were then analyzed further to assess contamination
constraints, plume impingement constraints, maneuvering precision
requirements, hardware interface requirements, and instrumenta-
tion and control requirements. Estimates of time and consumable
requirements for each of the five missions were obtained using
the Martin Marietta Space Operations Simulator and overhead re-
quirements were derived for each mission. The above process
resulted in basic specifications, derived from mission require-
ments, for the EEU. A larger "Tug" type vehicle was also sug-
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gested by some of the simulations, due to its greater efficiency
as compared to the EEU in manipulating larger classes of modules
and objects, and it was included in subsequent analyses.
The Langley Data Bases were analyzed in light of the above selec-
ted five generic missions to determine EEU and Tug sorties per
year. Very few missions required a sortie though many would
benefit from use of maneuvering propulsion. Therefore, the num-
ber of "possible" EEU and Tug sorties per year was determined and
formed the basis for subsequent analysis. Possible sorties were
defined as those resulting from a requirement by a mission for a
maneuvering propulsion sortie or a benefit by a mission from such
a sortie.
Figure 4-12 is a graph of possible EEU sorties per year, ranging
from a low of 8 sorties per year to a high of 32.
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Figure 4-13 shows possible Tug sorties per year, ranging from a
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POSSIBLE TUG SORTIES BY YEAR
These estimates are only as good as the Langley Data Base esti-
mates, and depend heavily on our estimate of a real benefit from
maneuvering propulsion use. Also, the fact that such a benefit
may actually exist does not mean that the payload sponsor or
mission planner will necessarily require the use of maneuvering
propulsion. Still, we believe that these are the best estimates
possible at this time and recommend their use until better esti-
mates become possible. One final note: No sorties are included
for Space Station maintenance missions, but EEU flights for
Station exterior inspections and other Station maintenance related
missions are very possible. This might increase the possible
sorties, but no reliable estimate of numbers of such sorties is
possible given current information.
Propellant required per year of operation was estimated using the
above sortie estimates, together with the basic vehicle specifi-
cations. Defining an EEU sortie as three round trips along a
single-keel power tower and a Tug sortie as one such round-trip
yielded propellant required per sortie. Total propellant re-
quired per year was then obtained by multiplying sorties by
propellant per sortie in the appropriate category. For the EEU,
from 288-1152 kg (8-32 sorties) of propellant were required per
year while for the Tug the requirement was for from 272-782 kg
(8-23 sorties) of propellant per year.
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4.6.2 PROPULSION TECHNIQUES
Alternative methods of propulsion were assessed to determine
relative attributes and suitability for use in the candidate
missions identified earlier. The evaluation criteria included
the following:
0 The propulsion media must fulfill the total impulse
requirements identified in the mission analyses.
0 The propellant media should not be contaminating in the
event of leakage or spillage during vehicle recharge or
resupply. Further, the products output from the thrusters
should minimize hazards and damage to payloads and EVA
crewmembers.
0 The propellant media should maximize efficiency to
minimize the quantity (mass and volume) required both on-
board the maneuvering vehicle and in the Space Station bulk
storage facility.
O The amount of vehicle electrical power required to operate
the propulsion system should be minimized.
O The propellant media should be safe and easy to handle in
order to increase crew safety and reduce overall system
design costs.
Several different propulsion techniques were evaluated using the
preceding criteria. These techniques were cold gas, augmented
cold gas, hot gas, ion, and nuclear. The results of the evalu-
ation, summarized in Table 4-6 indicated that cold gas is the
best approach.
TABLE 4-6
PROPULSION APPROACH EVALUATION MATRIX
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A further evaluation of different gases suitable for propellant
was conducted. The results of this evaluation ar_ summarized in
Table 4.6.2. Helium and nitrogen were the best two gases, with
nitrogen preferred because it is less susceptible to diffusion
losses due to fitting leakage.
TABLE 4-7
COLD GAS PROPELLANT EVALUATION MATRIX
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4.6.3 LOGISTICS
Several aspects of Space Station logistics were addressed; pro-
pellant transport and bulk storage, spare parts volume and weight
for on-orbit maintenance, and support equipment volume and
weight. Differing approaches to all three aspects were evaluated
using the following criteria:
0
0
0
0
Weight requirements
Volume requirements
Resupply intervals
System complexity
Propellant transport and storage via cryogenic means consumes the
least volume for a given mass. Further, if the cryogenic method
is used, it may be feasible to resupply propellant at one-year
intervals, freeing Orbiter payload bay volume and weight in three
of four annual resupply missions.
However, cryogenic storage and transport entails increased system
complexity, boil-off problems, and slosh during launch and orbital
maneuvering. In comparison, high-pressure gaseous-state
storage requires a slightly greater volume, does not involve
slosh problems, and can be implemented as a relatively simple
system. The recommendation, therefore, is to use high-pressure
gaseous systems for propellant storage.
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Using MMUground servicing experience as a general guideline, a
list of EEU and Tug spares was compiled. This list may be found
in Section 5.4v LOGISTICS. Estimates of volume and mass for the
spares are included in the list, with totals of 0.3 cubic meters(10.6 cubic feet) and 177 kilograms (390.1 pounds) required for
the maneuvering propulsion spares and equipment servicing expend-
ables. These totals could possibly be reduced as a result of
failure analyses which would pinpoint (and, where possible, elim-
inate) failure prone parts, allowing such parts to be stockpiled
while avoiding over-stocking of more reliable components. The
mass and volume totals could also be reduced by encouraging a
high degree of commonality between EEU and Tug parts, allowing
contingency repair parts to be stocked only once instead of
having separate EEU and Tug components. Of course, higher reli-
ability in all components will minimize the spares mass and
volume.
Support equipment for EEU and Tug maintenance_ such as mainten-
ance work stands and associated tools, was considered in the
iogistics analysis to determine the supply support requirements
for such equipment and, hence, the total logistics "cost" of
maneuvering propulsion. In generalv it is believed that very
little_ if any_ truly dedicated maneuvering propulsion support
equipment is necessary and that logistics requirements can be
made to be sensibly negligible by the use of standard Space
Station workbenches_ tools_ etc. Dedicated storage and nominal
servicing stands will, of course, be necessary for the EEUs and
Tugs, but logistics requirements for these, if properly designed_
should be minimal.
4.&.4 SERVICING
EVA maneuvering vehicle servicing operations are defined as pro-
pellant recharge_ battery check and/or changeout, and vehicle
checkout. The criteria used to assess servicing operations and
equipment include minimizing the time required to perform the
operations, minimizing the involvement of the EVA crewmember, and
maximizing the levels of crewmember safety and confidence.
This analysis concluded that some EVA time can be saved by using
an automatically mating connector for propellant recharge_ bat-
tery recharge, and vehicle Airborne Test Equipment (ATE) check-
out. A connector of this type currently exists, but it is not
yet flight qualified, and reliability data is not yet known.
Another savings in time results if the vehicle batteries have
sufficient capacity to support the vehicle for the duration of an
operation. In the case of the EEUv the nominal duration is eight
hours. By using this type of battery, the need to change out
batteries during the EVA is eliminated. Crewmember confidence
and safety are also enhanced because the batteries are less
likely to cause the vehicle to become stranded.
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Prior to commencing the EVA_ the vehicle should be thoroughly
checked out with ATE to eliminate the need far contingency
planning during EVA time. During EVA servicing operations, a
"quick ATE check" of vehicle health should be performed to ascer-
tain if any potential problems exist.
The final conclusions pertinent to servicing encompass the pro-
pellant recharging system. Maximum flow rates from the bulk
storage facility to the vehicle are necessary to'minimize re-
charge time. Flow rates can be maximized by locating the storage
tank close to the recharge station and by connecting the two with
straight lines using a minimum number of fittings.
4.6.5 MAINTENANCE, MAINTAINABILITY
The maintenance and maintainability analysis defined criteria for
performance of on-orbit maintenance such as microgravity con-
straints, crew time, and tool and support equipment requirements.
Using the present MMU as a basis, design changes required to
perform on-orbit maintenance were also defined.
This analysis concluded that a modular design approach is desir-
able to reduce diagnosis and repair times. Electrical and fluid
connectors (rather than welds) should be used to reduce repair
times and improve repairability. Bonded heaters should be pro-
vided on spare components as required to eliminate adhesive
curing times. The ATE should be able to isolate faults to the
lowest level orbital replacement unit (ORU) in order to minimize
diagnostic times. Maintenance activities can be minimized by
using high reliability components, and by performing maintenance
on an "as required" basis. Periodic maintenance requirements
should be eliminated or minimized.
4.8.6 EXTERNAL CONFIGURATION
The intent of this analysis was to ascertain preliminary physical
maneuvering vehicle characteristics such as size and mass.
The analysis concluded that several factors influence the future
size and weight. Among these factors is on-orbit maintenance,
and where maintenance will be performed. Designing the maneuver-
ing vehicles for compatibility with on-orbit maintenance con-
straints will result in larger vehicles to improve access to
interior components. Also, if the vehicle or a component thereof
is to be maintained inside Space Station, the airlock hatch must
be large enough to safely pass either the entire vehicle or the
largest module to be maintained.
Other factors influencing the size and weight include the Life
Support System (LSS), which latches into the EEU. If a regener-
able LSS is used, it is expected to be significantly larger than
the present unit. Additions to basic vehicle equipment, such'as
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navigation aids, rescue interfaces, larger batteries and pro-
pellant tanks, and more electronics also increase vehicle weight
and size.
In summary, the size and weight of the EEU and Tug cannot be
determined until decisions concerning other related equipment and
concepts are firm. However, for performance estimation purposes,
a mass of 820 kg was assumed for an EEU "stack" (crewmember + EEU
+ EMU + PAYLOAD) and a mass of 7700 kg was assumed for a Tug
"stack" ("OMV" + PAYLOAD). The EEU stack mass was estimated by
assuming upgrades from current equipment while the Tug stack mass
was estimated by assuming an OMV-class vehicle.
4.6.7 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL
This analysis considered two vehicle subsystems: the vehicle
control system and the vehicle rendezvous and targeting systems.
The control system alternatives considered included direct and
proportional rate systems as well as automatic control of trans-
lations and rotations. Two rendezvous and targeting techniques
were assessed: proportional navigation and Clohessy-Wiltshire
equations. The following paragraphs provide details of the above
analyses.
Manual direct control of an orbital, free-flying maneuvering
vehicle is accomplished simply by turning thrusters off or on in
response to a hand controller input. One constant acceleration
rate is provided by the thrusters and vehicle translation and
rotation rates increase (or decrease) as long as the manual
command is provided. Manual direct control is used on the cur-
rent Manned Maneuvering Unit vehicle. It has proven to be highly
satisfactory in all respects, yielding precise, straightforward,
convenient vehicle control by the pilot without mentally or
physically fatiguing him and without distracting him from the
task at hand. Before the MMU, manual direct control was used
experimentally on the Skylab M509 vehicle and found to be highly
satisfactory there. The M509 also was equipped with two propor-
tional rate control modes for proportional control of vehicle
rotations. While these were found to provide generally satisfac-
tory results, same crewmember fatigue was evinced during long
slow rotations (since the hand controller input must be held in
order to maintain a rate) and the overall conclusion was that
direct control of both rotations and translations was the prefer-
red method. Based on these results and the outstanding perform-
ance of the MMU to date, direct manual control of any Space
Station EVA maneuvering propulsion vehicles is recommended.
Automatic control of an EVA maneuvering vehicle can be provided
for both rotations and translations. In evaluating probable
missions it was found that attitude and position hold, rather
than non-zero rate maintenance or programming, would be the
desired features. Further analysis combined with experience from
the MMU program indicated that, while a position hold capability
would be useful, it would be much too costly in terms of propel-
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lant use for any practical system. The required capability,
therefore, is for an automatic attitude hold feature_ In u_e on
the MMO, this capability has proven to be useful and, for some
missions, nearly indispensable in lessening the pilot's workload
while simultaneously conserving propellant. It has also found
great use in some classes of malfunction handling, rendering
otherwise uncontrollable malfunctions relatively harmless. One
shortcoming of the present MMU attitude hold system becomes
apparent when it is used during _ranslations with large vehicle
center of gravity offsets. The amplitude and rate of deadband
oscillation are increased during translational thruster firing,
resulting in a "chattering" effect which is both unpleasant for
the pilot and wasteful of propellant. A simple CS offset compen-
sation feature has been proven in simulations to resolve the
problem and will be implemented on the MMU in the future. Such a
feature will be a necessity for any Space Station EVA maneuvering
propulsion. Implementation of the attitude hold feature can be
with thruster firings or with Control Moment Gyros. Given the size
of the contemplated EEU and Tug vehicles, and the range of expected
rotational rates, thruster implemented attitude control is the
preferred method since it provides the greatest range of control
with the least mass and power requirements. CMSs provide smoother
control than thrusters within their saturation limits, but usually
require the use of thrusters to bring large rates into those limits.
In summary, it is recommended that an automatic attitude hold
capability, implemented via thruster firings, be provided on
Space Station EVA maneuvering vehicles, and that the control
system be equipped with an automatic center of gravity offset
compensator.
In analyzing rendezvous navigation and targeting requirements for
EVA propulsion, it is best to examine targeting methods first
since these drive the navigation requirements. Two practical
methods for EVA rendezvous targeting exist: proportional naviga-
tion and Clohessy-Wiltshire equation navigation. Proportional
navigation uses two parabolic curves drawn on a range versus
range-rate plot to implement the rendezvous control law, as shown
in Figure 4-14 (overleaf).
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PROPORTIONAL NAVIGATION CURVES
On a log-log plot these curves are drawn as straight lines and
represent lines of constant deceleration. Both curves intersect
the 0,0 point, which corresponds to a completed rendezvous.
Thrusting is always performed directly along the line-of-sight to
the target vehicle so that the upper curve is defined as the
"thrust on" curve and the lower curve as the "thrust off " curve.
By following the zig-zag pattern of thrusting and coasting illus-
trated in the figure, the spacecraft are driven to rendezvous.
Curves are drawn based on the desired "gain" (deceleration
bandwidth) of the control system and in such a way as to cover
expected initial dispersions of the two vehicles. Navigation
requirements for this method consist only of range and range-rate
information and of the ability to see the target or determine a
line-o_-sight to it. Computational requirements are limited to
the ability to determine vehicle position on the range_ range-
rate plane with respect to the two curves. The technique can
also be implemented simply by drawing the curves on a card _or
crewmember reference.
Clohessy-Wiltshire equations are simply equations of relative
motion, linearized _or proximate (less than about 10 km.) vehicle
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ranges. They provide rendezvous targeting information by taking
terminal conditions (rates and displacements equal to z_ro, time
some specified value_, and initial position and yielding initial
velocities necessary to obtain the specified terminal conditions.
Delta-velocity, or required rendezvous thrusting, can then be
solved for by subtracting actual velocity at the initial condi-
tions from the desired velocities. Navigation requirements are
far instrumentation to determine relative position (X, Y, and Z
coordinates) and velocity between target and active vehicle and
instrumentation to monitor thrust targets far delta-v implementa-
tion. Computational requirements are for the ability to solve
the three linearized equations of motion.
Of the two methods, the proportional navigation scheme is simple
to implement, the least sensitive to navigation errors, and
requires the least equipment. The CW navigation scheme is the
more accurate of the two schemes, assuming accurate navigation
equipment (position to less than 10 meters, angles to less than
one degree accuracy), and theoretically requires only the initial
thrusting to accomplish rendezvous. However, it probably requires
an inertial platform on the maneuvering vehicle for delta-v
monitoring during thrusting, either to provide a thrust pointing
angle while monitoring delta-v or to provide separate delta-v
readings for each axis. It is therefore recommended that propor-
tional navigation be implemented for Space Station EVA propulsion
targeting. This will provide good targeting performance with the
least amount of equipment on board the maneuvering vehicle, in-
creasing overall performance.
In pursuit of the goal of maximizing overall maneuvering vehicle
performance, it is desirable to implement navigation and tracking
by placing the minimal amount of equipment (whether used to
determine range and range-rate or velocity and displacement com-
ponents) on the vehicle itself and as much equipment as possible
on the Space Station. It is also desirable to place any neces-
sary computational facilities on the Station, if possible, and
simply to have output displayed at the maneuvering vehicle. If,
in fact, all tracking and navigation functions were resident on
the Station, with only a transponder or similar device an the EVA
crewmember, then this system would provide an excellent basis far
adrift crewmember rescue navigation and targeting. It is there-
fore recommended that navigation and targeting functions be resi-
dent on the Space Station and that each and every EVA crewmember
be equipped only with such equipment as is required to interface
with the Station equipment, such ai a transponder and such data
reception and display equipment as is required for maneuvering
propulsion operations.
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4.6.8 INTERFACES
Many different interfaces were identified in this analysis.
These interfaces are:
Attachment to payloads.
Attachment at a maintenance/repair site
EVA rescue
Vehicle servicing
Vehicle storage
Test, checkout (ATE)
Man/machine (operator controls, displays)
EEU/EMU
Specific interface requirements are listed in Appendix B. In
general, this analysis found that costs, volumes, weights, and
crew times could be minimized by using universal interfaces that
are modular for repairability, and require minimal maintenance.
The man/machine interface should be designed to maximize crewmem-
bet confidence and safety, while minimizing the amount of initial
and ongoing training required to operate the vehicle.
4.6.9 OPERATIONAL LIFE ANALYSIS
The operational life analysis assumed a baseline interval of one
year on-orbit between ground depot maintenance operations. Based
on our previous estimate of sorties per year, the EEU can expect
to be operational for a minimum of 8 6-hour sorties and a maximum
of 32 6-hour sorties per year. As a minimum, then, the EEU will
be operational for 48 hours in one year or about 0.5% of the
time. As a maximum, it can be expected to be operational for 192
hours or about 2.2% of the time. The Tug has very similar use
figures. The conclusion to be derived from this analysis is that
both maneuvering propulsion vehicles will spend nearly all of
their on-orbit lives in storage.
Based on the above conclusion and upon general considerations of
vehicle use and maintenance, it is felt that maneuvering propul-
sion operational life will be maximized by proper design of the
storage facility, specifically:
O
0
0
0
0
0
A storage facility that protects the vehicles from thermal
extremes, micrometeoroids, radiation, and debris.
A simple design using high-reliability components that
require minimal or no periodic maintenance.
A modular design reducing repair times.
Redundant propulsion and control systems to increase
crew safety and confidence.
Tolerance of normal wear and tear with minimal degradation
of protection or capabilities.
A design requiring minimal initial and ongoing operator
training.
Additional discussion can be found in Section 5.7.
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4.7 CREWMEMBER SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS
Accomodation of the crewmembers' regular anatomical functions
(food, water, and waste management) is necessary to support
routine accomplishment of EVA missions. Additionally, the poten-
tial need for in-suit medical care must be considered.
4.7.1 FOOD AND WATER
The EVA Medical/Physiological Requirements document (SSCN
aj020011) states that minimum food and water requirements for an
eight hour EVA are 1.2 liters (40 oz.) of water and 750 Calories
of food. While these figures are somewhat more than the 0.62
liters (210Z) and 200 calories provided by the Shuttle system,
they are not believed to represent an unreasonable extension of
the current Shuttle suit technology.
Water and food, in the current system, are provided by an in-suit
drink bag and a food bar (wrapped in edible rice paper). Both
are accessed, at the crew enclosure neck ring, by use of the
mouth, unassisted by the hands. Inclusion of a hand-in capa-
bility in the EMU-Crew Enclosure design would make the use of
whatever specific designs are designs are decided upon much more
convenient.
4.7.2 WASTE MANAGEMENT
Waste management involves urine, fecal, and vomitus containment
and/or collection.
Urine collection systems have been developed for both men and
women.
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FIGURE 4-15
URINE COLLECTION SYSTEMS
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The device for males, the Urine Collection Device (UCD), is
basically a bag with a size selectable interface for the crewmem-
bet. The device for females, the Disposable Absorption Contain-
ment Trunk (DACT_, is essentially a large diaper and has disad-
vantages in its bulk and changes in fit due to crewmember physi-
cal changes. A Contingency Female Urine Absorbent System
(CFUAS), which operates simlarly to the UCD, has been developed
but never flown.
With either the UCD or the CFUAS, problems with interface fit can
cause serious hygiene problems. The inclusion of a hand-in capa-
bility could greatly reduce this problem.
The EVA Medical/Physiological Requirements document (SSCN
JJ020011) requires the urine collection systems to have capaci-
ties of 1000 co. This is comparable to the current UCD and should
present no design problems.
Fecal containment can best be accomplished by control of diet and
personal habits in order to negate the need for a collection sys-
tem. In case of an "accident" the liquid cooling garment inner
liner will serve as a temporary containment system.
Attempts to develop vomitus containment systems have been
largely unsuccessful due to the reflexive nature of the muscle
contractions involved. It makes it difficult to keep the mouth
enclosed on an entry way. While some work should continue in
this area, emphasis should be given to prevention rather than
containment. Again, a hand-in capability would greatly simplify
implementation of such a system.
4.7.3 MEDICAL CARE
A survey was performed to determine the medical problems that
could be induced by or associated with performance of EVA.
Facilities, equipment, and procedures for prevention diagnosis,
and treatment were identified.
The most likely problems were:
0
0
0
0
0
0
Barotrauma
Evolved gas dysbarism
Gas embolism
Conditions resulting from inadequate environmental
control
Mechanical trauma
Oxygen toxicity
As detailed in Appendix C, treatments for these conditions,
other than medication such as analgesics and decongestants, re-
quire return of the crewmember to the Station. In-suit medica-
tion use would be greatly facilitated by inclusion of a hand-in
capability in the crew enclosure.
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4.8 TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
.............. ,-,._.-,..= s.,.,,,,=r_,= th_ resuxts ov our analysis in
SOW task 3.2.2. A complete listing of the readiness status of
the various approaches can be found in Appendix C, and most of
these approaches are discussed in Sections 4.0-4.7 of this report.
4.8.1 HIGH PRESSURE SUIT TECHNOLOGY
The pressure of the crew enclosure must be high in order to
minimize the risk of decompression sickness. There is a direct
relationship between suit pressure and joint torques. The high
pressure required for physiological reasons thus creates a re-
quirement for technology development to increase mobility at
these higher pressures. The easiest way to do this is to develop
joints which have a constant volume during flexion and therefore
do not have a "preferred" orientation or set point. Also, since
a true constant volume joint is difficult to achieve, some joint
friction is necessary to resist it's tendency to seek the set
point. Obviously, this further increases the torque required to
manipulate the joint. Technology for gloves is so much different
from that for the large joints that it requires separate discus-
sion.
O Gloves: Glove mobility is generally considered to be the
most important element in EVA productivity. Unfortunately,
it has also been the most difficult to provide at an accept-
able level. The main problem has been the adaptation of
manufacturing techniques employed with the larger joints to
the small scale required for gloves. The problem becomes
more acute as attempts are made to accommodate the smaller
end of the target size range. Three concepts are being
pursued to enable higher pressure operation with little or
no degradation in torques and ranges. Two are "soft"
(tucked fabric finger joint) concepts and the other uses a
system of metal bellows and rigid knuckle sections very
similar in concept to the toroidal convolutes under develop-
ment for elbow and knee joints. The "Link-net" soft glove
concept being developed by the David Clark Company has had
prototype tests (Level a), while the ILC soft glove and
the NASA/ARC hard glove are at the conceptual design stage
(Level 3). Any of the three could reach full operational
capability (Level 8) in time for IOC. We recommend contin-
ued pursuit of all three concepts.
O Joints other than gloves: The current Shuttle suit
uses a minimum number of bearings, with tucked fabric used
for joint construction. While this provides acceptable
mobility at Shuttle EMU operating pressures, it is very
pressure-dependent and rapidly degrades productivity during
extended high-pressure operation. Four types of constant
volume joints are being investigated, along with improve
-ments to fabrics and construction techniques for tucked
fabric joints.
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The constant volume joint types are:
o Variable geometry hard sections/bearings (stove-pipe)
o Rolling convolute Single Wall Laminate (SWL)
o External linkage, toroidal convolute SWL
o Internal linkage, toroidal convolute SWL
The mechanical constant volume joints show much greater
promise of achieving the mobility and operational life
requirements than improvements to tucked fabric technology.
The four mechanical joints have all had prototype engineering
models tested in a relevant (manned, pressurized) environment
(Level 6), and could be at Full Operational Capability (Level 8)
by Space Station IOC. Emphasis should be placed on the stove-pipe
and rolling convolute SWL concepts.
4.8.2 CONFIGURATIONS PROVIDING RAPID DON/DOFF WITHOUT ASSISTANCE
For productivity's sake, it is highly desirable to have the
capability for a person to don and doff the crew enclosure with-
out assistance in a minimum time. The horizontal plane closure
currently in use on the Shuttle EMU does not meet this criteria.
While the suit can be donned and doffed unassisted, to do so is
difficult and time-consuming.
Other closure concepts being examined include diagonal (AX-1),
bi-planar (Manned Orbiting Laboratory), and rear-entry (AX-5,
ZPS, Soviet Salyut). The bi-planar and diagonal closures have
had prototypes tested (Level 6). The rear-entry closure is
operational (Level 8) in the Salyut suit and is at the conceptual
design stage (Level 3) for the AX-5 and ZPS suits. Any of the
three closures could be at Level 8 in time for IOC. We recommend
continued effort on the bi-planar and rear-entry closure, with
primary emphasis on the rear-entry method.
4.8.3 HIGH MOBILITY AND LONG TERM WEAR COMFORT
For productivity during routine operations, maximum comfort and
mobility must be provided with minimum torque/effort required.
The technology required for low-torque joints is discussed in
Section 4.8.1.
Shuttle EMU experience has shown that the use of pads to increase
comfort is an individual exercise for each astronaut, but basic
concepts have been developed and pure 02-compatible materials
selected which will be applicable to the Space Station EVAS.
A further recommendation regarding comfort is to continue devel-
opment of crew enclosures which permit a hand-in capability in
minimum external volume.
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4.8.4 IMPROVEDINFORMATIONDISPLAY, STORAGE, AND COMMAND
improving the information processing capability of the EVAS al-
lows increased autonomy for the EVA crewmember to perform his
assigned tasks without requiring the constant support of one or
more IV crewmembers or the ground. A system is envisioned for
the EVAS which not only monitors systems and alerts the crewmem-
bet to anomalies, but actually manages the systems while provid-
ing the capability for a crewmember to access the Space Station
IDMS while EVA. This appears to be completely feasible by util-
izing current technology developed primarily for the commercial
and home electronics markets. The only remaining decisions are
between types of technological solutions for each element of the
system. The recommended course of action is to allow the devel-
opment pace to continue without significant NASA R&D funds being
committed, then simply select and certify the appropriate systems
when required.
0 Display systems are getting smaller, lighter, more capable,
more reliable, less power-hungry, and most of all, LESS
EXPENSIVE by the month. The choice between CRT, liquid
crystal, and a host of other mature technology should be
based on which approach most exceeds the requirements for
the least money. We feel that this will most likely result
in incorporation of one or more high-resolution liquid crys-
tal displays (LCD) in the helmet. Of course, any visual
display will be augmented by some sort of audio alerts in
the event the crewmember is not looking at the display when
a warning occurs. Mature technology here ranges from bells
and buzzers to voice synthesis. Studies have shown that the
optimum audio alert is a synthesized voice with a quality
somewhat less than completely human-sounding, which gets the
crewmember's attention, but allows him to discriminate read-
ily between synthesized and human voices.
0 Like display systems, storage systems unimaginable a few
years ago are today within the budgetary reach of millions
of homes, and their development is accelerating, not just
advancing. This report contains much more information than
would be envisioned to be used during the course of an EVA,
and is contained on two 5-1/4 °° floppy disks which will soon
be obsolete due to their '°low" volume and mass efficiency in
storing large quantities of data. Read/write capabilities
for laser disks, for example, may soon increase this capa-
bility by two or three orders of magnitude. The use of ro-
tating memories (diskettes,etc.) should not be ruled out,
particularly for task or mission specific data such as time-
lines, procedures, etc. Random access memory technology
is sufficiently advanced that it should not be considered as
a constraint of any kind for processing or manipulating data.
0 EVAS DMS control systems, up until now, have consisted of
electromechanical switches on a Displays and Controls Module
(DCM) on the front of the EMU. Voice recognition technology
will probably never do away with this long-proven actuation
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method, but certainly promises to augment it in order to
greatly enhance productivity in two ways. Not only can the
crewmember concentrate on the task at hand during actuation
of the DMS, but the necessity for a DCM which intrudes on
his optimum work area has been eliminated since this would
no longer be the primary interface with the DMS. Virtual
control techniques (coupling a visual display with hand-
position sensing in order to manipulate a virtual switch)
now being developed for military aircraft applications are
not as mature as voice recognition, and even if they were,
have certain peculiarities which limit their application to
an EVAS. For instance, the normal method of allowing the
EVA crewmember to move his head about in the helmet intro-
duces the additional variable of eye position, significantly
complicating the application.
4.8.5 HARD STRUCTURE THERMAL INSULATION
Most concepts for higher pressure crew enclosures involve some
type of hard structures as opposed to the soft suit materials
used for EVA systems to date. The Thermal/Micrometeoroid Garment
(TMG) used for the Shuttle EMU is unsuitable for these hard
materials, and anyway cannot meet the anticipated cycle life
requirements for Station, without further development.
Three types of solutions are being examined
0
0
0
Fabric or composite thermal insulation as on STS EMU
Sold coatings
Aluminum coatings
All three of these concepts are at the conceptual design stage
(Level 3) and could easily reach full operational capability
(Level 8) by IOC. We recommend continued development on all
these concepts with emphasis on fabric/composite insulation due
to the additional advantage of extra micrometeoroid/debris pro-
tection capability.
4.8.6 ON-ORBIT MAINTENANCE, SERVICE, REPAIR, REPLACEMENT
(COMPONENT MODULARITY)
The need for on-orbit repair capability is obvious as stated in
Section 4.0.2.1. The primary challenge to providing this capa-
bility is designing modular components with easy access and few
loose parts.
0 Crew Enclosure: The use of Ortman coupling technology,
Figure 4-7, with some combination of mechanical joints
makes maintenance and repair of the crew enclosure simple
and straightforward. Relevant prototype testing has been
conducted on these concepts (Level &), and they could be
operational (Level 8) by IOC.
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0O
Life Support System: All filters, motors, valves, orifices,
regulators, and electrical fun_tion_ _hn_il_ hm m_X..l=._.=_
along with the obvious batteries, C02 scrubbing system, and
heat sink. Implementation of this requires mainly access
and captive fasteners, and could easily advance from its
current level of critical function tested (Level 4) to full
operational capability (Level 8) by IOC.
Propulsion System: Same concept as LSS. This modularity is
only at the level of basic principles observed and reported
(Level 1), but no problem is perceived in achieving opera-
tional status, especially considering the benign operating
environment (no requirement to withstand launch/landing
loads in operational configuration), which allows much less
rigid construction, along with ease of access to components.
4.8.7 ON-ORBIT FIT CHECK, RESIZINS
Because of the criticality of proper glove fit, we feel that the
use of custom gloves is justified.
On-orbit resizing of the remainder of the crew enclosure is
accomplished identically to crew enclosure maintenance, namely,
through the use of Ortman coupling technology to insert remove
sizing elements from the suit segments corresponding to long
bones (Level 6 now, Level 8 at IOC).
4.8.8 AUTOMATIC SERVICE AND CHECKOUT
Automating any routine function will obviously contribute to
enhancing overall productivity. However, in this instance, the
functions simple to automate have already been automated, while
the remainder will require a visual inspection anyway after
performance, and so provide a rapidly diminishing return.
Specifically:
0 Regeneration of the C02 scrubbing module is the most likely
candidate for automation, involving either the connection of
a regenerating umbilical to the EMU or the removal and
replacement of the C02 module with a fresh one, then initia-
tion of recharge. Termination of recharge would then be
automated based on a predetermined set of parameters. Veri-
fication would be by the EVA crewmember during pre-EVA
activities.
0 If humidity removal is not combined with C02 removal, this
will involve draining an accumulator, a function easily and
quickly accomplished manually. Automation of this function
is simple, but would provide only a minimal enhancement.
0 Battery and fluid (oxygen, nitrogen) recharge automatically
stop after the potential (pressure or voltage) is equalized,
so that only initiation and verification is required.
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0 Cleaning and sterilization of the crew enclosure can easily
be performed during a visual inspection for damage after
EVA; minimal effort should be expended toward automating
this function.
0 Automatic checkout of systems is best accomplished during
EMU donning and activation_ consisting of built-in tests
similar to those in use on the STS EMU (electronic self-test
at start-up, continuous system monitoring during operation).
The only time more complete checks would be required would
be after ORU replacement or maintenance and would not be
automated_ unless they are to be performed frequently.
4.8.9 AUTOMATIC THERMAL CONTROL
From a hardware standpoint, this is easily achievable using
current technology. The only obstacle is development of an
algorithm which provides comfortable control of temperature with
minimum crewmember involvement. Since nominal temperature con-
trol is envisioned to be accomplished by electronic manipulation
of valves_ the implementation of this technology at any point in
the development cycle should be all but transparent to the user
or the designer. Provisions should be made for its incorpora-
tion, with research continuing to develop the proper algorithm.
4.8.10 CONTROLLED EFFLUENT EMU
While no absolute requirement was identified for protection of
sensitive payloads from EVAS effluents, it stands to reason that
minimizing these effluents can only enhance observations by such
instruments as the SIRTF (SAAX 0004). A bigger impact has been
identified in the field of logistics. Use of a sublimator, such
as in the STS EMU_ requires resupply of around .5 kg (1 ibm) per
EVA man-hour. This penalty can be eliminated by use of a regen-
erable heat sink, a system allowing heat leakage in the cold
Space Station environment, or some combination of these. Suffi-
cient volume should be allocated in the LSS to enable inclusion
of such a heat sink, whether or not it is a part of the design at
IOC. An alternative approach is to use dependent life support
for these limited applications as an augmentation to the indepen-
dent life support provided by the LSS.
4.8.11 BASICALLY REGENERABLE EMU
The regeneration of LSS functions as opposed to using consumables
has the obvious advantage of reducing logistics requirements, but
also carries the not-so-obvious disadvantage of increasing LSS
volume for a given number of hours of life support. As stated in
4.1, we feel regeneration technology should be pursued at the
expense of LSS volume. In the event the technology is not ready
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in time for IOC, consumable systems can easily bridge the gap
until it is ready. All that is required is to standardize the
interfaces at the LSS:
0 The cooling system interface should provide a conductive
surface and instrumentation. Primary emphasis should be
placed on simple phase-change systems (without radiators)
augmented as required by umbilical cooling and proper use of
the environment to allow heat to escape from the crew enclo-
sure. As with C02 systems, the Phase B contractor must
trade these systems against the logistics impacts, smaller
volume, and payload contamination impacts of heat rejection
through a sublimator. Implementation of such a regenerable
cooling system should receive a higher priority than regen-
erable C02 removal.
0 The C02 scrubbing system interface should provide inlet,
outlet, cooling, instrumentation, and electrical power
interfaces. All current efforts should be continued toward
developing a regenerable system. Priority should go to the
hollow-fiber membrane approach and to whatever approach is
selected for Station cabin C02 regeneration by NASA in the
course of Phase B WP-01. The Phase B contractor must make
an informed recommendation based on a trade between the
logistics advantages of such a system against the lower
development cost and lesser LSS volume provided by LiOH
systems.
0 The electrical interface should accept whatever standard
power is provided by the Station (400 Hz, 20 kHz) and con-
vert it to whatever is required by the EVAS systems. This
should itself be standardized, if not to the same as the
Station power system, at least to 28 vdc as used on aircraft
systems. Efforts should continue toward increasing the
number of recharges acceptable for EVAS energy storage de-
vices; batteries, fuel cells, mechanical (flywheel).
4.8.12 MECHANICAL END-EFFECTOR
This task was descoped during contract negotiations. A copy of
the MDAC-HB IR&D status report is being provided under separate
COVIr,
4.8.13 8ENERIC WORKSTATION
No technology issues were identified in the development of a
generic workstation. The operational needs must, however, con-
tinue to be refined. At some point, preferably by the Phase B
Interface Requirements Review (IRR), these needs should be frozen
to allow preliminary design work to be conducted on a workstation
which will then itself define the interface to be met by the
remainder of the Station systems and payloads.
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4.8.14 MMU CAUTION/WARNING
Several techniques were identified which would permit passing of
MMU (or EEU, as defined in Section 4.6) data to the EVAS DMS
within the EMU. The most promising approach is to use the opti-
cal data link capability envisioned for the Shuttle EMU. In
addition to being more mature than RF or hardware linkage (Level
5 vs. Level 4), this makes the most efficient use of the mechani-
cal interface envisioned between the EMU and EEU. It also pre-
sents a simpler problem for the design engineer.
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4.9 EVAS/STS INTERFACES
A survey was performed to determine requirements for operating
the Space Station EVAS in conjunction with the Space Shuttle
Orbiter. Two scenarios were developed: the first assumed that
the EVAS would not be operated out of the Orbiter but would only
be used for rescue missions or EVA from the Station in the Orbiter
cargo bay--Section 4.9.1. The second scenario assumed that
the Station EVAS would be operated out of the Orbiter with all
attendant support functions provided by it--Section 4.9.2. A
final point of interest between the Station EVAS and the STS is
that Station EVAS technology might be applicable to an STS
EVAS, assuming that they are not the same system. This is dis-
cussed in Section 4.9.3.
4.9.1 STATION SUPPORTED EVA
If all EVA using the Space Station EVAS is supported only from
the Station, then Orbiter interface requirements are limited to
two: communications and hatch size. The EVA crewmembers must be
able to communicate directly with the Orbiter crew in a straight-
forward fashion, preferably without having to process such com-
munication through the Station. Communications frequencies, data
types, and power levels must then be compatible between the
Orbiter and the Station EVAS. For rescue scenarios, the Station
EMU must be capable of fitting through an Orbiter airlock hatch.
This imposes a size limitation on the Station EMU to be small
enough to fit through the present hatch, in order to avoid re-
quiring a new and larger Orbiter hatch.
4.9.2 ORBITER SUPPORTED EVA
If the Station EVAS is to be operated out of the Orbiter the
following requirements must be met. First, the Orbiter must
provide storage volume for three EMUs and such support equipment
as is deemed necessary. The Orbiter must be capable of securely
storing the potentially much more massive (compared to current)
Station EMUs through launch and landing loads, requiring more
heavy-duty mountings than are currently used, and attendant modi-
fications to the airlock and/or Orbiter middeck area. The Orbiter
must be capable of recharging consumables used by the Station EVAS.
Both the EMU and EEU (required because the Station EVAS LSS will
not interface with the current MMU) require battery recharge so
the Orbiter must supply properly regulated power through correct
connectors to them. The Orbiter must also supply correct power
either to the EMU or to adjacent EMU support equipment for carbon
dioxide control regeneration and heat sink resupply or regenera-
tion, or provide storage space for spare regenerable units. Cor-
rect connections through airlock or middeck umbilicals must also
be supplied. The Orbiter must supply gaseous oxygen to the EMU
for life support recharge and gaseous high pressure nitrogen to
the EEU for propellant recharge through the proper lines and con-
nections. Finally, the Orbiter software must interface with the
EMUs and EEUs for automatic checkout and servicing.
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4.9.3 STATION EVAS TECHNOLOGY APPLICATION TO SHUTTLE EVAS
Even if a separate NSTS EVAS is used, some of the Station EVAS
technology could be employed in it to good advantage. The regen-
erative consumables technology would probably not be used since
the Orbiter would be able to support the consumables use require-
ments easily but would be severely impacted, as noted above, by
regenerable support. While other pieces of Station EVAS techno-
logy may find use on the NSTS EVAS_ the prime area of technology
which could and should be transferred is high pressure suit
technology. This would would favorably impact Shuttle EVA opera-
tions by eliminating or minimizing prebreathe requirements and by
providing easily sized, easily maintained crew enclosures. Most
of all_ the mobility and torque enhancements required in order to
implement higher pressure suits have a major positive impact on
productivity no matter what operating pressure they are used with.
Other maintenance ideas and design philosophy from the Station
EVAS may be employed in the NSTS EVAS to provide a more reliable,
easier to service and maintain_ cheaper to operate system than
the current one.
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SECTION 5
SPACE STATION EVA REQUIREMENTS AND INTERFACE ACCOMMODATIONS
5.1 ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE AND COMPOSITION
The issue of Space Station cabin pressure and atmosphere composi-
tion as it relates to EVA involves a complex interrelationship
among human physiological factors, space suit technology limita-
tions, and complexity of EVA life support systems. The basic
issue includes the following considerations:
I.
2.
3.
4.
Suit pressure relationship to EVA productivity
Physiological relationship of suit pressure to cabin
pressure for reduction of the crewmember's bends risk
Space suit technology readiness for EVA operations at
higher pressures, particularly in regards to gloves
The degree to which EVA requirements for cabin pressure
selection can be imposed over global program issues
Suit Pressure Relationship To EVA Productivity
It has been previously reported, in the Midterm Review Presenta-
tion (DR2) of this study, that the EVA crewmember's joint mobili-
ty and dexterity vary inversely with the suit pressure level.
Constant volume, or near constant volume, type joints are re-
quired in the crew enclosure to eliminate, or at least reduce
this sensitivity. The tucked fabric type joints currently in use
are most sensitive to changes in operating pressure. The crew-
man's overall productivity in accomplishing EVA tasks will be
enhanced by having as low suit pressure as possible.
Physiological Relationship Of Suit Pressure To Cabin Pressure
Reduction of bends risk for crewman about to go EVA has been the
subject of intense study for the STS, and ongoing tests have
further defined this critical relationship. The ratio ("R value")
of the crewman's tissue nitrogen to the total suit pressure
determines acceptable combinations of suit/cabin pressure with
the associated risks determined by the R value selected. The
crewmember's tissue nitrogen level is a variable that can be
controlled by introduction of various prebreathing protocols, all
of which have attendant systems requirements and productivity
penalties associated with them.
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Suit Technology Readiness For High Pressure Operation
In the course of the technology surveys conducted early in this
study, it was our assessment that the highest reasonable pressure
level for operation of a suit incorporating advanced joint de-
signs was around 8 psid. While recent testing indicates that
this number may be somewhat conservative for most joints, the
gloves remain the most sensitive to pressure level. Since they
are also the most critical elements in the ability of the crewman
to perform useful work and since there is a good deal of techni-
cal risk still associated with enhanced gloves, the need to
operate a space suit at the lowest reasonable pressure must
continue to be emphasized.
Global Considerations For Selecting SS Pressure Level
The aforementioned factors that strongly suggested a cabin pres-
sure selection of 10.2 psi were duly considered by the SS program
managers along with other driving issues affecting many areas of
concern. Their recent decision to baseline a 14.7 psi Earth
normal atmosphere for the SS shifts the impacts of the EVA requi-
rements fully onto the EVA systems themselves and away from their
SS interfaces and accommodations. It must be noted, however,
that further studies by the SS phase B contractors, in attempting
to bridge the gap of cabin/suit pressure incompatibility due to
space suit technical limitations, may result in protocol options
that do have impacts on SS architecture and SS/EVAS interfaces to
maximize overall crew productivity. These may include methods
such as use of intermediate pressure levels in the EVA prepara-
tion areas for the suit donning activities or even for the entire
prebreathe period.
5.2 COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS
Communication of information to and from the EVA crewmembers will
be of utmost importance during the Space Station era due to the
multiplexity, complexity, and flexibility of EVA tasks to be
performed. Proper communications will optimize productivity,
increase reliability, and improve operational safety for all EVA
missions.
Communications include voice communication, telemetry, freeze-
frame TV, and full motion TV. Part of the communication problem
is how the data is displayed, since a good display will communi-
cate well the information contained therein while a poor display
may not communicate at all.
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For voice communication, the fundamental requirements are that
any crewmember who needs to be heard can be heard and that all
commun_=t_., =,,wu_d u= =,.uo_n, easy, ana prompt, with no "noise"
if possible. Noise as used here can be simple electronic noise
or other communications of a non-germane nature. To meet this
requirement, the equivalent of two channels of voice communica-
tions are needed for every pair of EVA crewmembers. In this
fashion, each crewmember can transmit on one channel and receive
on the other. The Space Station itself must be capable of recei-
ving each channel and of transmitting either on each channel or
on its own separate channel to each EVA team. The EVAS must then
receive the Station's transmission.
It is anticipated that for IOC, the EVAS must be capable of
supporting EVA by two crewmembers at once with the requirement to
support EVA by four crewmembers working in teams of two within 6
years. This means the equivalent of four channels of voice
communication will be required with a possible station channel
constituting a fifth and sixth channel. In addition, an "All
Call" channel will be required far emergency or off-nominal
operations, for a total of seven channels required.
The major function of telemitry in support of the EVAS will be to
provide IV crewmembers, ground monitors, and a possible on-orbit
expert system EVA monitor with data on crewmember health status
and EVAS hardware status.
Health monitoring will include EKS and respiration readouts for
each crewmember. While outputs from each crewmember can probably
be multiplexed so that each crewmember has only a single biomedi-
cal output, each crewmember will require that one output so that
at IOC two channels will be necessary for this monitoring with
four channels for growth.
Hardware system status can probably be treated like crewmember
biomedical monitoring with a single, higher data rate channel for
each EMU with EEU status information multiplexed into the signal
as required. Payload systems may additionally require teleme-
tered monitoring by the ground or an IV crewman. Whether this
requires a separate channel or can be multiplexed with the EVAS
hardware data is unknown. The EVAS hardware data may be amenable
to multiplexing with the crewman biomedical data, reducing the
required number of channels, but this has not been determined
yet.
Two distinct types of television will be required. One type will
constitute a single freeze-frame transmission from the station
DMS to an individual crewman or to a team of crewmen. The second
type of television will consist of normal-motion transmission
from the EVA crew to the Space Station.
In freeze-frame television use, each team of crewmembers could
receive the same picture. Additionally each crewmember of a team
could receive different pictures simultaneously. Source of the
transmission could be electronically stored data in the DMS
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(a satellite maintenance manual for instance), a diagram placed
on a camera table in the Space Station, or similar transmissions
relayed from the ground.
In normal-motion television, each team should be able to transmit
one channel of data to the Space Station for simultaneous dis-
play, recording, or transmission to the ground.
In all, then, two channels of freeze-frame television transmis-
sion/reception will be required for IOC and four for growth. One
channel of normal-motion television will be required for IOC and
two channels for growth.
It is not clear as yet exactly how EEU targeting will be perfor-
med for the long (approximately 1 kilometer) translations from
the Space Station. If all data taking and targeting functions
are handled within the EEU itself, no communications functions
with the Space Station, other than a possible transponder on the
station, will be required. However, if tracking and targeting
are handled by the Station with data relay to the EEU, then
provision must be made for that data relay. This would require
two channels for both IOC and growth with currently envisaged EEU
manifesting.
Provisions must further be made for communicating with teleopera-
tots and robotic devices. These may be attached or free-flying.
Examples are the MRMS or OMV in teleoperator mode and the OMV or
EEU with FIDO package in robotic mode. Command data must be
transmitted by the station and received by the device, and sys-
tems and status data, probably including television, must be
transmitted by the device and received by the station. Provi-
sions must be made for all of the above functions, but insuffi-
cient detail exists to estimate number of channels or all types
of data.
5.3 DATA MANABEMENT
The EVAS Data Management System (DMS) will be critical to the
success, optimization of tasks and efficiency, and safety of all
Space Station EVA missions, planned or unplanned.
The EVAS DMS will consist of various software and firmware pac-
kages that, depending on their application, are resident in the
EVAS, the Space Station, or both. The EVAS DMS will permit the
EVAS to receive, access, or transmit data from or to the Space
Station Information and Data Management System (IDMS) via RF or
hardline communications. It will also enhance the EVA crewmem-
ber's EVAS system monitoring capability, enhance the Space Sta-
tion's EVA monitoring capability, support EVAS memory management,
and optimize the use of the EVAS and Space Station resources to
provide real-time support to the EVA mission crewmember. Addi-
tionally, the EVAS DMS will be capable of recognizing partial or
complete data communications failure and will be capable of
providing support, on an autonomous basis, to an EVA crewmember
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in a critical failure to achieve a safe return or safe haven.
The fundamental requirements to be imposed on the EVAS Data
Management System (DMS) are the provision of Input/Output (I/O),
Data Handling, and Systems Management capabilities and the allo-
cation of these capabilities to software or firmNare Nithin the
EVAS, the Space Station, or both.
To provide the necessary interface between the EVAS processor,
the Space Station processor, and their corresponding full-duplex
telemetry communications systems, an I/O Data Handling capability
is Narranted. During an EVA, telemetry data can consist of
commands_ status, software loads, alarms, and other data types
necessary for mission success and safety. To most efficiently
use the communications system and maximize data transmission and
reception capability, the I/O system shall be capable of handling
serial, variable length, alphanumeric data strings. Additional-
ly, because certain data can be critical or routine, the transmi-
ssion and reception capability should extend to asynchronous or
synchronous communications.
During an EVA_ it isconsidered probable that the quality or
completeness of a data sequence in the transmission or reception
phase of communications may degrade or experience signal loss for
brief periods. Therefore, to preclude such a failure from cau-
sing any possible erroneous action or possible processing fai-
lures due to the received communications telemetry, the I/O Data
Handling system shall impose a validity test on all communica-
tions. For those data sequences considered life or mission
critical_ a unique validity test sequence shall be performed.
Variations in data type, length, criticality, and priority are
expected to exist within any EVA telemetry communications scena-
rio. To support these communications variations and to optimize
processing_ unique telemetry data formats, with the judicious use
of header words, are considered a necessary requirement on the
I/O Data Handling system. During transmission or reception,
telemetry data shall be formatted or unformatted so that necessa-
ry data characteristics are identified for processing.
During an EVA, it is desirable to maximize the processing capabi-
lity of the EVAS and the Space Station processor, while simulta-
neously reducing the probability of telemetry data loss due to
the receiving processor being utilized for other operations. To
achieve such a goal, the EVAS DMS shall be required to use commu-
nications protocol techniques that will direct the receiving I/O
system to prepare for r_eipt of data. Additionally_ such t_-
hniquee, when developed_ Nill prmit an EVAS or Space Station
processor that is not being addressed to continue its normal
operations with the exception of an "ALL CALL" signal intended
for reception at all processors other than the transmitting unit.
Due to synchronization of signal and processing requirements
inherent to synchronous communications of telemetry data_ the
EVAS resident DMS shall require a timing synchronization signal
from the Space Station on a periodic basis. HoNe,mr, it should
be noted_ that the loss of such • timing signal shall not
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prohibit the EVAS resident DMS from performing in an autonomous
manner.
Because the capability to communicate data bi-directianally bet-
ween the EVAS and the Space Station is a safety concern, it is
prudent to require that the EVAS DMS use bi-directional Keep-
Alive signals. These Keep-Alive signals shall be incorporated
within the telemetry data communications on a periodic basis to
identify to the receiving processor the continued communications
health of the transmitting system. Absence of the Keep-Alive
over some predefined number of periods shall result in an alarm
being issued to the resident IVA or EVA crewmember and approp-
riate action taken. Although loss of telemetry data communica-
tions is the only immediate failure that can be deduced for such
a signal loss, other failures such as a massive power failure or
extreme damage to the EVAS warrant the incorporation of a Keep-
Alive into the EVAS DMS.
In addition to performing those I/O operations necessary to
support telemetry communications during an EVA, the EVAS DMS must
provide the EVAS and the Space Station the capability to perform
those operations necessary for the efficient and safe performance
of the EVAS during its mission. To achieve such a goal, the EVAS
DMS shall be required to provide a complete Systems Management
operations environment via software or firmware. This Systems
Management operations environment shall, as a minimum, include
the following operating systems:
1. EVAS Monitoring and Control - provides the EVAS DMS and
the Space Station the direct interface to all EVAS and EEU
instrumentation and command/control hardware for data samples,
statuses, command/control operations, fault determination and
annunciation_ and all EVAS resident caution and warning
functions.
2. EVA Systems - provides the EVAS DMS the capability to
determine systems health and status of mission-related parameters
for update to the EVA crewmember or the Space Station. This
operating system shall also contain all necessary memory.
3. EEU Suidance and Control - provides the EVAS DMS the
capability to perform all EEU operations necessary for mission
success and safety.
4. Displays Management - interfaces all EVAS DMS
operations to the HM_ whether they are EVAS or Space Station
initiated.
For the purpose of future growth and updates, the above identi-
fied operating systems shall be required to be modular. They
shall also use, where feasible, data base techniques identical to
those used on Space Station to reduce interface impacts and to
permit program loads to most efficiently use both the EVAS and
Space Station processors. Because the EVAS system processor will
be more limited in its capabilities than those available on the
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Space Station, only those functions considered critical to EVAS
and EEU operations for EVA crewmember safety shall be required to
-- _ .............• .... u=,,_ A0, protected memory wltnln the EVA_ in
the event autonomous EVAS operations become necessary. Also, all
operations, whether permanent or non-permanent in EVAS residency,
shall be capable of being loaded into the EVAS by the Space
Station and shall be required to minimize their demands on the
EVAS processor and memory.
To minimize the possibility of data loss during any operation and
to preclude critical functions being performed erroneously, the
EVAS OMS shall be required to be fault tolerant and to be designed
Nith an automatic error recovery feature. An internal mechanism
or design feature shall also be required to prioritize and control
all processing operations within the EVAS to maximize safety
critical performance objectives and mission success objectives.
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RELIABILITY/MAINTAINABILITY
To permit ease of update and increase the efficiency of opera-
tions, the EVAS DMS shall be required to be developed within
those TBD standards for the Space Station Information and Data
Management System; however, those standards that adversely impact
the EVAS° processing capability shall be identified and consi-
dered for exception.
5.4 LOGISTICS
INTRODUCTION
EVAS logistics can be considered under three broad categories:
EMU logistics, EEU logistics, and tool and ancillary equipment
logistics. Our approach to examining these areas is to generate
an overall logistics philosophy, including a definition of five
generic categories of spare parts, and to apply this philosophy
to the specific systems to estimate spares and general resupply
requirements. The result is a preliminary estimate, based heavi-
ly on current experience with similar shuttle systems, of station
EVAS logistics requirements.
DISCUSSION
The following analysis assumes that two crewmembers will be
performing EVA each day within the bounds of an 18-hour workweek
for each crewmember. It is assumed that this will be implemented
via two complete airlocks supporting four separate EMU's and two
EEU°s_ with EVAS performed by at least four separate crewmembers.
In defining an overall logistics philosophy, it is first necessa-
ry to define categories of spare parts. Support in orbit requires
the following categories of ORU's:
Im
2.
_m
4.
5.
Scheduled maintenance items
Regenerable ORU's to support quick turnaround for
contingency EVA's
Single use and/or low MTBF items
Select_ damage-prone items
Select, random failure items
Scheduled maintenance ORU's are items with scheduled replacement
intervals to ensure proper equipment operation. Spares are main-
tained at a level to ensure that EVA to support a ?O-day mission
will not be curtailed by running out of these ORU's. Examples of
this equipment include filters, gas traps, chemical beds, and
mechanisms that must be replaced or actuated to ensure item
integrity. They are not usually life critical, but could delay
scheduled mission plans if not maintained.
Regenerable items are items that after operation require regene-
ration to ensure peak operation. Spares in this category include
batteries, carbon dioxide removal modules, and heat sink modules.
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Here spares are maintained to ensure that 1-hour turnaround can
be effected when contingency EVA is required within the normal
12-hour regeneration period. Regenerated modules are returned to
inventory after servicing is completed.
Single use/low MTBF items can be considered personal and/or
expendable. These items are usually life-limited or crew-preferred
items, such as urine collection devices, undergarments, gloves,
and sizing elements.
Selected damage-prone items are items that through experience or
anticipation are spared for potential damage occurrences that
could affect the mission. Examples of this equipment include
thermal garments, lower torso assemblies or elbow joints that
have no history of failure, but under adverse conditions could
sustain undesirable damage and require replacement.
Selected random failure items are EMU and service equipment items
that must be replaced in the event of failure. Items in this
category include sensors, service equipment, solenoids, and com-
munication equipment. 8enerally these are not life-critical
items, but malfunction would result in EVA sortie abort. On-
orbit replacement is expected to be quick and cost-effective.
As mentioned above the Space Station will maintain four operatio-
nal EMU°s and two operational EEU°s supported by the following
spares:
I.
2.
3.
4.
_e
Sufficient spares to satisfy EVA crew personnel sizing
elements every 90 days.
Sufficient spares to replace expendables and low
reliability items (less than 0.999) for a 90-day cycle.
Four SCU assemblies.
Sufficient quick turnaround recharge/regenerable items
to ensure emergency conditions will be met if normal
recharge/regeneration cycle cannot support contingency
mission needs.
Sufficient spares to support service equipment while
on-orbit. All items must be considered in the ?O-day
resupply to account for unscheduled maintenance problems
that occurred in the previous ?O-day period.
Batteries are considered resupply items because of their usually
low shelf life. All the batteriesv including spares, will proba-
bly have to be replaced every 90 days.
The suit parts are considered resupply items because sizing
considerations will require an inventory revision, including
spares every 90 days.
The spares list assumes that a set of resupply items is provided
prior to the first ?O-day period and resupplied thereafter.
ORU's may be components or modules depending on the capability of
the subsystem instrumentation to isolate the fault. Failure
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detection for each ORU will require added instrumentation and
information processing in the EMU Caution and Warning System.
Applying these definitions to specific systems yields the spares
lists as described in the accompanying tables. Table 5-1 lists
EMU spares, Table 5-2 lists EEU spares, and Table 5-3 lists
spares for tools and ancillary equipment.
TABLE 5-1
PROaECTED EMU SPARES REQUIREMENTS
ON-ORBIT EMU SPARES - One time delivery; replenish as required
ITEM QUANTITY MASS VOLUME
kg (Ibm) liters (_t**3)
EMU LSS 2 378 (834) 382 (13.5)
SCU 2 10(22) 57(2.0)
Phase Change Heat Exchanger 2 20(43) 28 ( 1. O)
C02 Removal Canister 2 98(216) 76(2.7)
CWS 1 2( 5) 3(0.1)
DCM 1 7(15) 6(0.2)
EVC 1 5( 11) 3(0.1)
EMU RESUPPLY 90 DAYS - Size sensitive, damage prone, and limited
li_e items
ITEM QUANTITY MASS VOLUME
kg (Ibm) liters (ft**3)
SSA (less LCVG, CCA, UCD/
DFXT, IDB) 2 161(354) 312(11.0)
Filters 1 Set .5( 1) 6(0.2)
Batteries 8 218 (480) 142 ( 5. O)
C02 Sensors 2 1 ( 2) 6 ( O. 2)
8loves 10 34 ( 75 ) 71 (2.5)
Sue t Components As Requi red 79 (175) 127 (4.5)
UCI) 32 Max 8(17) 57(2.0)
DACT 32 Max 7(16) 142(5.0)
Vomitus Collector 4 1( 2) 3( O. 1)
IDB 2 .5( 1) 14(0.5)
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TABLE 5-1
PROJECTED EMU SPARES REQUIREMENTS (CONTINUED)
ON-ORBIT SERVICE EQUIPMENT SPARES - One time delivery; replenish
as required
ITEM QUANTITY MASS VOLUME
kg (Ibm) liters (ft**3)
Pump Separator 1
Power Supply/Battery Charger 1
Fan 1
Fan Separator 1
Solenoid Valves 2
Compressor Head 1
Cammunicaton/Data Interface
Equipment 1
Regulator 1
Controller 1
Filters Miscellaneous 1 Set
5.0(10) 6.0(0.2)
2:3.0(50) 14.0(0.5)
5.0( 10) 6.0(0.2)
5.0( 10) 6.0(0.2)
0.5( 1) 0.3(0.01)
5.0( 10) 1.4(0.05)
0.2(0.5) 0.6(0.02)
2.0(4.0) 0.6(0.02)
1.0(3.0) 6.0(0.2 )
0.5(1.0) 6.0(0.2 )
SERVICE EQUIPMENT RESUPPLY 90 DAYS - Limited life items
ITEM QUANTITY MASS
kg (Ibm)
VOLUME
liters (ft**3)
Fi 1ters 1 Set .3(0.6) 6(0.2)
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TABLE 5-2
PROJECTED EEU/FSS SPARES REQUIREMENTS
SPARES REQUIRED PER YEAR
ITEM QTY
UNIT TOTAL
VOL MASS VOL MASS
(CC) (KS) (CC) (KG)
(1,2) (1,2) (1,2) (1,2)
Central Electronics Unit (3) 2
Regulator 2
Isolation Valve 2
Thruster Triad (2 RH & 2 LH) 4
Quick Disconnect Fittings 2
EMU/MMU Interface (3) 1
Control Arms with Handcontrollers 2
Locator Lights 2
Lap Belt 2
Small Hardware Set (3) 2
Batteries (3) (4) 4
Paint (3) 1
Velcro 1
Lubricant (4) 1
Service and C/O Connectors (3) 2
Internal Electrical Connectors (3) 4
Internal Fluid Connectors (3) 2
Propellant Filters (4) 80
Circuit Breakers 2
Switches 2
PLSS Latch (3) 2
FSS Latch (3) 2
Battery Latch (3) 2
Wire (3) 3
Propellant Line Repair Mat'ls (3) 2
Propellant Vessel (3) 2
33000 9.1 66000
1500 0.4 3000
1400 1.3 2800
3000 1.4 12000
500 0.5 1000
1000 0.9 1000
15500 4.6 31000
500 0.3 1000
500 0.5 1000
1100 1.0 2200
7900 6.8 31600
500 0.5 500
500 0.5 500
500 0.5 500
500 0.5 1000
135 0.3 540
270 0.3 540
7 0.1 560
135 0.1 270
135 0.1 270
2800 1.0 5600
550 1.0 1100
550 1.0 1100
1650 0.3 4950
260 0.7 520
10000 18.0 20000
Totals 84392 51.9 190550 125.1
1. Volumes and masses are based on presently used MMU components.
1 Volumes and masses are for components only and do not include packing
material and containers.
. Item definition not sufficiently precise for an exact volume and mass;
therefore, volumes and masses are rough estimates.
4. Resupply item.
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TABLE 5-3
PROJECTED ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT SPARES REQUIREMENTS
SPARES REQUIRED PER YEAR
ITEM
TOTAL
MASS VOLUME
QTY (KG) (CO)
SaN Blades
Trash Bags
Nibbler Bits
Surface Coating Materials
Drill Bits - Set
Welding Rods - Assortment
Brazing Rods
Grinder Pads - Assortment
Rivets - Assortment
Fluid Connectors - Assortment
Electrical Connectors - Assortment
Adhesive Tape - Rolls
Thermal Insulation Material
Gasket/Seal Material
Tie Wrap Assortment
ID Tags
Teflon Tape - Roll
Potting Compound - Can
Coveralls (EVA)
Glove Protectors
Fluid/Gas Sample Collection
Vial
Lubricant
Epoxies
Structural Repair Materials
Fabric Patch Material
Leak Patch Material
Cleaner Material Prepreg Clothes
Electrical Insulation Material
10 1.0 60
200 10.0 72000
10 0.5 30
1 5.0 4500
1 1.0 450
1 2.0 650
1 1.5 a50
1 1.0 3600
1 1.0 2000
5 0.5 3000
5 0.5 5000
2 1.5 3200
1 2.0 20000
1 0.1 250
1 0.25 500
1 0.1 50
2 0.1 100
1 1.0 1000
8 2.0 72000
16 2.0 55000
50 0.3 500
1 0.5 500
4 0.5 2000
1 1.0 20000
1 2.0 20000
1 0.75 1600
200 15.0 72000
1 1.0 1000
Totals
All items are spares - resupply as required.
In addition to the above logistics requirements, it will also be
necessary to resupply propellant for EVA maneuvering propulsion.
Two alternatives are possible, as defined in the midterm report.
The first alternative assumes two different maneuvering vehicles,
the EEU and an OMV-class vehicle (TUB). The maximum projected
propellant use for each vehicle was given in the midterm report
as 1152 kilograms per year and 782 kilograms per year, respecti-
vely. A 20% overhead was added to account for residuals not
available for use. The resulting volumes required for 90-day,
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180-day, and 3bO-day supplies of propellant are listed in Table 5-4
under "Case 1" for five different gaseous state storage pressures
and for cryogenic liquid storage.
The second alternative vehicle complement, Case 2 in Table 5-4,
assumes that the EEU is the sole maneuvering vehicle. The maxi-
mum propellant consumption per year for this case is estimated to
be 4680 kilograms per year. With the 20% overhead for residuals,
this figure becomes 5620 kilograms. Table 5-4, Case 2, lists the
volume and spherical radius parameters for this mass of fuel.
The larger amount of propellant required for the EEU-only vehicle
complement is mainly attributable to the relative inefficiency of
a small vehicle handling bigger payloads, as borne out in SOS
simulations. In these simulations, the larger thrust moment arms
of a larger vehicle (the TUG) were more efficient in controlling
vehicle rotations in the attitude hold mode and also provided
more control authority and higher maneuvering precision than the
smaller thrust moment arms of the smaller vehicle (the EEU).
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TABLE 5-4
PROPELLANT STORAGE REQUIREMENTS (!)
DAYS
SUPPLY
CASE 1
90
180
36O
(REFER
MASS SPHERICAL PRESSURE/
REQUIRED DENSITY VOLUME RADIUS STATE
(KG) (2) (KS/M3) (M3) (3) (M) (3) KPA (PSI)
TO TEXT)
580.25
1160.5
2321
278.72 2.08 0.79
302.75 1.91 0.77
403.67 1.43 0.7
470.69 1.23 0.66
521.13 1.11 0.65
791.31 0.8 0.64
338.33 4.16 0.99
302.75 3.83 0.97
403.67 2.87 0.88
470.69 2.46 0.83
521.13 2.22 0.83
791.31 1.61 0.81
278.72 8.32 1.25
302.75 7.66 1.21
403.67 5.74 1.1
470.69 4.93 1.05
521.13 4.45 1.04
781.31 3.22 1.01
24115 (3500)18AS
31005 (4500)18AS
41340 (6000)ISAS
55120 (8000)/GAS
68900 (IO000)/GAS
LIQUID/CRYO
74115 (3500)/SAS
31005 (4500)/GAS
41340 (6000)/GAS
55120 (8000)/SAS
68900 (IO000)/SAS
LIQUID/CRYO
24115 (3500)18AS
31005 (4500)ISAS
41340 (6000)ISAS
55120 (8000)/GAS
68900 (IO000)/8AS
LIQUID/CRYO
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TABLE 5-4
PROPELLANT STORAGE REQUIREMENTS (1) (CONTINUED)
CASE 2 (REFER TO TEXT)
MASS SPHERICAL PRESSURE/
DAYS REQUIRED DENSITY VOLUME RADIUS STATE
SUPPLY (KG) (2) (KG/M3) (M3) (3) (M) (3) KPA (PSI)
90 1405
180 2810
360 5620
278.72 5.04 1.06
302.75 4.64 1.03
403.67 3.48 0.93
470.69 2.98 0.89
521.13 2.69 0.88
791.31 1.95 0.86
278.72 10.08 1.33
302.75 9.28 1.29
403.67 6.96 1.18
470.69 5.96 1.12
521.13 5.39 1.12
791.31 3.9 1.08
278.72 20.16 1.67
302.75 18.56 1.63
403.67 13.92 1.48
470.69 11.93 1.41
521.13 10.78 1.41
791.31 7.81 1.36
24115 (3500)/GAS
31005 (4500)/GAS
41340 (6000)/GAS
55120 (8000)/GAS
68900 (10000)/GAS
L IQU ID/CRYO
24115 (3500)/GAS
31005 (4500)/GAS
41340 (6000)/GAS
55120 (8000)/GAS
68900 (IO000)/GAS
LIQUID/CRYO
24115 (3500)/GAS
31005 (4500)/GAS
41340 (6000)/GAS
55120 (8000)/GAS
68900 (IO000)/GA_
LIQUID/CRYO
I.
2.
.
GASEOUS STATE DATA ASSUMES NITROGEN AT ZERO DEGREES CENTIGRADE.
BASED ON PROPELLANT CONSUMPTION ESTIMATES PRESENTED IN THE MDTSCO MIDTERI
REPORT, WITH 20% ADDED FOR RESIDUALS.
LIQUID STATE VOLUMES AND RADII COMPUTED FOR 110% OF PROPELLANT VOLUME TO
ACCOUNT FOR VAPOR SPACE.
Note that the spherical radii given in Table 5-4 are inside
dimensions. The total volume occupied by the container requires
the addition of the container wall dimension, insulation, and
outer containers, as required. Research indicates that cryogenic
containers can normally only be filled to 90% of maximum capaci-
ty, due to vapor space. Therefore, the volumes for the cryogenic
media have been increased by 10% to allow for the vapor space.
The corresponding radii reflect this increase in volume.
As Table 5-4 indicates, gaseous state storage requires a greater
volume than liquid state storage, but is less complex than the
cryogenic storage systems. Another consideration is the tendency
of cryogenic liquids to return to the gaseous state ("boil off")
as the temperature of the outer layers of liquid in the container
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increases. The boil off phenomenon is normally dealt with in one
of two ways. The first, allowing the gasified media to escape,
is wasteful in the Space Station application, especially with an
estimated rate of loss of 1 to 3% of the stored mass per day.
The second method, recycling the gaseous boil off (reconverting
it to a liquid and returning it to the cryogenic tank), is expen-
sive in terms of system complexity and power consumption. A
third alternative may be feasible, using the boil off to pressu-
rize a separate gas container for vehicle recharging and recyc-
ling the excess back into the cryogenic tank. The quantity of
boiled off gas may not be sufficient to charge the gas holding
tank rapidly, however. An analogy may be found in the Orbiter
Power Reactant Storage Assembly (PRSA), wherein boil off from
cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen storage containers is used to
supply the fuel cells. In the orbiter, heaters are used inside
the cryogenic storage tanks to speed the liquid-to-gas conversion
process to supply the required gas flow rates to the fuel cells.
The same approach could be used on-orbit if the Space Station
uses cryogenic storage to facilitate conversion of the cryogenic
propellant to a gaseous state.
In addition to the boil off during storage on-orbit, a problem
may exist during the period from installation of the charged
cryogenic container in the orbiter payload bay until arrival at
the station. If the time is greater than a few days, the quanti-
ty of gas in the container could significantly increase the
pressure inside the container, if it is not allowed to escape.
Simply allowing the boil off to escape inside the closed payload
bay could adversely affect other payloads in the bay. Additiona-
lly, the problem of slosh in the partially full container during
launch could have adverse effects on the launch guidance and
control systems. A system to recycle the boil off during pre-
launch storage and launch would consume large amounts of power
for the pumps and compressors needed to re-liquify the gas.
Furthermore, additional volume is required to store the cooling
agent used to re-liquify the gaseous propellant boiled off.
Since these coolants are normally cryogens that are converted to
gases in the cooling process, this technique raises the problems
of storage and what to do with the used coolant.
In considering the above, the best approach appears to be tran-
sporting the propellant as a high pressure gas. The relatively
simple storage requirements and lack of propellant slosh are the
primary advantages. On-orbit storage could use either the cryo-
genic/gaseous state storage discussed earlier or a simple high-
pressure gaseous state storage. Again, the relative merits of
system complexity and power requirements must be traded off
against volume constraints.
If it can be assumed that two vehicles will be used (Case 1) and
if the MDAC estimates for cold gas propellant consumption are
accurate, then it appears feasible to transport a 1-year supply
of gas to the station at a time. The relative merits of this
philosophy include more payload bay volume and more available
payload weight for other uses on three of four ?O-day resupply
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sorties and a potential reduction in the amount of time required
for the orbiter to be on-site for the resupply operation.
5.5 SAFETY HAVEN
At the nominal Space Station altitude and inclination, an EVA
crewmember may be exposed to fairly high levels of particle
radiation as the station passes through the South Atlantic
Anomaly (SAA} in the Van Allen Radiation Belts. These exposures
can quickly reach safe limits if EVA is performed during this
time frame. Similarly, Solar Flares may occasionally present a
radiation hazard to an EVA crewmember. Furthermore, if an EVA
crewmember suffers a catastrophic failure of his EVAS at some
distance from the pressurized portion of the Space Station, he
may be at a great hazard. An EVA safe haven pressurizable volume
has been proposed as a solution to the catastrophic problems.
The following discussion examines the issues in more detail.
In the presence of a very intense Solar Flare Ce.g., 1000 rad),
EVA must be aborted and the crewmember must retreat to a safe
haven with shielding of at least 10 gm/cm2. There is at least a
30- to 60-minute warning before such a Solar Flare would reach
the station. This type of activity only occurs one or two times
in an 11-year cycle and generally lasts several days. Intense
radiation is limited to a few hours. Most of the time, the
crewmember would be able to reach the safety of the station
before the effects of the flare would be felt. Therefore, no
safe haven appears to be necessary in this case.
As discussed earlier in section 4.2.1, EVA operations can be
scheduled around the South Atlantic Anomaly radiation hazard.
Therefore, no safe haven is required for protection from this or
any other radiation hazard.
In case of a catastrophic failure such as the suit becoming torn
or punctured, the crewmember needs to reach a safe location
quickly. In this case it needs to be a pressurized safe haven
that has all the necessary provisions where the crewmember can
either repair the suit or be brought back to the Station airlock.
In the case of an incapacitated crewmember due to space adapta-
tion syndrome, induced nausea, or some other major medical prob-
lem, a few minutes difference in getting help could be enormously
important. The crewmember's partner may need this time to get
him to some pressurized safe haven location where he can receive
immediate treatment.
An independent safety haven, however, may not be required, depen-
ding on what type of translation system is available. The crew-
member needs a fast means of transportation so that he can reach
the Station airlock quickly in an emergency. This transportation
system can range from a "dumbwaiter", which is permanently moun-
ted along the keel, to an EEU, which would have to be worn at all
times. Another possibility is to ride the MRMS, but this would be
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too slow in an emergency so it should be ruled out.
Ba_ed on the current reference configuration of the Space Station
(modules and airlock located at the one end of the keel), a
crewmember can be approximately 200 feet away from the Station
pressurized volume at the time of an accident or emergency.
Depending on the exact accident profile or emergency condition,
he may only have a very short amount of time to reach a pressu-
rized area. With this time factor being critical, even with a
rapid translation device such as a dumbwaiter, he may not be able
to reach the Station interior in time. Therefore, a pressurizable
safe haven must be as close as possible to the worksite. It must
have the capability to be pressurized very quickly. The crewmember
might receive ear damage due to this rapid pressurization, but he
will have a much improved chance of surviving. If the safe haven
is portable via the RMS, then it can be brought from the worksite
to mate with the station docking module with the crewmember in a
safe environment inside. Therefore, hatch interface should be
developed to dock with the Station airlock and/or the Shuttle
docking port so that the crewmember can transfer to the Station
interior from the safe haven while remaining pressurized.
Utility of the EVA safety haven must be considered. If the fai-
lures it is designed to protect against are considered to be so
unlikely that the risk incurred in not having the safe haven is
acceptable, then there is no requirement for it. The opposite is
also true. A decision must await further EVAS hardware defi-
nition to allow better accident/failure prediction and further
safety haven definition to allow prediction of safety haven costs.
5. b SPACE STATION INTERIOR REQUIREMENTS
Space Station interior requirements refers to accommodations for
the EVAS, interior to the Space Station pressurized volume. This
is considered, for purposes of this evaluation, to be separate
from the airlock and the logistics module. Thus any services or
stowage supplied by the airlock or logistics module should not be
duplicated in the Space Station interior.
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Space Station support requirements fall into the following major
categories:
Ii
2.
3.
4.
5.
Servicing
Maintenance
Checkout
Prep and Post
Stowage (of EVAS spares)
For purposes of this report, the Space Station can provide these
functions in three areas:
i.
2.
3.
Airlock
Logistics Module
Space Station Interior (Common Modules)
There is considerable possible overlap in how these functions can
be allocated to the possible locations. The first step then is
to perform the suggested allocation:
Ii
.
3.
Airlock
a. Servicing
b. Checkout
c. Prep and Post
Logistics Module
a. Stowage (of EVAS Spares)
Space Station Interior
a. Maintenance
The maintenance functions to be performed in the Space Station
interior involve standard scheduled maintenance and repair of any
components found necessary by checkout in the airlock. The major
divisions of the EVAS on which this maintenance is to be perfor-
med are:
I.
2.
3.
4.
Crew Enclosure
Life Support System
Propulsion System
EVA Tools
Maintenance and repair equipment for the Life Support System,
Propulsion System, and EVAS tools involves that equipment needed
for evaluation and repair of electrical/mechanical systems. This
equipment includes: screwdrivers, clamps, am meters, volt me-
ters, and soldering equipment. If proper design work is done in
advance, much, if not all, of this equipment can be common with
IV tools and equipment. In addition, any extra equipment for
safing of high pressure systems while working on them IV will be
needed.
Both the Life Support and Propulsion Systems will require moun-
ting positions to secure them while they are worked on. These
mountings should allow easy access to the units from all perti-
nent angles.
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Cleanliness levels for both the Life Support and Propulsion
Systems are only generally clean (as for the crew enclosure and
EVA tools). The excaptian to this will be on the Life Support
System oxygen subsystem. Here a cleanliness of 10,000 will be
required whenever pressurization above 500 psi is accomplished.
Maintenance and repair of the crew enclosure will involve bearing
and lock maintenance and repair/replacement of any leaking suit
components. Again, use of standard IV screwdrivers and other
tools should be possible.
In discussing the crew enclosure, it should be noted that the
most difficult problem could be isolating the source of a leak.
Procedures currently in use include leak teck_ halogen detector,
and individual pressure test on suit components. These methods
are used on the ground only and are either not suitable or inef-
fective for Space Station use. Leak reck involves use of a soapy
liquid applied over the area of a suspected leak. It is effec-
tive only if the area in which the leak is located is already
known.
Halogen detectors can be used only if freon is pumped into the
suit. The detector reacts to the freon setting off a loud noise
at the point of the leak. Use of freon in the closed environment
of the Station, however, would have to be extremely restricted.
Pressure testing of components (arms, legs, etc.) is effective
but requires a test stand and equipment (mounting fixtures, test
plugs, etc.). This equipment has penalties in terms of power,
volumev and mass. This procedure would also consume a good deal
of IV crew time.
To circumvent these problems, a new approach to leak detection in
the crew enclosure is suggested. Since the oxygen pumped into
the suit for leak checks will be at least subtly different in
temperature from ambient in the airlock, an infrared detection
system for leak detection should be practical. The detector
could be either a scope or video camera, and the leak isolation
could be done in the airlock don/doff area.
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5.7 SPACE STATION EXTERIOR
This study was undertaken to identify interface requirements for
Space Station exterior operations. The objective of this study
is to define the operational requirements that should be consi-
dered prior to design of the Station exterior, EVA workstation,
and mobility aids.
STS experience has demonstrated that on-orbit repair, servicing,
and maintenance of spacecraft is more cost effective than retur-
ning the vehicle to the ground for work. In the case of the
Space Station and other satellites in orbit during that time
frame, routine and contingency repairs, maintenance, and servi-
cing will be accomplished on-orbit. To facilitate on-orbit ser-
vicing and repair, subsystem and component design and the overall
design of the Space Station and other orbiting vehicles should be
compatible with EVA in general and with EVA servicing in particular.
This section discusses Space Station exterior design for inter-
face with the EVAS system, an area where compatibility is of
great concern. This area can be broken up into five subcatego-
ties:
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
EVA Access Requirements
EVA Workstation Design
Dependent Life Support Subsystem
EVA Storage
External Safety Requirements
The following sections address each of the five categories in
turn.
EVA Access Requirements
EVA operations should have access to all exterior areas of the
Space Station for Station and spacecraft assembly or servicing.
Handholds and handrails will be required for translation to and
positioning at any location on the exterior of the Space Station.
Provision of an effective means of transporting the crewmember to
and from his worksite will mean less time spent on unproductive
translation activities and more time for task performance. More
than one type of such mobility hardware may be required to enable
efficient transport of small and large items. Handrails consti-
tute the basic provision, as stated above, but other aids similar
to the current Shuttle EVA slidewire or more sophisticated de-
vices, possibly motor-driven, such as "clothesline" or "dumbwaiter"
concepts, will be necessary for rapid, efficient translation over
major Space Station distances. It should be noted that free-
flying translation via the EEU was considered as a possible
solution to this last question, but was dismissed because it
required large amounts of propellant for nominal translations.
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EVA Workstation Design
A satellit_ slrvicing workstation will be required to manipulate,
position, and service said spacecraft while in EVA and can be
used to service other large modules, as required. The worksta-
tion should have standard interfaces that accommodate required
tools and EVA mobility and positioning aids (such as a portable
foot restraint) to maximize EVA crew productivity. The work
station will provide its own restraints, either fixed or portab-
le, as well as provisions for storing and restraining tools,
spare parts, and vehicle components during the maintenance/repair
activity.
The workstation must, as a minimum, accommodate servicing of the
Hubble Space Telescope at the large end of the spectrum, but be
capable of restraining an EEU Central Electronics Unit for main-
tenance at the small end. It must allow maximum flexibility in
positioning and restraining the item under repair.
The workstation should interface with automatic test equipment
resident in the Station (probably the station DMS) for spacecraft
and component diagnosis, test, and checkout.
Dependent Life Support Subsystem
A Dependent Life Support Subsystem (DLSS), via EVA umbilical, is
justified on two accounts. First, it may be necessary to extend
an EVA beyond the capability of the EMU's self-contained life
support subsystem. This situation could especially arise if a
regenerable system were down-sized to limit the volume of the
outer shell of the LSS, making the EMU less cumbersome and bulky
but also lowering the allowable independent EVA time. It is
still debatable as to whether or not such a down-sizing will be
necessary, but if it is, a dependent life support capability, via
an umbilical, will certainly be necessary. The second
justification for a DLSS is that it can be made to be fully self-
contained, that is, without any effluents, so that it would not
contaminate any sensitive payloads or instruments while
operating. If the EMU LSS is fully self-contained anyway, then
the DLSS may not be an advantage over it. Beyond this, there is
a good deal of concern that the normal leak rate of the EMU Crew
Enclosure may be such that it alone provides more contamination
than some sensitive equipment can tolerate.
Further design details or, rather, more maturity of the Space
Station EMU is required before a decision for a DLSS is made.
Provisioning for a DLSS, though, should be relatively simple.
Length of the actual umbilical should be based on the maximum
length that is operationally tolerable. "Tolerable" is certainly
the correct word, since from an operational standpoint umbilicals
are encumbrances. In zero-g they act as a drag and entanglement
and are to be avoided unless there is no alternative. A DLSS
support network would have to be emplaced throughout the Station
exterior with "junction boxes" for umbilical interface as
necessary to allow EVA access to all parts of the Station while
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using the DLSS. The basic spacing between the junction boxes
would be equal to two times the length of the tolerable umbili-
cal. This, again, would allow access to all portions of the
Station.
EVA Storage
The optimum storage location for most EVA equipment would be
outside the Space Station pressurized volume. Outside storage
reduces wear and tear incurred during translation through the
airlock, maximizes available airlock volume for suit don and doff
and necessary storage, and maximizes the availability of equip-
ment to the EVA crewmembers. The disadvantages of outside sto-
rage are the requirements imposed by the environment. Protection
must be available to minimize damage to equipment caused by
thermal extremes, micrometeoroids, and radiation. An EV storage
facility to stow all possible tools and equipment outside while
providing the necessary protection from the environment should,
then, be provided. This facility should be located near the EVA
airlock (perhaps on its exterior surface) to minimize the time
and effort required to acquire or stow tools and equipment during
EVA.
External Safety Requirements
Sharp corner/edge, impact, and general design safety requirements
for equipment interfacing with the Shuttle EVAS are covered in
JSC document 10615A, "EVA Description and Design Criteria." A
similar document detailing design criteria for equipment interfa-
cing with the Space Station EVAS will be required and is assumed.
This document should be standard for safety-related requirements
as well as for general EVA interface requirements. One area that
aSC 10615A does not address is that of an EVA safe haven, which
would provide radiation protection and a pressurizable volume for
emergencies. Normally this subject would be included in this
section, but because of its magnitude, it is discussed separately
in this document.
Some sort of autonomous rescue capability - autonomous to the
Station - must be provided to rescue stranded, free-floating
crewmembers. The crewmember may have been the victim of a malfu-
nctioning EEU and possibly be as much as 1 kilometer away from
the Station, or he may simply have experienced a broken tether
and so, probably, be quite close to the station. In either case,
the capability to rescue him must exist.
In the first situation, besides being some distance from the
Station, the crewmember may also have a signficant opening rate
with respect to it. In this case, a free-flying rescue vehicle
is necessary. This vehicle would be similar to an EEU and could
be manned, robotic, or teleoperator controlled from within the
vehicle. Since time is of the essence in a rescue situation such
as this, the latter two options are favored. They would allow
immediate initiation of the rescue, whereas the manned vehicle
option would require waiting for a second EVA crewmember to
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arrive at the vehicle storage site and performing subsequent
checkout procedures (though abbreviated, of course) before rescue
initiation. The robotic/teleoperator vehicle could be a unit
designed to plug into an EEU, and in fact, such a vehicle has
been proposed as an EVA astronaut assistant. This vehicle should
be pursued because of its importance as a rescue device and
because of its added usefulness to the EVA astronaut. If it is
adopted, provision for this device must be made on the exterior
of the Station. This will probably be an automated storage
facility and, if the EEU is used, will simply be the EEU FSS.
If the stranded astronaut is in reasonably close proximity to the
Station structure, he may be able to rescue himself with some
sort of self-contained line-thrower. Several devices to perform
this function have been proposed, but no detailed concepts exist.
This is considered to be a prims area for experimentation on
Shuttle flights prior to Station construction. Depending on the
design adopted, if one is, special interface requirements on the
exterior of the Space Station may or may not be imposed. For
instance, one concept proposes the use of a large net on the
Station exterior that would provide a large target for a stranded
crewmember°s line-thrower. It should be noted that a small
propulsion unit integral to the EMU could also be used in this
case, but may be impractical due to EMU LSS sizing and cost
considerations.
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5.8 AIRLOCK FUNCTIONALDEFINITION
The intent of this section is to provide a definition of an EVA
airlock system for Space Station operations. The goal is to
present feasible airlock concepts that might be considered prior
to incorporating such a system into the final Space Station
configuration. This study will reflect the current convergence
of operational conditions that are considered to be design dri-
vers for an effective EVA support airlock system. Although the
following discussion on airlock requirements is in no way inclu-
sive, it does represent issues that support a preliminary design
concept. References for this section were obtained from the
following sources: the Request for Proposal CRFP), the Reference
Configuration Document (RCD), Data package 2.3 Phase B, and the
Science Division EVA requirements for Space Station Technical
Status Review (TSR}.
To move men and equipment safely beween the pressurized area of a
space craft and the vacuum of space, an airlock is needed. The
airlock permits entering and exiting of the space vehicle without
subjecting the entire crew and equipment to the vacuum of space.
During this process, the airlock atmospheric pressure must be
equal to that of the cabin pressure before a suited crewman can
enter the airlock from the cabin. After entering the airlock and
before exiting into space, the crewman must reduce the airlock
pressure to nearly equal that of space. After the EVA has been
completed and the crewman wishes to re-enter the cabin, the
process must be reversed. This procedure can be accomplished
using two basic methods, the gas expendable method or the gas
recovery method. The simplest airlock pressurization method is
an expendable gas system, whereby all or the greater portion of
the airlock atmosphere is expended overboard for each airlock
use, as in the current shuttle airlock system, (Figure 1}. The
major penalties associated with this type of method, however, are
the cost of resupplying lost gases and providing storage areas
for replacement gases. This process, then, is reasonable only
when a small number of EVA's are planned for a given mission.
The second method recovers the airlock atmosphere by pumping most
of the gases into a separate receiver for re-use (Figure 2}.
This receiver can be the main cabin, a second airlock, a high
pressure container located elsewhere, or a second area of the
airlock module. This pump-down to receiver concept is considered
optimal for high use rates where the less complex expendable gas
systems would discard an amount of gases greater than the total
pump-down cost penalty (e.g., pump weight, pump power cost, and
storage).
This pump-down to receiver method is considered the method of
choice for the Space Station configuration because of the large
number of EVA excursions expected for Station operation. There
are, however, penalties associated with this method of gas reco-
very. Two of the most important cost penalties are pump-down
power and time. Depending on the airlock volume and number of
EVA°s, this operational cost penalty could be substantial. To
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reduce the impact of this cost, it is recommended that the in-
gress and egress area of the airlock be kem_ a_ =m=;1 == n_==_--
le, without jeopardizing crew safety. This would reduce the time
needed for gas pump-down and allow for the use of a smaller pump-
down compressor. For this reason, we recommend that the airlock
be designed with two separate chambers. One larger chamber could
be used for an EVA equipment and service area, while the smaller
chamber could serve as an egress and ingress pathway. The larger
service area could also serve as a special airlock chamber for
large equipment when necessary.
The _ollowing Figure 5-1 provides an idea o_ these two basic
methods.
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FIGURE 5-1
AIRLOCK CONFIGURATIONS
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Still another pressure/volume related design driver for airlock
architecture is the requirement for hyperbaric capability. At
least one airlock must be capable of achieving and holding pres-
sures of up to six atmospheres for the treatment of rapid decom-
pression illness. This illness is caused by the infusion of
gases into the blood while at pressure. If these gases are then
allowed to expand, as in a rapid decompression, they might cause
damage to the crewman that could be fatal in some extreme cases.
For most practical applications, however, the hyperbaric chamber
will be used to treat the effects of bends, which occur when
nitrogen bubbles form in the skeletal joints. The recommended
treatment for these pressure-related contingencies is to repres-
surize the subject as soon as possible to approximately five
times the pressure at sea level and to bring the pressure down in
controlled increments. This procedure allows the blood to disse-
minate the gases from the circulatory system without causing
further distress. Therefore, the airlock will require the proper
controls and displays to aid in the biomedical monitoring of the
affected crewman. The airlock controls and displays will be
required to monitor and assist in the regulation of parameters
such as blood gas levels, heart rate, chamber pressure, chamber
temperature, and chamber gas composition.
For the reasons stated above, the airlock architecture should
include in its design ample room for the transfer of men and
equipment through all hatchways, which would include both the
ingress/egress chamber and the main service chamber. While the
size is yet to be determined, it is suggested that the airlock
hatchways be sized to accommodate a standard equipment rack or
the return of an incapacitated EVA crewman. It is further
recommended that an additional small service airlock be incorpo-
rated into the airlock. This pass-through airlock would be used
to support routine EVA's for tool and equipment requirements and
to provide an emergency passageway in case of medical equipment
needs. This small pass-through airlock should be installed in
the airlock hatchway that separates the main service chamber and
the egress/ingress chamber. The use of this small pass-through
airlock could be expected to save a substantial amount of airlock
cycle time.
Because of the difficulty in anticipating the equipment needs of
the EVA crewmen, it is important to store as much EVA hardware as
possible in areas that will complement the EVA mission require-
ments. Therefore, we suggest that all EVA equipment that is
compatible with a space environment be located in storage areas
external to the airlock, but in close proximity to the airlock
hatchway. For the EVA hardware that requires service, such as
the MMU's, an external service area that can be operated from
inside the airlock would conserve IV space and localize EVA
systems controls. Additional EVA equipment service and checkout
could be accomplished in the main airlock chamber. Localization
of this equipment within the airlock service area will ensure a
quick turnaround time for scheduling flexibility. Because of the
small volume of the airlock service area, however, we recommend
that only required tools and equipment needed in support of EVA
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activities be stored inside the airlock area. All other equip-
ment should be supplied, as needed, from the Space Station common
modules, in addition to localization of EVA service equipment,
it is important to conserve as much room as possible inside the
airlock area. For this reason it is suggested that as much of
the EVA support equipment as possible be equipped with automatic
checkout capabilities. This would reduce the need for crew
involvement in equipment turnaround and improve the reliance on
automatic systems.
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SECTION &
HUMAN PRODUCTIVITY STUDY CROSS TASK COORDINATION - TASK 5
INTRODUCTION
The study contract mandated that an allocation of study resources
be made to coordinating with the Space Station Human Productivity
Study sponsored by the NASA-3SC, Manned Systems Division. NASA
defined, coordinated, and authorized the effort associated with
this task.
&.l REQUIREMENTS AND ISSUES REVIEW
Approximately midway through this study, a set of preliminary
elements and issues related to EVA were provided for review and
comment. As the definition of purely EVA productivity issues had
been left to the EVAS Phase A studies, most of the review items
concerned elements of IVA/EVA interfaces. The material was re-
viewed for consistency with EVAS study findings to date and
applicable lessons learned from the STS and previous programs
experience base.
In addition to providing comments on all EVA related requirements
and issues the critical assumption of baselining pressure suited
operations for the SS Man-Tended Approach (MTA) configuration was
analyzed and various impacts addressed as follows:
O Design requirements would be imposed on all EVA crew inter-
faces to accommodate EVA; such as access, layout/spacing of
switches, etc., for operation by pressure suited crewmembers
as well as overall volumetric requirements of the EMU (ref-
erence 3SC 10a15A).
O It would limit all (IVA & EVA) MTA crew operations to the
maximum EVA time available from NSTS; namely, two six-hour,
t_-man EVAs, for a maximum of 24 man-hours of crew time.
Additional time could possibly be made available by provid-
ing additional EVA consumables, primarily nitrogen for more
airlock repressurization cycles. In-module EVA time could
possibly be extended by providing umbilicals (which do not
now exist) for dependent life support from Shuttle; however,
C02 removal remains an independent life support function and
could be a limiting factor. (LiOH cartridges provide a
minimum of 7 hours of C02 removal but have tested consis-
tently for longer periods).
&-I
00
Even with extended life support capability, operations in a
pressure suit are generally more fatiguing than in shirt
sleeves and would be significantly less productive.
Unless additional EMUs are provided above the two baselined,
use of EMUs by multiple crewmembers (e.g., to support two-
shift operations) would require selecting crewmembers of
comparable anthropometry since Shuttle EMUs have a very
limited on-orbit resizing capability. Providing more EMUs
than the two baselined carries a significant weight and
volume penalty, with no current or planned capability to
stow more than a total of three.
0 It was recommended that EVA not be baselined for MTA IV
operations. EVA has too many encumbrances associated with
its use to be acceptably productive in the cabin. EVA is a
limited resource in itself and the EVA mission requirements
for the baseline MTA payloads already exceed the NSTS capa-
bilities to deliver.
0 If EVA must be considered for IV operations as a contingency
requirement, as it should be, then trade studies must be
performed to determine the optimum degree of imposition of
EVA design requirements, with weighting given to those acti-
vities necessary to reestablish a pressurized environment.
During the course of the review several elements such as 303
Maintainability were found to be generically applicable to the
EVA systems and the guidelines were considered in formulating the
design requirements for the EVAS. Our inputs to the SS Human
Productivity Study were conveyed in our letter HAD-1.0-4947 dated
2a July 1985.
6.2 REVIEW OF PROGRAM PLAN FOR HUMAN PRODUCTIVITY DATA BASE
Late in the course of this study, a copy of the program plan for
development of the Human Productivity Data Base was reviewed.
With the level of detail provided it was not apparent how useful
the data base would be in the EVA area and an illustrative ex-
ample was requested which would in part satisfy the following
concerns|
o How would the user identify the underlying assumptions for
various requirements?
O Can the data base be manipulated by, for instance, altering
a critical assumption, and then can all the ramifications of
such a change be readily displayed for assessment of
impacts?
0 Can the data base be accessed in plain English words or must
the user have specialized knowledge of its architecture,
interrelationships, and vocabulary?
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0 After delivery to NASA, who will exercise control over the
content of the data base, particularly with regard to stand-
=fu._=_.u_ Qf requirements for consistency with the evolving
SS systems design definition?
As the schedule for the SS Human Productivity Data Base runs well
beyond that of this study, it is not anticipated that these
issues will be resolved by contract end.
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SECTION 7
SUMMARY
7.1 STUDY OBJECTIVES ACHIEVED
As they were defined by the Statement o+ Work, our study objec-
tives were achieved by survey and research, analyses and trade
studies. We have developed what we consider to be a comprehen-
sive set of design requirements for the Space Station EVAS and
its interfacing and supporting systems.
In addition to the study contract objectives, the McDonnell-
Douglas team had several other objectives in mind. First, we
were determined to assist NASA in justifying a productive EVA
capability for the Space Station program. As adamant EVA advo-
cates we were strongly motivated to see that EVA and its attend-
ant systems and accommodations received the programmatic atten-
tion they deserved. Secondlyv we were fresh from our experiences
in developing and conducting the STS EVA missions and eager to
apply the lessons learned to the Space Station development ef-
fort. We were confident that as a continuing part of the NASA-
led SS development team, we would share in the downstream bene-
fits of a strong front end effort. Finally, and taking our cue
from a theme consistent throughout the SOW, we wanted to make
sure that all EVA system definition and development efforts were
sensitive to human productivity aspects and impacts which are so
often expressed in non-quantifiable terms.
Our first objective was shown to have been naively conceived as
our mission requirements survey resulted in an EVA mission model
which demands EVA services on a sustained and routine basis.
Even with peak needs exceeding 3000 manhours in a year, the model
must be considered conservative_ since the SS maintenance, ser-
vicing, and repair requirements are poorly defined at this time
and there is virtually no data to support the unplanned or con-
tingency requirements which have been responsible for so much of
the STS recent EVA requirements. We must continue to recognize
that our mission model, as well as those we are aware of being
utilized in SS Phase B trade studies_ are indeed conservative and
may not represent the full scope of EVA requirements for the
Space Station.
Throughout the study we were careful to apply the lessons learned _
from the STS EVA experience base to our analyses and trade stud-
ies and found this background useful in identifying truly useful
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advancements, in weighting trade-off criteria or in assessing all
the ramifications of a new requirement or concept. Extrapolating
from this base also enabled us to characterize the key differ-
ences in EVA capabilities and limitations between the STS and the
SS. While we feel we were thus successful in meeting our second
objective we recognize that there is a continuing need far NASA
and the Space Station contractors to pursue this goal in the
development of EVA systems.
With regards to the emphasis placed on human productivity aspects
of EVA designs, we made a concerted effort to bias our trades in
favor of productivity, even to the point of ignoring development
cost as a discriminator between design options. So far, our
conviction that maximizing the use of the crew as the most criti-
cal SS resource was the highest priority is being borne out by
the EVAS cost trades being performed in the Phase B arena. We
will have a continuing concern, though, that there will be pro-
ductivity impacts resulting from priorities established for dis-
tributing limited SS development funds and minimizing those im-
pacts will be a major challenge to the program. The savings in
operational costs will be the future dividend of that effort.
7.2 AREAS REQUIRING FURTHER STUDY
Phase B studies will continue to refine EVAS requirements during
the SS preliminary design phase, and both contractor and NASA
Advanced Development programs will continue to develop the neces-
sary technologies. We strongly recommend that emphasis be placed
in the following areas as the program advances (Figure 7-1).
7.2.1 KEY ISSUES
The SS program has already recognized the importance of the
radiation exposure issue as it affects the SS as a whole. We
feel that this is the proper perspective to take considering the
frequency, duration_ and dose rate of the possible crew expos-
ures, both IV and EV.
So long as space suit mobility remains affected by suit pressure,
we must look for ways to improve the technology or lower the suit
pressure. This is especially true for the gloves where even a
technology breakthrough would be enhanced even further by lower-
ing the operating pressure. However difficult it is to measure
the impacts of this problem an overall EVA productivity, we are
convinced that it will significantly affect the productive util-
ization of EVA as a valuable program resource.
While we are convinced that a maneuvering propulsion capability
should be a part of the advanced EVAS, we recognize that the
justification for it is not as firmly rooted in mission require-
ments as are the justifications for other systems. The cost of
providing this capability should be carefully balanced against
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KEY ISSUES
0 RADIATION EXPOSURE LIMITS
0 GLOUE DEXTERITY/SUIT MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS US TECHNOLOGY
LIMITS
0 EEU JUSTIFICATION
0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ROBOTICS
DESIGN TRADE STUDIES FOR PHASE B/C/D CONTRACTORS
0 HAND-IN-SUIT CAPABILITY FOR CREW ENCLOSURE US SUIT FIT,
DEXTERITY, EUAS UOLUME IMPACTS
0 CREW ENCLOSURE 30INT DESIGN SELECTION
0 BODY SIZE ACCOMMODATION RANGE US COST OF IMPLEMENTATION
0 DUAL PRESSURE EMU
0 EXTENDED EUA DURATION US EUAS UOLUME GROWTH
0 THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
FIGURE 7-1
AREAS REQUIRING FURTHER STUDY
prioritizmd program needs, regardless of the benefits of having
it. Maneuvering propulsion does remain the only practical solu-
tion to the potential problem of crew rescue.
We have identified a number of areas which would benefit from
advancing technologies in expert systems, teleoperations and
other automation or robotic-type applications. While the imple-
mentation of such advances is still premature in many cases, the
productive benefits warrant continued emphasis.
7.2.2 DESIGN TRADES
The hand-in-suit capability, while offering some significant
benefits for crew health and comfort, must be evaluated for the
potential impacts to suit fit in general, and especially to the
critical glove fit relationship to hand dexterity. The overall
crew enclosure may also tend to grow which may also be a problem.
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While actual selection of the joint designs was not a Phase A
issue, several concepts were evaluated and appear workable. To
prevent development from being hindered, premature selection of
one concept should be avoided. The modularity afforded by all
the current design concepts supports this.
Just as it was far the STS program, the actual crew size range to
be accommodated by the SS program, regardless of the range accom-
modated by the EVAS design, will have to be a carefully consid-
ered decision,based heavily an program cost.
A dual pressure EMU must be considered as an option until the
suit pressure can be maintained at a level that satisfies both
human physiological and productivity considerations. Our re-
quirement far a variable suit pressure reflects the current
dilemma posed by the sea level cabin. This will definitely
require further study.
Several factors (maintainability, regenerative system efficiency,
reliability} continue to conspire to increase the overall volume
of the EVAS. This concern may result in a need to reduce the LSS
volume allocated far time dependent functions which must be
traded off against allowable independent life support time.
The EVAS thermal control system, which was overdesigned for the
STS environment, should benefit even more from the mare thermally
benign SS environment, and thus reduce its volume as the perform-
ance requirements are relieved.
There are numerous other design options to be considered as EVA
systems and subsystems develop. As cast driven compromises have
an effect an crew productivity, continuing effort must be applied
to carefully assess those effects to be sure that negative im-
pacts are properly justified.
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1 LIFE SUPPORT
APPENDIX A
EVAS BASELINE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
1.1 PRESSURIZATION/PRESSURE CONTROL
1.1.1 The Pressure Control System (PCS) shall maintain pressure
at 30-66 kPa (4.3-9.5 psi) through the use of gaseous oxygen
make-up to a closed-loop Atmosphere Revitalization System (ARS).
This pressure shall be selectable on-orbit within 10 minutes.
Capability to vary/adjust pressure during EVA is desirable. Se-
lected pressure shall be maintained plus or minus 3 kPa (0.4 psi)
at flow rates ranging from 0-6 kg/hr.
1.1.2 The PCS shall continue to operate nominally with any
single credible failure including failure of a pressure
regulator.
1.1.3 The PCS shall permit safe return of the EVA crewmember to
a pressurized module after any two credible failures.
1.2 BREATHING OXYGEN
Sufficient breathing oxygen shall be provided to permit 6 hours
of useful work at an average rate of 300 watts (1000 BTU/hr) with
a leak rate of 100 scc/min, plus two hours of combination over-
head/reserve at this rate_ plus 45 minutes of contingency opera-
tions with a leak rate of a kg/hr.
1.3 ATMOSPHERE REVITALIZATION
1.3.1 C02 CONTROL
C02 partial pressure (ppC02) shall be maintained below 3.8 tort
for the first seven hours and below 7.6 tort at all times during
EVA. During periods of metabolic activity > 450 watts (1500
BTU/hr), ppCO2 will be permitted to rise as high as 15 tort, but
must return to normal levels upon cessation of the high metabolic
rate.
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1.3.2 HUMIDITY CONTROL
Relative humidity shall be maintained between 40 and 70 percent.
During periods of metabolic activity > 450 watts (1500 BTU/hr),
relative humidity may rise to > 70 percent9 so long as helmet
fogging is prevented, but must return to normal levels upon ces-
sation of the high metabolic rate.
1.3.3 TRACE CONTAMINATE CONTROL
Particulates, organic compounds, and other contaminates shall be
controlled to physiologically acceptable levels as specified
below:
TABLE A-1
MAXIMUM LEVELS FOR CONTAMINATES
CONTAMINANT
Any particulates
Families of compounds
MAXIMUM LEVEL
(mg/m**3)
0.1
Alcohols 10
Aldehydes 0.1
Aromatic hydrocarbons 3
Esters 30
Ethers 3
Halocarbons
Chlorocarbons 0.2
Chlorofluorocarbons 24
Fluorocarbons 12
Hydrocarbons 3
Inorganic acids 0.08
Ketones 29
Mercaptans 2
Oxides of nitrogen 0.9
Organic acids 5
Organic nitrogens 0.03
Organic sulfides 0.37
Specific compounds
Ammonia
Carbon monoxide
Hydrogen cyanide
17
500
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1.4 THERMALCONTROL
1.4.1 COOLING
The crewmember must be able to maintain thermal comfort at meta-
bolic rates up to 450 watts (1500 BTU/hr), with an average rate
of 300 watts (1000 BTU/hr). Above 450 watts (1500 BTU/hr), some
overheating of the crewmember is to be expected, but the system
must accept metabolic heat loads at rates up to 600 watts (2000
BTU/hr). Automatic temperature control is desirable. If auto-
matic temperature control is implemented, capability for crewmem-
bet selection of set point is mandatory.
1.4.2 HEATING
The crewmember must be able to maintain thermal comfort at meta-
bolic rates as low as 100 watts (340 BTU/hr) during the night
portion of orbits. Automatic temperature control is desirable.
If automatic temperature control is implemented, capability for
crewmember selection of set point is mandatory.
1.5 INSTRUMENTATION
Appropriate transducers, gauges, and/or other sensors shall be
provided to permit the EVA crewmember, the IV crew, or the ground
to ascertain correct functioning of the systems described above.
1.6 ELECTRIC POWER
The system shall accept unconditioned power from the Space
Station electrical system (currently planned at 400 Hz) for EVAS
power system recharge.
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2 ENVIRONMENTALPROTECTION
2.1 RADIATION
2.1.1 IONIZING
2.1.1.1 The EVAS shall provide sufficient protection from proton
radiation to maintain the crewmembers ° total mission dose at or
below the allowable dose for the Space Station program. The
level of protection provided shall in no case be less than that
provided by the Shuttle EMU. All non-emergency EVA shall be
scheduled so as not to coincide with passes through the South
Atlantic Anomaly in the inner Van Allen radiation belt.
2.1.1.2 RF radiation protection will be provided by operational
restrictions on Station antenna selection, pointing, and power
levels during EVA; as such, no specific requirement is placed on
the EVAS.
2.1.2 NON-IONIZING
2.1.2.1 The crewmembers ° eyes shall be protected from UV radia-
tion. Intensity of ultraviolet radiation admitted to the crew
enclosure shall be no more than that admitted by the Shuttle
helmet/visor assembly, including the gold visor.
2.1.2.2 If a polycarbonate is used for the helmet pressure
shellw it shall be protected from the degradation effects of UV
radiation. The preferred method of protection is to use an
easily replaceable protective visor_ as this would also provide
protection from mechanical dangers.
2.2 MECHANICALDANGERS
2.2.1 MICROMETEOROIDSAND SPACE DEBRIS
The EVAS shall provide > 95% probability of safety from puncture
for a ten year operational life at 93a hours/year_ using the best
available space debris model for hazard assessment.
2.2.3 IMPACTS WITH SHARP CORNERS/EDGES
The EVAS (EMU + EEU + crewmember + maximum consumables) shall
survive an impact with a 1 mm (.04 in) radius corner on the
Station with a relative velocity of .6 m/s (2 ft/s) with no more
than cosmetic damage.
2.3 ATOMIC OXYGEN
Materials used on the EVAS shall be at least as resistant to the
effects of atomic oxygen as those of the Shuttle EMU. If a
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polycarbonate is used for the helmet, it shall be shielded from
atomic oxygen impingement_
2.4 STATIC CHARSINB
2.4.1 CRENMEMBER PROTECTION
The Imvels of static charging encountered in LEO, Polar, and GEO
are not sufficient to present a direct threat to the EVA
crewmember.
2.4.2 EVASIPAYLOAD PROTECTION
All EVAS/payload electronics shall be properly shielded and
grounded. Proper ground paths shall be provided between any
mechanically interfacing EVAS components and between the EVAS and
payloads, in order to prevent buildup of charges to potentially
damaging levels.
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3 MOBILITY/ANTHROPOMETRICSIZING
3.1 MOBILITY
3.1.1 The range of motion provided shall be no less than that
provided by the Shuttle EMU Space Suit Assembly (SSA}.
3.1.2 The torques required to operate the joints of the crew
enclosure shall be na greater than those required to operate the
corresponding joints of the Shuttle SSA.
3.2 ANTHROPOMETRIC SIZING
The crew enclosure shall accommodate the maximum possible number
of people, with the capability of accommodating a ?5th percentile
Caucasian male.
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4 COMMUNICATIONS
Encryption capability is required for all RF links.
4.1 VOICE COMMUNICATIONS
Full duplex voice capability is required between all parties at
all times during EVA. This includes up to six EVA crewmembers,
any or all IV crewmembersv and Mission Control. EVA crewmembers
must have the capability to deselect transmit and/or receive
functions for any party(s)--including Mission Control, but a
deselected party must be able to re-establish communication with
the EVA crewmember if required by using a "call-up" capability.
4.2 DATA COMMUNICATIONS
4.2.1 UPLINK (Station to EVAS)
4.2.1.1 A relative state vector (range, range rate) update is
required once/second during untethered operations.
4.2.1.2 Procedural text and graphics (NTSC resolution) is re-
quired at a rate of one screen every 5 seconds.
4.2.2 DOWNLINK (EVAS to Station)
4.2.2.1 Complete system status must be transmitted at least
once/second.
4.2.2.2 A continuous carrier ("keep-alive") signal is required.
4.3 VIDEO COMMUNICATIONS
4.3.1 UPLINK (Station to EVAS)
4.3.1.1 RF Link:
seconds.
One NTSC-resolution screen is required every 5
4.3.1.2 Hardline Link: An interface is required on the EVAS to
permit full-motion video from the Station CCTV system, hand-held
cameras, etc.
4.3.2 DOWNLINK (EVAS to Station)
4.3.2.1 Nominal (attached operations in designated work areas)
video services are provided by the Station CCTV system and/or
hardline hand-held cameras.
4.3.2.2 NTSC-resolution full-motion video is required from the
EVAS during EEU free-flight.
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5 DATA MANAGEMENT
5.1 I/O DATA HANDLING
5.1.1 Interfaces shall be provided from the EVAS Data Management
System (DMS) to the EVA crewmember, the EVAS display, the EVAS
systems (LSS, EEU), and the EVAS communication system as speci-
fied in Table 4-5.
5.1.2 Capability shall be provided to transmit and receive
serial, variable length alphanumeric data strings.
5.1.3 Validation tests shall be performed on all received data
with the severity of the test dependent on the criticality of the
data, as determined primarily by header words on data strings.
5.2 SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT
5.2.1 Monitoring and Control: The EVAS DMS shall sample all
biomedical, EMU, and EEU instrumentation and deliver the data to
the 2/0 Data Handling function (for transmission to the Space
Station), to the Systems Operations function, and to the Displays
Management function.
5.2.2 Systems Operations: The EVAS DMS shall determine the
health and mission status of all EMU and EEU systems, and provide
appropriate Caution and Warning functions.
5.2.3 Displays Management: This function shall process all
necessary data and/or video for use by the Helmet Mounted
Display. The capability to recall prior displays is desirable.
5.2.4 EEU Guidance and Control is performed by the Systems
Management function. Detailed requirements are found in this
Appendix, &.3.1.
5.3 APPLICATIONS PROGRAMS
5.3.1 Applications programs necessary to support the functions
above shall be wholly resident in the EVAS DMS, in software
and/or firmware. Only non-safety critical programs are permitted
software-only residency.
5.3.2 Standards and specifications for these programs shall be
as similar as possible to those applied to the Space Station
IDMS, in order to permit greater portability of programs.
5.3.3 The crewmember interface to applications programs shall be
standardized to the maximum extent possible, with a goal of
providing a level of standardization such an provided between
various applications programs within the new generation of inte-
grated software packages for personal computers.
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6 MANEUVERINGPROPULSIONREQUIREMENTS
6.1 MISSION REQUIREMENTS
MMU-class propulsion capability (Extravehicular Excursion Unit)
is required to support adrift EVA crewmember rescue operations.
It is highly desirable for support of routine mission operations.
OMV-class propulsion capability (Tug) is highly desirable due to
its greater efficiency at large object manipulation and transfer
in support of EVA missions.
6.2 PROPULSION SYSTEM
6.2.1 Cold nitrogen gas shall be used as the EEU propellant and
as the Tug propellant for proximity operations.
6.2.2 Sufficient propellant shall be provided on board the EEU
to insure a minimum of 50 meters/second (150 feet/second) delta
velocity capability with an EMU-suited 90 kg (200 Ibm) crewmember
piloting the EEU.
6.2.3 Thruster force shall be sized so as to yield the same
thrust to mass ratio on the EEU as is currently provided on the
MMU (acceleration = .09 meters per second per second). Thruster
moments shall be adjusted to provide the same rotational control
authority on the EEU as is currently provided on the MMU (6
degrees per second per second).
6.2.4 Two completely redundant propulsion systems shall be pro-
vided by the EEU so that, in the event of catastrophic failure of
one system, the remaining system will provide full maneuvering
capability to ensure a safe return to the Space Station
structure.
6.3 INSTRUMENTATION
6.3.1 The following information shall be provided to the EEU/Tug
pilot via appropriate sensors and displays:
I.
2.
3.
.
Vehicle health and status data
Cautions and _arnings
Navigation/targeting information sufficient to perform
rendezvous Nith a Circular Error Probable of 10 meters
at ranges of up to 2 kilometers and precision maneuver-
ing to a predetermined position and attitude at
up to 2 kilometers range. Maneuvering precision limits
shall be those adequate to perform the specified
rendezvous.
Malfunction procedures at time of occurrence of
malfunction.
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6.3.2 Built-In Test Equipment (BITE) shall be provided to deter-
mine vehicle operational status with interfaces to Space Station
IV displays and to EV crewmember displays. A complete check
shall be performed automatically as a part of initial power-up,
with continuous monitoring of key parameters during operation.
6.4 CONTROLS
6.4.1 Manual control of EEU/Tug translations and rotations shall
be provided, with the same control authority as the current MMU.
6.4.2 An Automatic Attitude Hold (AAH) capability shall be
provided with selectable axis inhibit of up to two axes.
6.4.3 Selectable center-of-gravity offset compensation shall be
provided to allow more efficient rotational control with large
attached masses.
6.4.4 Except for hand controller handles_ all portions of the
EEU and Tug control systems shall be fully redundant so that, in
the event of catastrophic loss of one system, the remaining
system shall provide full maneuvering capability in order to
enable a safe return to Space Station structure.
6.4.5 The capability shall exist to attach a robotic and/or
teleoperator control device to the EEU so that it may be control-
led by that robot or by a teleoperator while operating unmanned.
6.5 INTERFACES
6.5.1 EEU/PAYLOAD
6.5.1.1 A universal attachment fixture capable of grappling/
attaching to all requisite EVA serviced payloads is highly de-
sired. The fixture should support all module manipulations in-
cluding satellite retrieval. It should require minimum effort to
attach to or remove from the EEU and minimum effort to operate in
grappling a payload. The fixture should maximize rigidity of the
EEU/paylaad interface while minimizing loads transmitted to EEU
structure and fittings. It should minimize interference with
pilot visibility and access to EEU controls. It should also
minimize vehicle center-of-gravity offsets when a payload is
attached. It should require minimal maintenance/servicing be-
tween uses.
6.5.1.2 An EVA crewmember rescue interface shall be provided on
the EEU such that an adrift crewmember_ with or without an at-
tached EEU_ can be attached to a functioning EEU and returned
safely to Space Station structure.
6.5.1.3 A workstation interface shall be provided to allow
attachment of a generic EVA workstation to the EEU and its use by
the crewmember while it is still attached. Attachment/detachment
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of the workstation shall be easily accomplished by a suited EVA
crewmomber_ The workstation, _ith or Nithout attached configura-
tion modules, shall provide minimum interference with pilot vi-
sion and access to EEU controls and shall maximize work volume
and envelope at the worksite while minimizing required effort.
It shall allow doffing of the EEU at the worksite and egress and
ingress of the combined works_ation/EEU there. It shall transmit
minimal loading tO EEU structure and fittings while providing
maximum rigidity during flight and tolerance of collision and
work loads.
6.5.1.4 Thruster plume impingement on attached payloads, work-
stations, and the Space Station exterior should be minimized
through the use of careful interface design, and proper thruster
positioning. Canted thrusters and variable thruster select logic
should also be employed, where and if appropriate, to minimize
such plume impingement effects.
6.5.1.4 A worksite interface shall be provided to allow removal
and "parking" of the EEU at a remote worksite.
6.5.2 EEU/STORAGE AND SERVICIN6 FACILITY
6.5.2.1 A storage facility shall be provided to allow safe on-
orbit storage of the EEU. The facility shall provide protection
from the on-orbit environment including thermal, radiation,
micro-meteoroid, debris, atomic oxygen, and impact threats.
6.5.2.2 The storage facility shall be equipped with interfaces
to allow automatic servicing and checkout of the EEU and to allow
monitoring of such tasks as well as general EEU status by IV and
EV crewmembers. Connections between the EEU and such interfaces
shall either be automatic with EEU docking or shall be quickly
and easily made and unmade by a suited EV crewmember. The inter-
faces shall be designed to minimize servicing/recharge times.
6.5.2.3 The storage facility shall be provided with positioning
aids such as handrails, tether points, and foot restraints so as
to allow EV crewmembers to be properly restrained and positioned
during EEU and storage facility servicing, repair, and donning
and doffing.
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7 CREWMEMBERSUPPORTFUNCTIONS
While alternate design solutions can no doubt be found, the
inclusion of a hand-in capability in the crew enclosure greatly
simplifies accomplishment of all crewmember support functions.
This capability also has a positive psychological effect on the
crewmember, and as such is highly desirable.
7.1 FOOD/WATER
7.1.1 FOOD
The EVAS shall provide the crewmember with 750 Calories of food
accessible during EVA.
7.1.2 WATER
The EVAS shall provide the crewmember with 1.2 liters (40 oz) of
water accessible during EVA.
7.2 WASTE MANAGEMENT
7.2.1 URINE
The EVAS shall provide a hygienic method of collecting up to 1.5
liters (51 oz) of urine for male and female crewmembers. A hand-
in capability is highly desirable in order to enhance hygiene.
7.2.2 FECES
Fecal control shall be be accomplished through control of diet
and personal habits. A hand-in capability is highly desirable,
in which case appropriate containers shall be provided to enable
collection; otherwise, no requirement should be imposed.
7.2.3 VOMITUS
Conditions leading to sickness in the crew enclosure shall be
avoided. A hand-in capability is highly desirable, in which case
appropriate containers shall be provided to enable collection;
otherwise, no requirement should be imposed.
7.3 MEDICAL CARE
A hand-in capability is highly desirable to enable the in-suit
use of medication.
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8 MISCELLANEOUS
8.1 MAINTENANCE/MAINTAINABILITY
8.1.1 EVAS design shall be conducive to on-orbit maintenance by
the use of modular designs employing easy access provisions and
quick disconnect Connectors for fluid and electrical lines, as
well as for access panel fasteners and other mechanical fasten-
ers. All fasteners shall be captured fasteners. EVAS design
shall be according to the constraints of microgravity servicing
requirements, with the guiding constraint being to minimize the
time for on-orbit repair of the system.
8.1.2 The use of periodic or preventive maintenance and testing
shall be minimized and a maintain as required philosophy will be
substituted, backed-up both by a fail-safe design allowing safe
return to a pressurized environment in the event of a malfunc-
tion, and by Automatic Test Equipment enabling early diagnosis of
any impending system faults.
8.1.3 An IV maintenance workstation shall be provided for EVAS
repair and servicing. The workstation shall include provisions
for equipment restraint and positioning, module, tool, and part
restraint, restraint and positioning aids for two crewmembers,
and interfaces to fluid, electrical, and electronic lines as
required. This includes interfaces to instrumentation and auto-
matic test equipment.
8.1.4 An EVA maintenance stand shall be provided, either as a
separate work area or as an integral part of the EEU or Tug
storage facility. The stand shall provide positioning and re-
straint functions for the vehicle under repair, fluid, power, and
electronic interfaces as required by the repair process, tool
storage and restraint, crewmember restraint and positioning for
two crewmembers, and part and module restraint. If the vehicle
must be moved to the interior of the station for whatever reason,
provision shall be made for draining propellants to safe levels.
8.2 SERVICINS
8.2.1 Routine servicing of the EVAS shall be automated to the
maximum extent practical. Daily reservice shall require no more
than 15 minutes (post-EVA) for activation, 5 minutes (<12 hours
later) for deactivation, and 10 minutes (pre-EVA) for verification.
Capability shall be provided to replace modules (vs. recharge/
regeneration) in < 30 minutes to support rapid turnaround.
8.2.2 If regenerable LSS systems are used, in-place regenera-
tion is desirable.
A-I_;
8.3 LOGISTICS
8.3.1 Sufficient consumables and spare parts shall be stored
aboard the Station to enable three two-man, 8-hour EVAs/week for
120 days.
8.3.2 It is highly desirable to have the capability to store a
one year supply of propellant in the form of high pressure
(nitrogen) gas in order to minimize transportation costs of the
propellant.
8.3.3 Quantities of spare parts required shall be minimized by
the use of rugged, high reliability parts, commonality of design
where applicable (as between Tug and EEU), and the use of failure
history analyses to correctly size inventories.
8.3.4 Use of specialized support equipment shall be minimized by
the use of generic tools and modular design to facilitate repair.
Generally, the requirement for any tools for maintenance should
be minimized.
8.4 OPERATIONAL LIFE
8.4.1 The EVAS shall be capable of a minimum on-orbit use time
of one year between ground depot servicings.
8.4.2 EVAS design shall emphasize simple, rugged components
designed for maximal operational life. Component mass shall be a
secondary consideration, and other performance parameters should
be compromised as appropriate in order to achieve high reliabil-
ity with acceptable performance.
8.4.3 Design of mechanical and electrical hardware as well as
procedural design shall be such as to minimize component opera-
tional cycles and thus maximize component operational life.
8.4.4 EVAS components shall be selected and/or designed to
require a minimum amount of servicing and maintenance.
8.4.5 Vehicle design should maximize protection from EVA envir-
onmental hazards such as thermal extremes, radiation, micromete-
oroids and debris, atomic oxygen, and impacts encountered during
EEU or Tug operation.
8.5 CHECKOUT
Nominal checkout of all EVAS systems shall be automatic, and
shall be in conjunction with nominal system donning and activa-
tion. More extensive checkout shall only be performed after ORU
replacement repair.
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8.6 EXTERNAL CONFIGURATION
8.6.1 The crew enclosure shall be anthropomorphic.
8.6.2 When sized for a 95th percentile Caucasian male, the EMU
shall pass through a Shuttle airlock hatch.
8.6.2 The EEU shall accommodate a Shuttle EMU-suited crewmember.
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APPENDIX B
EVAS/SPACE STATION SYSTEMINTERFACE REQUIREMENTS
1. REQUIREMENTSFOR SPACE STATION/EVAS COMMUNICATIONSINTERFACE
1.1.0 COMMUNICATIONS
1.1.1 VOICE COMMUNICATIONS
1.1.1.1 All EVA crewmembers should have full duplex voice
communications capability with sufficient channel selection
available to permit non-interference communication between any
two crewmembers and/or the Station.
1.1.1.2 An "All Call" capability shall exist so that any EVA
crewmember or the Station will be able to contact all EVA
crewmembers and the Station simultaneously. This capability
shall exist in both transmit and receive functions.
1.1.1.3 The Station shall be able to receive all crew
transmissions simultaneously.
1.1.1.4 The Station shall be capable of two separate
transmissions simultaneously to any combination of EVA
crewmembers as selected by Station personnel.
1.1.2 TELEMETRY
1.1.2.1 One channel of telemetry per EVA crewmember shall be
required for biomedical monitoring.
1.1.2.2 One channel of telemetry per crewmember, either discrete
or multiplexed with the biomedical signal, is required for EVA
systems monitoring.
1.1.2.3 The Station communications and data management system
shall be capable of receiving, demultiplexing, processing,
displaying_ recordingv and re-transmitting to the ground all EVA
telemetry.
1.1.3 TELEVISION
1.1.3.1 The Station shall be capable of transmitting a separate
freeze-frame television picture to each individual EVA crewmember
simultaneously.
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1.1.3.2 Each EVA crewmember shall be capable of receiving and
displaying freeze-frame television transmitted to him on his
individually assigned channel or on another crewman's assigned
channel.
1.1.3.3 The Space Station DMS shall provide the picture for
freeze-frame transmission to the EVA crewmembers and shall be
capable of providing separate pictures to each crewmember
simultaneously.
1.1.3.4 Each EVA crewmember shall be capable of transmitting one
channel of normal-motion television (NTSC Resolution).
1.1.3.5 The Station shall be capable of simultaneously
receiving, displaying, recording, and transmitting to ground all
normal-motion television from each EVA crewmember.
1.1.4 TARGET ING
1.1.4.1 The Station shall support free-flying EVA navigation and
targeting.
1.1.5 TELEOPERATOR/ROBOT CONTROL
1.1.5.1 The Station shall support control/communications
required in association with teleoperator/robotic operations.
1.2.0 RELIABILITY/MAINTAINABILITY
1.2.1 The Station and EVAS communication systems shall be
designed in accordance with the General Requirements for
Reliability and Maintainability as set forth in Appendix A of
this report.
2. DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
2.1.0 EVAS DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (DMS)
2.1.1 INPUT/OUTPUT (I/O) DATA HANDLING
2.1.1.1 The EVAS DMS, at the Space Station and the EVAS
communications interfaces, shall be capable of the transmission
and reception of serial, variable length, alphanumeric data on a
synchronous or asynchronous basis depending on the particular
data type.
2.1.1.2 The EVAS DMS shall validate all data received or
transmitted and shall use a unique validation sequence to verify
the integrity of all data defined as life or mission critical.
2.1.1.3 The EVAS DMS shall provide for the formatting and
unformatting of all transmitted and received data, respectively,
and shall make effective use of header words in these operations
to further define the data type, length, and criticality.
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2.1.1.4 The EVAS DMSshall use protocol techniques for ail
transmitted and received data to minimize the probability of data
loss and to optimize the processing capabilities of the processor
in which it is resident.
2.1.1.5 The EVAS DMS shall output, on a periodic basis, a Keep-
Alive signal that shall be used by the receiving DMS as a
verification of communications capability, and the loss of the
signal over time shall result in an alarm being issued to both
the EVA and IVA crewpersons.
2.1.1.6 The EVAS DMS shall require a time synchronization signal
to be transmitted from the Space Station and received in the EVAS
to maintain I/O time synchronization.
2.1.1.7 The EVAS DMS resident in the Space Station shall
interface the EVAS voice communications channel and use a minimal
voice recognition capability to respond to any of a predefined
set of life- or mission-critical messages from the EVA
crewperson.
2.1.2 SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT
2.1.2.1 The EVAS DMS shall use advanced data base management
techniques to maximize the efficient use of the EVAS memory and
to prioritize and control all processing operations within the
EVAS.
2.1.2.2 The EVAS DMS shall provide a Monitoring and Control
Operating System, resident within the EVAS, to periodically
sample and store in digital form all biomedical, EVAS system, and
EEU system parameters available from the EVAS instrumentation;
additionally, EVA crewmember initiated discretes shall be
monitored and the appropriate response initiated.
2.1.2.3 The EVAS DMS shall require an EVAS Systems Management
Operating System resident in both the Space Station and EVAS
processors to acquire, process, and evaluate biomedical, EVAS
system, and EEU system data obtained by the Monitoring and
Control Operating System.
2.1.2.4 An EEU Guidance and Control Operating System shall be
required to be resident for both the EVAS and the Space Station
to support, as needed, EEU navigation and targeting on a joint
integrated or autonomous EVAS basis.
2.1.2.5 The EVAS DMS shall provide the EVAS with Displays
Management Operating System, which shall support efficient HMD
display generation via a minimal set of geometric entities.
2.1.2.6 The EVAS DMS shall provide automatic error recovery
capability and fault tolerant processing to minimize possible
data loss or loss of critical processing within the EVAS.
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2.1.2.7 As a minimum, the EVAS DMS shall provide the EVA
crewmember with the capability for autonomous EEU and non-EEU
operations to attain a safe haven in the event of a total
communications failure.
2.1.3 FIRMWAREAND SOFTWARE
2.1.3.1 The EVAS DMSshall make optimal use of EVAS resident
firmware for those applications considered critical to EVA
operations.
2.2 RELIABILITY/MAINTAINABILITY
2.2.1 The EVAS DMS shall be required to comply with those
standards TBD for Space Station software and firmware development
except for those standards that, when identified, reduce the
efficiency or capabilities of the EVAS processor.
3. EVAS LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS
3.1.0 EVAS SPARE PARTS REQUIREMENTS
3.1.1 EMU spare part requirements are shown in Table B-1.
3.1.2 EEU spare part requirements are shown in Table B-2.
3.1.3 Ancillary equipment spare part requirements are shown in
Table B-3.
3.2.0 EVAS CONSUMABLES REQUIREMENTS
3.2.1 EMU consumables requirements are met by nominal IV usage
requirements except as noted below.
3.2.1.1 If a sublimator is used, 1.5 lbm of water (max) per EVA
man-hour is required for sublimator operations. (See Figure B-1.)
A minimum of 2250 Ibm and a maximum of 6000 Ibm of water should
be provided.
3.2.1.2 Airlock make-up gas as indicated in Figure 2 shall be
provided to make up for gas vented overboard during airlock
depress.
3.2.1.3 If LiOH is used for C02 scrubbing in the EVAS, LiOH and
Oxygen as per Figure 3 must be supplied.
3.2.2 EEU consumables requirements are 2400 kg of gaseous
nitrogen per year_ pressurized to 4500 psia at the supply outlet.
3.2.3 Ancillary equipment consumables requirements are covered
under 3.1.3, Spare parts.
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TABLE B- 1
PROJECTEDEMU SPARESREQUIREMENTS
ON-ORBIT EMU SPARES- One time delivery; replenish as required
ITEM QUANTITY MASS kg (lbm) VOL. liters (Ft3)
EMU LSS 2 378 (834) 382 (13.5)
SCU 2 10(22) 57(2.0)
Phase Change Heat Exchanger 2 20 (43) 28 ( 1. O)
C02 Removal Canister 2 98 (216) 76 (2.7)
CWS 1 2( 5) 3(0.1)
DCM 1 7( 15) 6(0.2)
EVC 1 5( 11) 3(0.1)
EMU RESUPPLY 90 DAYS - Size sensitive, damage prone, and limited life items
ITEM QUANTITY MASS kg (Ibm) VOL. liters (Ft3)
SSA (less LCVG, CCA, UCD/
DFXT_ 1DB) 2 161(354) 312( 11)
Filters I Set .5( I) 6(0.2)
Batteries 8 218(480) 142( 5)
C02 Sensors 2 1( 2) 6(0.2)
Gloves 10 34(75) 71(2.5)
Suit Components As Required 79(175) 127(4.5)
UCD 32 Maximum 8(17) 57( 2)
DACT 32 Maximum 7(16) 142( 5)
Vomitus Collector 4 1( 2) 3(0.1)
IDB 2 .5( 1) 14(0.5)
ON-ORBIT SERVICE EQUIPMENT SPARES - One time delivery; replenish as required
ITEM QUANTITY MASS kg (Ibm) VOL. liters (Ft3)
Pump Separator 1
Power Supply/Battery Charger 1
Fan 1
Fan/Separator 1
Solenoid Valves 2
Compressor Head 1
Communicatan/Data Interface
Equipment 1
Regulator 1
Controller 1
Filters Miscellaneous 1 Set
5(10) 6(0.2)
23(50) 14(0.5)
5( 10) 6(0.2)
5( 10) 6(0.2)
.5( 1) .3(0.01)
5( 10) 1.4 (0.05)
.2(0.5) .6(0.02)
2( 4) . 6(0.02)
1 ( 3;) 6(0.2)
.5( 1) 6(0.2)
SERVICE EQUIPMENT RESUPPLY 90 DAYS - Limited life items
ITEM QUANTITY MASS kg (Ibm) VOL. liters (Ft3)
Filters 1 Set .3(0.6) 6(0.2)
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TABLE B-2
PROJECTEEU/FSS SPARESREQUIREMENTS
SPARESREQUIREDPER YEAR
ITEM QTY
UNIT TOTAL
VOL MASS VOL MASS
(CC) (K8) (CC) (K8)
(1,2) (1,2) (1,2) (1,2)
Central Electronics Unit (3)
Regulator
Isolation Valve
Thruster Triad (2 RH & 2 LH)
Quick Disconnect Fittings
EMU/MMUInterface (3)
Control Arms with Handcontrollers
Locator Lights
Lap Belt
Small Hardware Set (3)
Batteries (3) (4)
Paint (3)
Velcro
Lubricant (4)
Service and C/O Connectors (3)
Internal Electrical Connectors (3)
Internal Fluid Connectors (3)
Propellant Filters (4)
Circuit Breakers
Switches
PLSS Latch (3)
FSS Latch (3)
Battery Latch (3)
Wire (3)
Propellant Line Repair Mar'Is (3)
Propellant Vessel (3)
2 33000 9.1 66000
2 1500 0.4 3000
2 1400 1.3 2800
4 3000 1.4 12000
2 500 0.5 1000
1 1000 0.9 1000
2 15500 4.6 31000
2 500 0.3 1000
2 500 0.5 1000
2 1100 1.0 2200
4 7900 6.8 31600
1 500 0.5 500
1 500 0.5 500
1 500 0.5 500
2 500 0.5 1000
4 135 0.3 540
2 270 0.3 540
80 7 0.1 560
2 135 0.1 270
2 135 0.1 270
2 2800 1.0 5600
2 550 1.0 1100
2 550 1.0 1100
3 1650 0.3 4950
2 260 0.7 520
2 10000 18.0 20000
18.2
0.8
2.6
5.6
1.0
0.9
9.2
0.6
1.0
2.0
27.2
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.0
1.2
O.&
8.0
0.2
Totals 84392 51.9 190550 125.1
1. Volumes and masses are based on presently used MMU components.
2. Volumes and masses are for components only and do not include packing
material and containers.
m Item definition not sufficiently precise for an exact volume and mass;
therefore, volumes and masses are rough estimates.
4. Resupply item.
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TABLE B-3
PROd_TED ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT SPARES REQUIREMENTS
SPARES REQUIRED PER YEAR
ITEM
TOTAL
MASS VOLUME
QTY (KG) (CC)
Saw Blades
Trash Bags
Nibbler Bits
Surface Coating Materials
Drill Bits - Set
Welding Rods - Assortment
Brazing Rods
Grinder Pads - Assortment
Rivets - Assortment
Fluid Connectors - Assortment
Electrical Connectors - Assortment
Adhesive Tape - Rolls
Thermal Insulation Material
Gasket/Seal Material
Tie Wrap Assortment
ID Tags
Teflon Tape - Roll
Potting Compound - Can
Coveralls (EVA)
Glove Protectors
Fluid/Gas Sample Collection
Vial
Lubricant
Epoxies
Structural Repair Materials
Fabric Patch Material
Leak Patch Material
Cleaner Material Prepreg Clothes
Electrical Insulation Material
10 1.0 60
200 10.0 72000
10 0.5 30
1 5.0 4500
1 1.0 450
1 2.0 650
1 1.5 650
1 1.0 3600
1 1.0 2000
5 0.5 3000
5 0.5 5000
2 1.5 3200
1 2.0 20000
1 0.1 250
1 0.25 500
1 0.1 50
2 0.1 100
1 1.0 1000
8 2.0 72000
16 2.0 55000
50 0.3 500
1 0.5 500
4 0.5 2000
1 1.0 20000
1 2.0 20000
1 0.75 1600
200 15.0 72000
1 1.0 1000
All items are spares - resupply as required.
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4. SPACE STATION SAFETY HAVENREQUIREMENTS
4.1.0 An EVA safety haven shall be provided.
4.1.1 The safety haven shall be portable via MRMSto remote worksite.
4.1.1.1 The safety haven shall be secured to Station structure near
the workstation.
4.1.2 The safety haven shall be pressurizable.
4.1.2.1 The safety haven shall be pressurizable to 4.0 psia 100% 02 in
less than 10 seconds.
4.1.2.2 The safety haven shall be pressurizable to 14.7 psia in less
than 5 minutes.
4.1.2.3 The safety haven atmosphere shall be 21% 02 minimum - 30% 02
maximum and the remainder of N2 at 14.7 psia.
4.1.2.4 The safety haven shall have enough 02 for two crewmembers for
2 hours.
4.1.3 The hatch size shall accommodate two crewmen.
4.1.3.1 The hatch shall be designed to dock with airlock or
docking module hatch with interface seal to maintain pressure.
4.1.4 The safety haven shall have lighting equal to 50 footcandles to
illuminate the interior for up to 2 hours.
4.1.5 The safety haven shall have a basic medical kit installed in the
interior.
4.1.6 The safety haven shall have handholds on interior walls for
positioning.
4.1.7 The safety haven shall have restraints to hold incapacitated
crewmember.
4.1.8 The safety haven shall have the capability to communicate via
voice comm with IV crewmembers.
5. SPACE STATION INTERIOR REQUIREMENTS
5.1 CLEANLINESS
5.1.1 A I0,000 class clean room is required for work on life
support system oxygen subsystem.
5.2 SAFETY
5.2.1 Safing equipment in the form of restraints for high
pressure components of EVAS oxygen and nitrogen systems is
required.
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5.3 WORKSTANDS
5.3.1 Workstands to restrain and position EVAS components while
they are being maintained are required.
5.3.1.1 Workstands shall be equipped with such tools as are
necessary to maintain the EVAS.
5.3.1.1.1 The EVAS shall be designed so that standard IV tools
can be used to accomplish as much maintenance and servicing as
feasible.
6. SPACE STATION EXTERIOR REQUIREMENTS
6.1 TRANSLATION AIDS
6.1.1 EVA translation aids shall be provided to allow EVA access
to all portions of the exterior of the Space Station and any
attached payloads.
6.1.2 The basic translation aid shall be a system of hand rails
arranged to give the crewmember access to all exterior areas of
the Space Station.
6.1.3 A supplemental translation aid shall be provided that will
provide transportation for the crewmember and a module of less
than 250 kg mass and less than 1 cubic meter volume from one
extremity of the Space Station to the other in under 5 minutes.
6.1.3.1 The supplemental translation aid shall be controllable
by either the crewmember riding it or another EV or IV
crewmember.
6.1.4 A supplemental translation aid shall be provided that
shall be capable of transporting any size module encountered in a
Space Station EVA from one extremity of the Space Station to
another.
&.1.4.1 The translation aid shall be capable of limited fine
positioning via a self-contained manipulator arm.
6.1.4.1.1 The arm shall use a standard RMS end effector
interface.
6.2 RESTRAINTS
6.2.1 A system of tether points shall accompany the translation
aids, allowing the EVA crewmember to be tethered at all times
while performing EVA.
6.2.1.1 A TBD mobile tether system shall be used to allow the
astronaut to be tethered continuously while translating, without
interfering with that translation or requiring continuous
shifting of tethers.
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6.2.2 Workstations shall be provided where and as necessary to
restrain equipment under repair and associated tools and spare
parts. If these are not fixed, the Station shall provide
interfaces as necessary to restrain portable workstations.
6.2.2.1 Workstations shall provide restraint as necessary to
position and hold EVA crewmembers while they are performing work.
6.2.2.2 A workstation shall be provided that is capable of
holding and positioning a satellite for repair or servicing.
6.2.2.2.1 The workstation shall be able to accommodate
spacecraft up to the size of the Hubble Space Telescope.
6.3 STORAGE
6.3.1 External storage shall be provided for all EVA tools and
for a TBD amount of spare parts and equipment for Space Station
and satellite servicing and repair.
6.3.1.1 The external storage facilities shall provide such
protection as required by the stored equipment from the on-orbit
environment.
6.3.1.2 The external storage facilities shall be located in
proximity to the EVA airlock.
6.4 LIGHTING
6.4.1 All areas of the Space Station exterior should have
provisions for lighting to the 50 footcandle level.
6.4.1.1 The lighting should be selectable on/off by EV or IV
personnel.
6.5 TELEVISION
6.5.1 Closed-circuit television CCCTV) cameras shall be mounted
at TBD locations on the exterior of the Station.
6.5.1.1 The CCTV's shall be IV controllable in azimuth,
elevation f-stop, and zoom.
6.6 DEPENDENT LIFE SUPPORT SUBSYSTEM
6.6.1 A Dependent Life Support Subsystem shall be provided,
allowing crewmembers dependent life support while they are
located at any point on the Space Station exterior.
6.7.0 External Safety Requirements
6.7.1 Space Station and all external equipment design, including
spacecraft to be serviced by EVA crewmembers, shall conform to a
TBD EVA Design Criteria document similar to the current JSC
10&15A document.
B-12
6.7.2 The Space Station personnel shall be capable of carrying
out an independent, autonomous rescue of a free-floating,
stranded crewmember with initial distance and velocity of up to 1
kilometer and 1 foot per second opening.
7. AIRLOCK REQUIREMENTS
A set of working requirements has been compiled to serve as
design and performance guidelines for airlock subsystems. The
following list represents what we feel to be, at this time, the
most important Space Station sensitive of these areas.
7.1 GENERAL AIRLOCK DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
7.1.1 The EVA airlock shall provide a controlled rate of
depressurized and pressurization. The nominal rate experienced
by the crewman inside the EMU shall not exceed 689 N/m2-sec2 (.1
psi/see). The maximum rates are not to exceed 6896 N/m2-sec (1
psi/see).
7.1.2 As a design goal, 90% of the airlock gas shall be
recovered during depressurization.
7.1.3 Control of depressurization and pressurization shall be
possible from inside the Space Station and inside and outside the
airlock.
7.1.4 The airlock design shall accommodate the transfer of a
standard equipment rack or the return of an incapacitated EVA
crewmember.
7.1.5 Two EVA airlocks shall be provided to ensure redundant
egress/ingress capability.
7.1.6 Each airlock hatchway shall be sized to accommodate the
transfer of two suited crewmen.
7.1.7 The EMU shall be capable of being resized inside the
airlock service area.
7.1.8 The airlocks shall be sized to accommodate donning/doffing
the EMU by an unaided crewman.
7.2 EMU SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS
7.2.1 Stowage of the EMU's in the airlock versus in the Space
Station is required to allow for automatic checkout of the EMU's
during depressurization and for reconnection of life support for
contingencies while at vacuum.
7.2.2 The Space Station shall provide the IVA service, repair,
and maintenance operations for the EMU. These operations include
power, N2 purge and purge verification, cooling, IV pressure
regulation, suit integrated check, airlock depressurization/
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repressurization, and service lines connection/disconnection.
7.2.3 The EMUwill normally be reserviced as an assembly in the
airlock.
7.2.4 Automatic servicing and performance checkout of the EMU
includes expendables regeneration, such as 02 and N2 resupply,
and the regeneration of time dependent processes, such as C02 and
H20 removal, heat rejection, and power storage.
7.2.5 The service station will automatically dry the suit.
7.2.6 The entire normal servicing will be accomplished in 12
hours with the minimum human intervention.
7.2.7 A non-standard, short notice time TBD, reservicing
capability shall be provided.
7.2.8 Servicing capabilities shall be based on 10 EMU reservices
per week initially and on 20 EMU reservices per week for the
growth Station.
7.2.9 Cleanliness levels of the EMU shall meet the requirements
in NHB 8060.Ib (a8400003) and microbiological contamination
levels shall meet the requirements of "STS Microbial
Contamination Plan" (J8400084).
7.2.10 A capability shall be provided for decontamination of the
EMU after a chemical spill. Verification of safe contamination
levels shall be made.
7.2.11 The cooling garment (extracted from the EMU) shall be
removed in the Space Station and washed or replaced.
7.2.12 The EVA suit must be kept biologically and chemically
clean, and the cleaning agent must not present toxic hazards.
Periodic microbiological sampling of the suit areas will be
performed at regular intervals TBD.
7.2.13 The Space Station shall accommodate the disposal of EMU
waste. The containers shall be easily cleaned or disposable.
7.2.14 The EMU shall be capable of being fully maintained in the
Space Station.
7.3 EEU SUPPORT, STOWAGE
7.3.1 Stowage of the EEU's outside the airlock is required to
centralize the EVA servicing equipment and to localize the EVA
hardware. This localization also allows for easier relocation of
the equipment for flexibility for growth phases.
7.3.2 Micrometeoroid protection for the stored EEU (shall be
provided).
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7.3.3 Automatic servicing and performance checkout of the EEU
includes expendables regeneration, such as N2 resupply, and the
regeneration of time dependent processes, such as heat rejection
and power storage.
7.3.4 The Space Station shall support recharge of the EEU
propellant by supplying gaseous nitrogen at least 300 x 105 N/m2
(4500 psia) to the flight support station.
7.3.5 The Space Station shall provide recharge of the EEU
batteries while installed in the EEU.
7.3.6 Power for thermal control (of the EEU) shall be provided.
7.3.7 The entire normal servicing will be accomplished in 12
hours without human intervention.
7.3.8 A non-standard, 1-hour, reservicing capability shall be
provided.
7.3.9 Servicing capabilities shall be based on 10 EEU reservices
per week initially and on 20 EEU reservices per week for the
growth Station .....
7.3.10 The Space Station shall provide spare parts to the EEU.
7.3.11 The EEU shall be maintained outside the Space Station to
at least the ORU level.
7.4 EVA EQUIPMENT
7.4.1 Provisions for EVA equipment and spares stowage shall be
provided inside the Space Station and outside the EVA airlock.
7.4.2 External storage facilities with appropriate handrails and
supports for work restraints shall provide for storage of EVA
tools and support equipment. The storage boxes shall be
modularized with easy attach/detach capability for transport and
worksite convenience.
7.5 MAINTENANCE
7.5.1 A functional capability shall be provided to bring
internally located ORU's into the pressurized work area to
conduct maintenance.
7.5.2 Maintenance and repair of all EVA equipment shall be
performed inside the Space Station except EEU ORU replacement.
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7.6 HYPERBARICCHAMBERGENERALREQUIREMENTS
7.6.1 One airlock shall have the capability of serving as a
hyperbaric chamber for two crewmen.
7.6.2 The hyperbaric chamber shall be of sufficient size to
accommodate two crewmen - one patient and one attendant.
7.&.3 The hyperbaric chamber shall be of sufficient size to
allow the patient to be extended at full length and restrained on
a hard surface so the attendant shall have access to all of the
patient.
7.6.4 Large items of equipment that must be simultaneously
accommodated include a mechanical cardiac massage unit, a cardiac
defibrillator/pacemaker, a pulmonary ventilator/respirator, and
an IV fluid system.
7.6.5 Other smaller units and kits required for examination and
treatment of the patient include a physician's "black bag" and a
trauma treatment kit.
7.6.6 In a hyperbaric chamber mode, the airlock pressure shall
be raised to as high as 5.0 atmospheres above the ambient cabin
pressure.
7.6.7 The chamber must be capable of attaining and holding the
following pressures for the following minimum durations:
- & atmospheres for 2 hours
- 2.8 atmospheres for 4 hours
- 1.9 atmospheres for 5 hours
7.6.8 The chamber must be capable of the following rates of
pressure increases.
- Nominal cabin pressure to 6 atmospheres at a rate of
approximately 2 atmospheres per minute.
- Nominal cabin pressure to 2.8 atmospheres at a rate of
0.76 atmospheres (11 psi) per minute.
7.6.? The chamber must be capable of the following rates of
pressure decreases:
- 6 atmospheres to 2.8 atmospheres at a rate of 0.79
atmospheres (11.6 psi) per minute.
- 2.8 atmospheres to 1.9 atmospheres and 1.9 atmospheres
to nominal cabin pressure at a rate of 0.03
atmospheres (0.45 psi) per minute.
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7.6.10 The chamber shall be capable of one recycle from 6
atmospheres to 3 atmospheres and return to 6 atmospheres. This
requirement would apply to the treatment of a pneumothorax in
which air of 6 atmospheres had entered the chest cavity and
become apparent only following a decrease in chamber pressure.
7.7 CHAMBER DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
7.7.1 Chamber pressure shall be automatically controlled with
manual override controls both inside and outside the chamber.
7.7.2 Total pressure_ oxygen partial pressure, oxygen percent,
carbon dioxide partial pressure, and temperature shall be
continuously monitored and displayed both inside and outside the
chamber. Out-of-tolerance values shall be indicated by both
visual and auditory signals.
7.7.3 Elapsed and interval time shall be displayed both inside
and outside the chamber in accordance with accepted hyperbaric
operational procedures.
7.7.4 The airlock controls and displays shall include biomedical
monitoring of heart rate (EKG), blood pressure, body temperature,
blood gas levels (via audio monitoring or blood sample), and
brain wave recording (ECG).
7.8 CHAMBER LIGHTING
7.8.1 The general level of illumination within the chamber shall
be 50 footcandles.
7.8.2 Supplemental lighting with a level of 200 footcandles
shall be available for illuminating selected areas.
7.9 MONITORING AND COMMUNICATIONS
7.9.1 Video monitoring of the chamber shall be provided to give
outside close-up visual access to the anatomical parts of the
patient.
7.9.2 Video cameras shall be adjustable and remotely controlled
from outside the chamber.
7.9.3 A window shall be available for visual access to the
inside of the chamber for back-up monitoring capability.
7.9.4 All video images shall be capable of being down-linked to
ground observers.
7.9.5 Three lead EK8"s shall be available for patient
electrocardiographic monitoring. The EKG waveform shall be
displayed both inside and outside the chamber and shall be
capable of being down-linked.
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7.9.6 A pass-through airlock between the hyperbaric chamber
airlock and the airlock service area shall be provided for
passing medication, food, and water.
7.10 CHAMBER ATMOSPHERE COMPOSITION AND BREATHING GAS PROVISIONS
7.10.1 The 02 concentration shall not exceed 30% for 02 toxicity
reasons.
7.10.2 The chamber shall be pressurized with compressed air for
all pressures and procedures.
7.10.3 Breathing oxygen (and masks) shall be provided for both
the patient and the attendant.
7.10.4 A 7-hour oxygen supply shall be available for the patient
for each treatment task.
7.10.5 A 90-minute 02 supply shall be available for the
attendant for all operations.
7.10.6 A 2-hour supply of nitrox (50% N2; 50% 02) shall be
available for patient breathing (via mask) when the chamber is
being operated at 6 atmospheres.
7.11 CHAMBER TEMPERATURE
7.11.1 The normal operating temperature shall be 75t-80t.
Degraded operating temperature shall be 70t-90t.
7.11.2 The temperature in the chamber following pressurization
shall not exceed 120tF.
7.11.3 Following pressurization, the chamber temperature shall
be reduced from the maximum to degraded operating temperature
range within 15 minutes and to the nominal operating range within
30 minutes.
7.11.4 The chamber temperature shall not decrease below 70tF as
a result of reducing chamber pressure.
7.11.5 Following a reduction in chamber pressure, the chamber
temperature shall be returned to the normal operating range
within 15 minutes.
7.12 SAFETY
7.12.1 The oxygen percentage in the chamber atmosphere shall not
exceed 30% to be compatible with fire safety.
7.12.2 Rapid emergency EVA egress shall be possible with minimal
EMU functional checkout.
7.12.3 The nominal rate of depressurization and pressurization
experienced by the crewman inside the EMU shall not exceed 0.1 psi/see.
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7.12.4 The C02 concentration within the chamber atmosphere shall
not be allowed to exceed 7.6 tort for nominal operations or 15
torr for emergency operations.
7.12.5 The 02:N2 ratio within the chamber shall be maintained at
approximately that of cabin air, 21% O2 and 79% N2.
7.13 AIRLOCK LIGHTING
7.13.1 Floodlights shall be provided to aid EVA crew visibility
in areas of high EVA activity such as the airlock.
7.14 AIRLOCK COMMUNICATIONS
7.14.1 The airlock shall have wireless voice communications that
shall be capable of being down-linked.
7.15 DATA
7.15.1 The service data of EVA equipment shall be retained by
the data system. Performance trend data shall be used to define
the need for maintenance of the EMU and EEU.
7.16 EQUIPMENT AIRLOCK
7.16.1 An equipment airlock shall be provided for the transfer
of tools, parts, and equipment without using the EVA airlock.
7.16.2 The equipment airlock can be located at any convenient
location on the Space Station.
7.17 ECLSS INTERFACING
7.17.1 The ECLSS shall support the capability to service and
checkout the regenerative EMU within the airlocks. The ECLSS
shall also support servicing the EEU.
7.17.2 Life-support umbilical connectors shall be available
outside the pressurized compartments to allow umbilical-supported
EVA operations.
7.17.3 Checkout functions provided by the ECLSS service
equipment, which are considered critical functions for EVA
equipment operations, shall be continuously verifiable.
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SENSORSYSTEMSTECHNOLOGY
C02 LIDARWIND AND TRACE GASES
SATELLITEDOPPLER..,._,_.wr'=°n"RADAR
LONG TERMCRYO FLUIDSTORAGE
LASER_nol:,_,n_
ADVANCED_,,.,_AnAO_TU_CONTROL
DISTRIBUTEDADAPTIVECONTROL
T N'Pp _ _1DYNAMICBIS,URBA.... C.NTR..
ACTIVEOPTICTECHNOLOGY
ADVANCEDCONTROLDEVICETECH
GUIDEDWAVE OPTICS_ATA 8YS EXP
TELEOPERATORSENSOREVAL & TEST
SPACEPOWERBYS ENVIROINT
TETHEREDCONSTELLATION
TETHEREDTRANSPORTATION
TETHEREDFLUIDSTOWAGETRANSFER
SATELLITESERVICING& REFURB
SATELLITEMAINTENANCE& REPAIR
WA_D/A _ DrOHDD V
THERMALINTERFACETECHNOLOGY
OTVIPAYLOADINTERFACING/TRANSFER
OTV MAINTENANCETECHNOLOGY
36
96
8
144
m
12
mQ_
,L,/.
oo _ Ot
B 8 8
412 - - -
102 - -
50 ....
48 48 48 48 48 cB, _o'_
4 4 - - -
4 _ .....
12 .....
48 42 24 .....
48 ......
- - 48 .....
84 ......
- 24 .....
B S 8 8 - -
104 104 ......
- 744 - 744 - 744 744 -
.... 100 94 94 94 -
_ _o_..,_li,_ 1195 I_95 ..,. 1195 i,% -
734 - -
....
- - 43804380 - -
432 - -
C-2-2
TABLEC-2
Oi IGmlAL PAGE 1'3
POOR QUALrrY
SPACESTATIONPAYLOADSREDUIRINSEVA SUPPORT(MHRS)
MAY 1985 _._.'_:':v DATA BASE
STRAIGHT_.,,,_nn_TOF DATA BASE .,.,.'u°e
_,A:I:0
SPA 801
TOS 40t
JAPAN
C-0¢2
C-OO3
O-004
E-001
vv_
_. dv,.¢
E-O05
S-O01
S-')O:,
B-006
S-008
,_ vv r
SJ,_Ov
T_¢IA_
T-¢07
T-O09
CANADA
SAAX 4002
SAAX 4004
SAAX 4006
TDM](4.';0.6
_ .it
,,,_A_O00t
NOAA 0002
NDAA 00O3
NOAA 0004
NOAA 0005
NOAA 0006
NOAA 0007
NOAA O00e
NOAA 0009
NOAA 0010
_m^^ 0011
NOAA 0012
NOAA 0013
NOAA 0014
NOAA 0015
NOAA 0016
NOAA 0017
NOAA 0018
O_VLO_D"_'r 92 9_ 94 95 o_ 97 oo _
.........v ,, - - 384 _84 384 - - -
FAR [NFRAREDISUBMMSPACE TEL - - - 24 - - - 24
A_V TECH TEST _'_:':
......... - - - 2J ....
LARSEr_w. A.... _NA - - 10 -
ADV _nww & DATA u ,_,,........ ANu._.NoSYS .... _0 - - -
GRAV STABZL_DEPLOYANT ?=o- _
LASER=^_'_ ....
.... _.... SYSTEM _ - _ - -
OBSERVOF UPPERATMOSPHERE ..... 2B - -
A=?_'mklm_f_l pl^_n_w 24
........................ - - - - 2¢ 24 24
LINE SAMMAD.,.C_,ON - 6 - - -
n _r • n, 24X-RAYASTRONOMY.B .RVA,I_N -
SPACEVLBI - - -
.... _.......... SYS _........ u_,
.-.u...ARRAY .,_c_n.
DD C I _flL!QUID ,,,OP_L_ANTHAND_,NG - - -
100
!6
POLCATS 6 6 6
LOWS GAS ..,._'_"_ARRAY _
UV aT,_mmu:m,_LIMB =r_w,N,cm 16 16 16
m_ _TDHm_MD_D _?
6 6 6 6
GEO SYNTHETICAPERTURERADAR
E' II 1" PSEA .Y,,THE,I_APERTURERADAR
MULTISPECTRALINEARARMY
SEARCHAND RESCUE
SPATEENVIRONMENTMONITOR - 20 20 20
ADV MICROWAVESOUNDINGUNIT - 20 20 20
ADV MICROWAVERADIOMETER - - -
MEDRES IMAGINGRADIOMETER - -
RADAR ALTIMETER ......
ALONG TRACKSCANRAD MICROWAVE .....
HIGH RES IR RADIATIONSOUNDER - 46 - 46 - 46
C_' "rl: r_ _ .....N-ROSS_AT _RuMET_R
SpErIN...._,._,,_c_'_n_MICROWAVEIMAGINB - _2 - 92 - 92
DATA COLLECTIONSYSTEM - 40 - 40 - 40
SPACE ENVIRONMENTMONITOR - 20 - 20 - 20
SEARCHAND R,..,,.UE ......
ADV MICROWAVEBOUNDING - 20 - 20 - 20
'TP r%ADV M,,.R,,WAVERADIOMETER ......
6
v ,.,
L_
6
2O
_A
LU -
46 -
92 -
40 -
_0 -
20 -
01
C-2-3
TABLe,_C-2
SPACESTATZDNPAYLOADSRE_UIRIRSEVA_:cI':'onDT,_.. _Muo_,,,.._,
MAY1985LANGLEYDATABASE
STRAIGHT_._,,_nH_IT,9F DA A BASE<,.,<._=°c
NOAA 0021
NOAA 0023
_OAA 0,._4
_OAA 0025
NOAA 0,._6
kith hh_
HIGH RES IR RADIATIONSOUNDER - 46 - 46 - 46 ¢6 -
RADARALTIMETER .......
SPECIALoc_,cnR,,.C.,.iIA,EIMA_.,,G - ,. - - <. -
DATA _<._..._"'_rr'r'n_s,._,.SYSTEM - - 40 - 40 - _,_0 40 -
EARTH_n_A_n_ _lln.--,
r_rp,_.wi rOi po T m,_-,
w_uOltO _wiA_
US_
GAPX _., 616 16BB
COMM 160 60 126
"_ 2570 _7_ ._7
,_IA_ 2790 =99_ AlOl
_,'5 t _Ac , ?_A _ _'_'_c
0 0 0 ,:;
5763 ,..,,..'"°_1601 .;,..,.,'v'P°<
42_ 3B4 0 0
27 50 70 CP_
6 A A
"7. .0 r;,
o_ :,_, '::
B27B 919_ ¢0652.3,52122:383.... _A: eI_
C-2-4
' TABLE_-7._
_AL PAt,._ 1'3
OF POOR QUN___
SPACE STATION PAYLOADS REQUIRING EVA SUPPORT(MHRB)
MAY 19S5 LANGLEYDATA BASE
TOTALFIRMNESS
BASED ON MDAC SURVEY
MISSIONS
USA
SAAX 0004
SAAX 0005
SAAX 0006
SAAX 0007
SAAX O00B
SAAX 0011
0 V h_iO
_AA.....
SAAX O01l
SAAX 0016
SAAX nn_vv_t
SAAX 0020
SAAX 0021
SAAX n_n_v_v_
SAAX 0208
SAAX 0209
SAAX 0210
SAAX 02!I
SAAX _'_
SAAX nn,_
SAAX 0214
SAAX 0215
SAAX 0216
SAAX 021g
SAAX 022O
SAAX 0221
SAAX 0222
SAAX 0223
SAAX 0225
SAAX 0227
SAAX 0228
SAAX 0229
SAAX 0230
SAAX 0231
SAAX 0232
SAAX 0255
SAAX 0234
SAAX 02_5
SAAX 0256
SAAX 0237
SAAX 0238
SAAX 0306
GAAX OIOV
SAAX 0402
SAAX 0501
SAAX 0502
PAYLOADNAME 92 93 94 95 96 97 9B 99 O0 01
SIRTF PLATFORMMISSION .... 48 50 -
TRANS.RAD & ION CAL - - G B 8 8
STARLAB - - 30 30
Hl THROUGHPUTMISSIONSERV - 30 3¢
HIGH ENERGY1S0 EXP - - B 8 8 8 B B
AGO II/POF+ SOT - - - _0 ._r',..
HUBBLESPACE "_' - , n -: _ SERV - I00 - 0,.
GAM_ RAY CBSERSERV - - 16 !6 i_
SOLAR MAX ..,,,.u.,_'°°rnw'_.,,.°P=u 20 - - 20 - '_" ""
AXAF SERVICING - - 86 86 _6
....u, REFLECTOR .... 450 - .,., - _..,.,
SUPERCOND MAG FAC - 16 16 16 16 - - -
EARTHOBSER SYS 440 4.40 440 440 440 44!) 44) '_40 440
MODRES IMAGSPECT 20 - 20 - ,0 - ?^ -
HIGH RES iMAGSF'ECT 20 .... :v - 20 - "0:_ - "_,._"
H,:H RES HULTI M'WRAD 2C" - 20 - "" _" ....&;J - &b ,_J
LASER _1T'I#_ ,".Ol!I_)n.r'_& A! T .1, .
......•._'-,,-......... _, 20 - 2f' - 2" - 2!Z;
SYNTHETICAPER RADAR 20 - 20 - 20 - _ ""
A; "" r wl_Tco '_r, .10 - ?r, "_,'_ 9_',.
SCATTEROMETER !0 - 10 - 10 - !0 - 10
Tt ._mC,,RRELA,_O_RADIOMETER - 6 - 6 - 6 - 6 - 6
EARTHRAD BUDGETEXP - 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 - 10
I T T IENV,ROMEN,A,.MONITORS - 20 - _ ._.,0 - 20 - ' ;' - 2;}.
".mw ? n ' "_',nw - 2,0 "AU,,,_,A,E,,DATA COLLEu_u,, - 20 2:) - - 2u - 20
INFRAREDSOUNDING ........ 16 16
LARGE IMAGER ....... 16 16
SOLAR TERREBPOLAR PLATFORM ..... _B ....
. - 'IACONTAINEDPLASMAEXP ,,,4 104 - - -
THERMALIR MAPPINGSPECT - 20 - 20 - 20 - 20 -
CRYOGENICINTERFER/SPECT - 20 20 - 20 20 -
FABRY PEROT INTERFEROMETER - 20 20 - 20 - 20 -
VISIUVSPECTOMETER " 20 - 20 20 -
MICROWAVELIMB SOUNDER " 20 - 20 - 20 -
,,, _ "rr - 2O-SUBM . .I.E,,.RSPECT - 20 -
INTERFERDMETERISPECTYUPPERATM - 20 - 20 - 20 -
UPPERATM IR RADIOMETER - 20 20 20 -
DOPPLERLIDAR - "n '_,,
DIFFERENTIALABSORPLIDAR '_
_ 20
NADIRCLIMATEINTERFER/BPECT 20 20 20 20
CELSSPALLET - 32 _2 32 32
SETI GEO ANTENNAMISSION - 200
MICRO8 VARIABLE'8' FREE FLYER - - - - I00 1_2 _,._.'1._._"
EXP SEO PLATFORM - - - 720
SPACEBASEDANTENNATEST RANGE - 1i52 1152 1152 1152 1152 11_=_ 11_'_1!52
C-S-I
TABLE.._P-7
SPACESTATIONPAYLOADSREQUIRINGEVASUPPORT(MHRS1
MAY 19B5LANGLEYDATA BASE
TOTALFIRMNESS
BASED ON MDAC SURVEY
MISSIONS
COMM 1304
COMM 1309
TDMX *_*/v • i
•n_v 2022I_HA
TDMX ?n,,
_v_ _.
TDMX 206.3
"hTDMX -,,64
TD_X _r,?_/v, •
TDMX 2072
TD_X ",, _,
TDMX _-2
TDMX "_,_n
T_MX 215_
T_X _'
TD_X _'_
TD_X " _'
TDMX 2224
TDMX 2261
TD_X 2263
TD_X _
Tn_,v2311
TDMX ,._2
,-, ,;TDMX _4.1
TDMX ,,.'_-'2
,_,MX2413
TDMX 2421
TDMX 2431
TDMX 2441
TDMX 2462
TDMX 2511
TDMX 2542
TDMX 2543
TDMX 2544
TDMX 256_
TDMX 2562
TDMX 2563
TDMX 2565
TDMX 2571
TDMX 2574
PAYLOADNAME 92 93
OMVITMS 160 60
ORBITALTRANSFERVEHICLE - -
SPACECRAFTMATERIAL& COATINGS S
GROWTHOF COND SEMICONDCRYSTALS 32
LARGESPAr._*_"_._"_ 228
T Tn CTDHPTHR_' 7')SP.A,CES,_T.,N ,,
n 'rON _RB•TSPACECRAFTASSY/TEST
AN I_1,'_ P,
_.VA_,_E,,ANT _SS/PERFOR_
.... H_ DYNAMICS 'n="T_=A"_'nN
SIC STRAINAND ACOUSTIC_._u,,_cw'c_°e12
) D
H H n ,_TEST SOLARP_,,PE_LASER _0
c ._1 CP rnwm,coc_'rlM 30_.AS_.R.... TRIC ENERGY........... _,
ADVA,,C.,,RADIATORCONCEPTS 16
cc cr,_r'C cv_TcM_
_.AR,_ POWER
SOLARDYN_:C ,_u_........ .>_
II) T? ,_,Tl_'llk!.".
_l,_ i I..j_I,IIR ; _,51 ( I,._l;'h._
,;.,,.,_ "RE_UENCYANTE'INATECH
LASERr_.w _ "r,RArw_,_.E_E._,P
SENSORSYSTEMSTECHNOLOGY
C02 LIDAR ,,,,_l"'_"_A,,,.""_RA_.E"GASES -
A_E_._IE _,,PP_.ER,,,._nI,_._,,.RADAR 6
LONS..... vn eTn_-_" -
LASERPROPULSION
ADVANCEDADAPTIVE,.,,,,.,,,,,.r'_°_'
DISTRIBUTEDADAPTIVECONTROL
DYNAMICDISTURBANCECONTROL
ACTIVEOPTICTECHNOLOGY 78
ADVANCEDCONTROLDEVICETECH
GUIDEDWAVE OPTICSDATA SYS EXP S
TELEDPERATORSE_'SOREVAL & TEST 8
SPACEPOWERSYS ENVIROINT
"l" ITETHEREDCONS,EL_.ATIO,_
TETHEREDTRANSPORTATION
• ¢7 c tn t) x l:P'
,_,H_.E._,FLUIDSTOWAGET,,.A,_S._R
SATELLITESERVICINS& REFURB 12
M k:T mSATELLITE,,AI,,,ENAN,,E& REPAIR
MATERIALSRESUPPLY
THERMALINTERFACETECHNOLOGY 24
OTVIPAYLOADINTERFACINSITRANSFER-
OTV MAINTENANCETECHNOLOGY
4
32
48
154
94 95 96
126 - -
4 4 ¢
16 16
lOS IOB
¢_
_B -
- _B -
2S - °
- - 48
- -
-- ° -
4 4 -
30 42 42
- 16
- - 16
7B
2_
B S B
_04 104
616
96 36
20
6 " "
- - 98
- 40 -
I0
°
°
4B
S
616
36
°
°
9B
97 98 99 O0
4 4 4
E "1
°
- ° °
° ° --
° - -
. -- °
° - --
° - -
° -- .
¢8 4B 48
- 616
14 24
36 _6
-- °
4_
- 616
24 2¢
° °
4
_8
C-3-2
TA_I
SPACE S1.'_T'nNo^v, n_no _- . - " =Va t_m
MAY'985 LA,_'GLEYDATAo_o_6,'..',J Q.
BASEDON MDAC SURVEY
ORIGIN.AL PAC-,_ !'3
I:K)K}RQUALrr_
ESA
MAT 130
SPA BOI.
_n_ 401
JAPAN
C-002
C-C04
E-'.'O:
S-002
S-O0'
S-005
S-DOS
S-¢09
S-OlD
T-D02
_-007
T-D09
C_,,A_A
SAAX 4002
SA_X 40O4
SAAX 4006
TDMX ¢006
NOAA
_'_0AA0001
NOAA 0002
NOAA 0003
NOAA 0004
,_'OAA0005
NOAA 0006
NOAA DO07
NDAA 0008
NOAA 0009
NOAA DO10
NOAA O011
NOAA00!2
NOAA001.3
NOAA 0014
_IOAA0015
NOAA 0016
NOAA 0017
PAYLOADNAME 92 93 94 95 96
- 354 408 408
20
MICROGRAVITY
FAR INFRARED/SUBMMSPACE TEL
ADV TECH T==T_wSATELLITE
n#_MLARGEC..... ANTENNA
._,"V,,,.,,,,""_"& _ATA ,,,,,,,,.,.,,uA_'n'_ _.SYG
.,,_,,,,,.,, 9EPLOYA},_TTEST
LASERR_NGZ,_GSYSTE_
TEST DF SEYSORTECHnOLOgIES
_=ro. OF UPPERA ..... rH_,,E
01.U
LINE GAMMA ,.,.,EC,.uN
X-RAYASTRONOMYOBSERVATZON
_rHb_ y'..ui
SUBMILL'YETERTELESCOPE
LARGEANTE_'ASYST-'_CHNOLCGY
..LARARRAY ........
LIQUIDPROPELLANT.HANDLING
!0
- ,')
- 2
- !00
- 16
G B
4?
2
'4
- 2
2
97
2q
2 2
5_
98 99 00
2¢
pt_l 1"
,_.,.CA,S B 8 B 8 S 8 8
.._,,_'' '_-BAS L_%.,.ARRAY _ ....
SPACE STRUCTURES 40 6 6 - -
2 2
12
0
GEO SYNTHPTICAPERTURERADAR _ _n _ 20 - _n - _n -
SEA SYNTHETICAPERTURERADAR - 20 - 20 20 - 20 -
MULTISPECTRALINEARARRY - 20 - 20 - 20 - 20 -
SEARCHAND _:_'"= - 20 - 20 - ?n ?_
SPACE ENVIRONMENTMONITOR - 20 - 20 - 20 - 20 -
ADV MICROWAVESOUNDINGUNIT - 20 - 20 - 20 - 20 -
ADV MICROWAVERADIOMETER - 20 - 20 - 20 - .n
MED RES IMAGINGRADIOMETER - 20 - 20 - 20 - 20 -
RADARALTIMETER - 20 - 20 - 20 - 20 -
ALONG TRACKSCAN RAD MICROWAVE - 20 - 20 - 20 - 20 "
c= _n_unco - - - 46HISH R_ IR RADIATION._.,._. 46 46 _6 - -
N-ROSSSCATTEROMETER - 20 - 20 - 20 - 20 -
SPECIALSENSORMICROWAVEIMAGING - - 92 - 92 - 92 - 92 -
DATA COLLECTIONSYSTEM - - 40 - 40 - 40 - 40 -
l ISPACEENVIRONMENTMONITOR - 24 - 24 - 24 - 24 -
BEARCHAND RESCUE - - 20 - 20 - 20 - 20 -
ADV ,,.CR_WAVESOUNDING - 40 40 - 4_ - 40 -
r,*
V:
C-3-3
_ "" TABLEC-3
MAY19B5LAN,%EYDATABASE
BASEDONMDACSURVEY
MISSIONS PAYLOAD_ ME 92 93 94
TnM_ -NOAA 0018 ADV MICROWAVERAD..... T.-R 20
NOAA 0019 MED RES IMAGINGRADIOMETER - 20
NOAA 0020 ALONGTRACKSCAN RAD MICROWAVE - 20
NOAA 0021 HIGH RES IR RADIATIONSOUNDER - - 46
NOAA ^ " _AvO_2 oAn^oA_TIMPTER
_'CAA'__" ,,_on_ r TT - = - - 20.,0_._........LA, ,ER_MET.R
,_ __,wIr. _ _ 92
ROAA ........ _'00_,_DATA ,,_UmEJ_iwSYSTEM - - 40
.,.L_ GLOBAL,_0,_................. ,,_,_,, - - 66
_A_,_i_O,_o_n_._SENSOR - _,,.....A _v-_ EARTH ,._.. - "
USA
SAAX 20 626 !688
rnMw_ 160 _0 _2_
r_
,_AP_ _ B 13B
_NAuA 68 ._0
NOAA 0 0 B66
TOTAL '_'.....4 1476 43_0
95 96 97 9B 99 00
- 20 - 20 - 20
- 20 - 20 20
- 20 - 20 - 20
- 46 - 46 46
- 20 - _ _^
- _,_ - 20
'_ 40- _v - 40
- 66 - 66 _6
- _ _.
.v _v 2_
_,AL
..... 4 1980
.30B B2P,
!6 26
S
0 B66
_ 41_6
v
.'4% _on _",? _,,,',_,......
8 S S S E
0 B66 0 _66 (!
• 9,,.4 4610 _4,..0:62B .. ,
C-3-4
T Ot
EV_ _ANHOURSBY -_R'_'Fe=
FIRMNESS:OPERATIONAL(I)
BASEDON MDAC SURVEY
MISSIONS
5AAX 0016
SAAX 0211
NOAA 0003
NOAA 0004
NOAA 0005
NOAA 0007
.,AA 000g
w_n_8 0010
NOAA 0014
NOAA 0015
_OAA 0016
,,_AAO0_v
NOAA vow,
_OAA 0022
,_AA 0024
_OqA 0027
NOAA 0028
PAYLOADNAME
SOLAR MAX MISSION5ERV
LASER ATMO SOUNDER& ALT
MULTISPECTRALINEARARRY
SEARCHANI)RESCUE
SPACEENVIRONMENTMONITOR
ADV MICROWAVERADIOMETER
I" M T 0RADARA_:I.E,E,,
HIGH RESIR _ _' _'_,.A_,A,.oN SOUNDER
DATA _" _'_ BYSTE_
o_ar_=_.,on_,_ MONITOR
SEARCHAND RESCUE
ADV w_roni,_mm o,_n;n__-_o
ALONGTRACK.C_.NRAG ,,..,,....."'r°"'_^"_
HIBH RESIR RADIAl.u,.SOUNDER
OCEA_....,,'_n'no ZMAGER
1992 93 94 95 96 97 9B 99 O0 Ol
20 - 20 - 20 - - 20
- 20 20 20 20 - ?_'
v
- 20 - 20 - 20 - 20 -
20 20 20 - 20 -
20 20 20 - 20
20 20 20 20
20 _n _^ _n
46 46 46 46
92 92 92 92
v
24 24 24 _'
mh _h _r' _A
20 20 20 _
v
- 46 _6 46 46
- 92 92 92 02
- _,,_ - 40 '_ _^
- 20 20 20 .?r,,
_" 6'0 "TOTAL 20 20 620 40 40 20 ,_. 2:) 620 4v
O-_-5
EVA .AN_OUR_BY :To_k,F=_
F_RH_Jcc_,APPROVED12)
TABLE_r-_-".J.,
BASEDON MDACSURVEY
M,,_,ONS PAY,._AD_AME
SAAX0012HUBBLESPACETELSERV
SAAX0013BAMMARAYOBBERSERV
NOAA0006ADVMICROWAVESOUNDINGUNIT
Y t_M TNOAA00!2N-ROSS5CAT,ER_,,E,ER
NOAA0017ADVMICROWAVE50UNDINB
NOAA00,_3,N-ROSSSDATTERO_ETER
92 93 94 95 96 97 98 _9 O0 O!
ih
- - tO0 - ,0,, - -
- - I_ - 16 - 16
- 20 - 20 20 - 20 -
- 20 - 20 20 20 -
- 40 40 40 - 40 -
_ _0 20 - 20 -
0 0 I00 ,,."L I00 ,0 216 0 lOO 16
C-3-6
EVAMANHOURSBY FIRMNESS
c_o_w_, PLANNED (3)
BASEDON MDAC SURVEY
M_TnNR PAYLOADu^wc _ 9¢
.......... 9_ 95
SAAX 0004 SIRTFPLATFORM.._._.'7_e+nu
SAAX 0006 GTARLAB
SAAX 0011 AGO II/PDF+ GOT
5AAX 0017 AXAF SERVICING 86
SAAX 0020 LARGEDEPLOYREFLECTOR
SAAX 0202 EARTHOBSERGYS 440 +40 440
SAAX 020B MOD RES IMAG SPECT 20 20
SAAX 0209 HIGH REB IMAB SPECT 20 20
SAAX _'_ u+_H RES .+.-TMW _AD 20 20
_hAV An+ 9 _V_'TU_TTP _PER RADAR _ _A
v
SAAX _'_ EARTH RAD +,,n+ ? EXP 10....... IoE+ - 10
SAAX 02:9 E,._IR_ME,.,A_MO,_.i_RS 20 - 20
5AAX 0220 AUTOMATEDDATA _,._._.+_,_rm'_r_'n_+20 - 20
SAAX 0221 _ o_A,, EMICROWAVE^ .?_w.,^
SAAX 0223 '^_= +:+A_=R
e^_v 0229 C_YOGEN!C,_,_o_:_.,=_=r- _
SAAX 0230 FABRYPERDT IN ER+ER...... R _ o_ _
SAAX _' VIS/UV cOrrTnWC_c_
SAAX 0232 MICROWAVELIMB SOUNDER - - -
SAAX _
,2=1,4 'klT=O=¢OnW¢+_:leO_'T/, D_'_D ATM
SAAX _=,,_ UPPERATM IR RADIOMETER - - -
SAAX 0236 n , o,,_OPP_E:_.DAR - - -
SAAX 0237 DIFFERENTIALABSORPLIDAR - - -
5AAX _o _,^n+o , v= ,7 =, o c.+_ ,._+.CL! ,A,_IJ_ERF_RI_P_C, - - 20 -
5AAX 0402 MICRO G VARIABLE"8' FREE FLYER ....
SAAX 0501EXP BED PLATFORM - - -
COMM I_04OMV/TMS 160 60 -
CDMM 1309ORBITALTRANSFERVEHICLE - 126
SAAX 4006 UV ATMOSPHERICLIMB SCANNER 16 16 16 -
NOAA 0001 BED SYNTHETICAPERTURERADAR - 20
NOAA 0002 SEA SYNTHETICAPERTURERADAR - 20
NOAA O00B MED RES IMAGINGRADIOMETER - 20
NDAA 0019 MED REB IMAGINGRADIOMETER - 20
NOAA 0026 GLOBALOZONEMONITORINGRADIOM - - 66
TOTAL 176 682 BOB 692
o, 97 Do 99
4B 50 -
30 _0
- .30 -
86 -
450 50
440 440 440 440
20 _._
-v
20 _"+
20 ""
.C,'V
?O 0_
',r, 90
6
- _ ;"t 'I t}
& v •1+"
v LO
- 20 2")
Oh m_
_ - 206V
_A
- _v -_v
_ _ _ _
20 - 20
20 - 20 -
- - on _
- - _A -
- - I00 "_
- - 720 I
20 - 20 -
20 - 20 -
20 20
20 20
66 66
776 IIOA 1792 BIB
++• ;j ,_
- _0
86
a0
_n
_A
.:)
_v
_V
:6 2"
2O
&. v
20 -
_A
; V -
20 -
1.32 t32
20 -
20
986 i_,^_
C-_-7
"lua'_^_lun,ooBYp;pM_,r_o
....MII_SS.CANDIDATEI4)
'9
TABLEC-3-4
BASEDONMDAC_u,,="="rv..:
SAAX0005
SAAX 0007
SAAX O00B
SAAX 0021
GAAX 0225
SAAX 0227
SAAX 0306
SAAX 030g
SAAX .,_0_
_M¥ _A41
TDMX _n
_qTn_v _06_
_,.. .. 2062
........_06._
TDMX _.,64
_,,X 2071
TD_X _
TD_X _'_'
•n,v 2122
TDMX 2!32
TDMX 2!52
TDMX 2153
•n,v 2211
TDMX 2212
_n_ 2213
TD_X 2224
T_MX 226_
TDMX _
TDMX 2265
TDMX 231I
TDMX _2
TDMX 2411
TDMX 2412
TDMX 2413
TDMX .4_,
TDMX 2431
TDMX 2441
TDMX 2462
TDMX 2511
TDMX 2542
TDMX 2543
TDMX 2544
TDMX 2561
TDMX 2562
PAYLO:_D,_,-,,,"^"_ 92
TRANS.RAD _ ION CAL
HI THROUGHPUTMISSIONHERV
HIGH ENERGYISO EXP
SUPERCDND MA8 FAC
SOLARTERRESPOLARPLATFORM
CONTAINEDPLASMAEXP
CELSS_' _r_
e_ r)
_._._=_^":BASEDA,_,E,,,,ATESTR_NGE -
GROWTHOr,,,_;,,.rn_mSEM!CD_D.,,,Y,,TA_.,,r_:'e , e - '_,_
An._cn ANT ASS/PERFORM
_'1 'rB_ T h'id CAPT _WI i.24.... H, DYNAMICSI#,,TI....lu,, '"
kll_ ,_.PrHl c'_Pi m (_S/C ='r_r_! A,,,, SENSORS ,_.
................. SOLARCu,4..,_._.'
TEST _' _ p,!_w_.pn, ccc, ..
, T ^"rm r'f_xi/'CpTq _AD,:ANCEDRAO_,,_R.,_.......
LARGESPACEPOWER SYSTEMS
SOLARDYNAMICPOWER 32
MULTIFTN SPACEANTENNARNS TECH
MULTIANTENNABEAM PATTERNS
M#W T_,;% mV T_'Ii'.LASER,.0.....& ........._ DEVELOP
n._:o...,SPACE ,,P, I,ALDS,"_...........
GENSORSYSTEMSTECHNOLOGY
OD2 LIDAR,,_,.nAND _n^r._-A_:=
SATELLITEDOPPLERMETEROLRADAR 6
LONG TERMCRYO FLUIDSTORAGE
LASERPROPULSION
ADVANCEDADAPTIVECONTROL
DISTRIBUTEDADAPTIVECONTROL
DYNAMICDISTURBANCECONTROL
ACTIVEOPTIC TECHNOLOGY 78
ADVANCEDCONTROLDEVICETECH
GUIDEDWAVE OPTICSDATA SYS EXP 8
TELEOPERATORSENSOREVAL & TEST B
SPACEPOWERSYG ENVIRO INT
TC'_u_ocnCONSTELLATION
TETHEREDTRANSPORTATION
TETHEREDFLUIDSTOWAGETRANSFER -
SATELLITESERVICING& REFURB 12
S^T.,:,,,'rrMAINTENANCE& REPAIR
9_ 94 95 96 97 9B 99 O0 01
8 8 B 8 - - -
- 30 - - 30 - -
B B 8 8 B B -
16 16 16 16 ....
- - - ¢8 ....
- 1,_ 104 ....
_ 32 _ 32 - -
" _ !152 '_ '1=" '_ ....
¢ 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
_ ......
48 ......
154 .....
,_o I08
_h
,u tO 32 ....
46 ....
44 .....
39 .....
18 ......
28 .....
- 48 48 4e 48 4H 48 _8
8 8 .....
4 4 ......
12 ........
30 42 42 ......
78 ......
- 24 ....
8 8 8 8 -
!04 104 - -
- 616 - 616 616 616
- - - 14 24 24 24
- 96 36 36 36 _6 36 _6
20 - -
C-3-8
EVAMANHOURSBYFIRMNESS
FIRMNESS:CANDIDATE(41
TABLEC-3-4
BASEDON MOAC SURVEY
cmmGm IDA.. l,a
MISSIONS
TDMX 2563
TDMX 2565
TDMX 2571
TDMX 2574
MAT t30
SPA 801
TO5 40I
C-O02
0-003
C-004
C.A_I
vv_
E-O02
E-O03
E-O05
5-001
S-002
S-005
S-O0_
S-OOS
5-009
S-01O
T-O02
T-O07
T-OO9
SAAX 4002
PAYLOADNAME g2 93 g4 95 96 97 9G g9 O0 Ol
MATERIALSRESUPPLY 6
THERMALINTERFACETECHNOLOGY 24 - - -
OTVIPAYLOAOINTERFACING/TRANSFER - 98 98
OTV MAINTENANCETECHNOLOGY - 40 - -
MICROGRAVITY - 354 408 408 -
FAR INFRARED/SUBMMSPACETEL - - 12 - 12 -
ADV TECHTEST SATELLITE - - 20 - -
LARGECOMM ANTENNA - 10 ....
ADV COMM _ DATA HANDLINGSYS - - - 10 - - -
8RAV STABILDDEPLOYANT TEST .... 12 -
LASER RANGINGSYSTEM ¢ - - - 2 -
........ =.H,,OLO_,.S ....
OBSERVOF UPPERATMOSPHERE .... 24 -
_: FOR EARTHOBSERVATION - 2
ASTRONOMICALPLATFORM - - - t¢ 2 2 2 2
INFRAREDTELESCOPEIN SPACE - 2 - 2 - - -
LINE _^"^ DETECTION - - 2 - - -
X-RAYASTRONOMYOBSERVATION .... 24 - - -
SPACE VLSI ...... 24 -
SOLAR ACTIVITYMCNZTCR ..... 2_ - -
SUBMILLIMETERTELESCOPE .... 24 - - -
LARGE ANTENNASYS TECHNOLO@Y - _'_mvv ......
2D-SOLARARRAYMISSION - _6 ......
LIQUIDPROPELLANTHANDLING B 8 .......
POLCAT5 8 8 B 8 8 B B 9 8 e
VPT^_ 7_¢ 768 2796 1988 z6_O .._,. ,.,. ,%.
C-_-9
_,_ _ ._a_ TABLEC-3-5
D TI TTFIRMNESS:OP,OR,UN,,Y (51
MISSIONS PAYLOADNAME
SAAX 0004 LONG BAS LINE ARRAY
TDMX 4006 SPACESTRUCTURES
TOTAL
92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 Ol
i ......
40 6 6 .....
44 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0
C-3-I0
TABLEO-4
SPACESTATIONPAYLOADSR..u,R,N_:EVASUPPORT,.uoc_
_AY IgB5LARSLEYDATA BASE
MnH_prll _ MTCC_kI_
BASEDON MDAC._Rv_Y
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
MISSIONS
SAAX 0004
SAAX 0005
AASAAX O,_L
SAAX 0007
SA_X 0011
CA
vv_
_A v •
SAAX C_16
SAAX _,_i
SAAX 0020
SAAX ,_v_t
_,._ ,_
S_AX _o_o
SAAX _"v_._
o_,v 0227
_A._ A_AL
,,,Jv_
AV hlh_
v_v{
SAAX 0302
COM_ ,_A_
T_MX _o_
"_WV _A..... V61
?_,v 2063I b'i_^
•n, 2054
T_MX 2071
TDMX 2072
TDMX 2111
TDMX _,o,
T_MX 2122
TDMX _,_9
TDMX 2152
TDMX 2153
TDMX 2211
?n_v 2212
,_ 2213
TDMX _°'
TDMX 2224
TDMX 2263
_.^ 2265
TDMX ?_"
•_,v 2Z22( _I(A
PAYLOADNAME 92 93
_T_TC O{ ATC_DW _CT_
TRANS.PAD & ION _AL - -
STARLAB l --
_ YUDOI!_UDHT W_C_Tn_ _DU
ASG !I/POF_ SOT
HUBBLESPACETEL SERV - -
GAMMA RAY OBSERSERV
SOLAR _AX _..... " _
,_o_ np_,nvREFLECTOR
,.,FRA..... u_._..... -
I_O_C TWA_
P_;TA,_IC_ D_AO_A _vO
CELSS = ""
"_ ,....._ _ _ rn:_ FLYER -
, WI _:_ .... _SPACEBASEDAiGEdA TESTR_NGE
O,,V..... __ 60
ORBITALTRANSFER"_'_'_
-_._^_ _P_: ............. 228
S" _" 72r_% QT&mt_W, OTO!'_IID_C
_,,°_'._,_Rm",SPACECRAFT_,,,_w,^ccv_?- 154
ADVANCEDANT Ac_o_o_no.
F,,_u_D,,,A....S "=""_^"""_ '__&Ul, ( VW# MT_ &_&lql lrn_ I &_iq &q
SiC STRAINAND _u_.._n_'r SENSORS 12
DEPLOY& TEST LARGE SOLARCONCEN 32
TEST SOLAR PUMPED.A_.R 20
LASER-ELECTRICE_ERGYCO_VERS!ON ZO
ADVANCEDRADIATORCONCEPTS t6 16
LARGE SPACEPOWERSYSTEMS - lOB
_._n'A°DYNAMICPO_ER Z2 ,_'_
MULTIFTN SPACE ANTENNARNG TECH - ¢6
MULTI=.a_="_'a,.,,,._BEAM PATTERNS - 44
_l WIMULTI FL_UE,,CYANTENNATECH
'^_=_COMM & TRACKING.......
DEEP SPACE n _,__P, ALDSN TERMINAL - 28
SEKSORSYSTEMSTECHNOLOGY - -
CO2 LIDARWIND AND TRACEBASES - -
._,_c^_,,._cDOPPLERMETEnu_"'RADAR 6 -
LONG TERM CRYD FLUIDSTORAGE - 4
DI I n, WI 4_
,_epmPR&U_:_O.
94 95 96 97 9B ?9 OZ :1'_
- - - _.o _ _ _ _
- B 8 £ 8 - - -
a,_ .,x.z - -
_ _ -_n
,iv w,v
- ? A _ _ _ "%
v v . ,.
I00 - - _'_" - - -•; ,.."v
4,L
- *L . _
e _'_ _ _ _ .'. _ " ,'_
S6 - 86 - - ":6
'6 !6 t6 I,_. - -
- - - 15 16
I -- !L 4L
.... " 16
10_ I:)4 - - -
_ _n_'! .. -
!!52 ,_o ,,_ _'_ _........... _£52
_id& °
126
lOB
tO
.38
18
4
16 10
48 48
8 B
_ ¢'r'l
4G 48 48 48 48
C-4-I
TAS,LEC-¢
ill TID't I
MAY [98.5LANGLEYDATA BASE
N&_I-POLAR,',!S_!_NS
i_,_Ii,.ll MII_ {(}_,,,,%_W41.#ikVlIt
MISSIONS
_'ImM
_.X 2412
T_i,X.'4,,3
TDMX _ _'i4z_
T_MX """L 4".,;, 1
< wq:^
T_X "=_
_,Ju-a
,u.im _,J
"D_'257:
7_v 257';
SPA m^_
TOG 401
C-002
m /'! h '_
S-::',03
S-001
,zV&,
S-O0_
S-006
S-OOB
S-009
5-010
T-O02
T-007
T-O09
A9SAAX 40,,,.
SAAX ¢004
SAAX 4:)06
TDMX ¢006
PAYLOADNAME 92 93 94 95
A.UAN,.-_n^ o_ I: - 42
........ A._,, .V. CONTROL 30 42
DISTRIBUTEDADAPTIVE_ONTROL - - :6 -
ACTIVEOPTIC_._,_=r'u"n',,_,,,..,_._cv 7B 78, - -
..-r
GUIDED'W'c o -;_ DATA Svs EXP o
........................ _vA: & TEST 8' - - -
SP_-". PO_ERSYS=__V:Rg_":T,..: - '_,,.._ ,'0C
"rPT'-:c_,': D r'fi_c'r:l _&TTnM _ _ L_;
m_: M"T', TI:"_A_ ,**-r* Tr.-l,,k,,91 m_ _r_,
"V
ADV TECH"r_CT._,_T_',* ,'r_ 20
,^o_.crn._ ANTENNA '_'
_v
ADV _.,,_'.w,SDATA HANDLINGSYS
TESTOFSD;SOR"'_'_"_,_'......"" = '"
_',o, OFUPPEREr_._,_._=_.'=
o FOR nI:)crnu_ T _' nwI_P,, EARTH - _' _'
I "" M
^OTOm_,nN_,rAI P_.A_FOR,,
INFRAREDTELESCOPE.,.".._.=_^r: _ .- _
LINEGAMMA DETECTION 2
I TT £_NIX-RAYASTRONOMYOBSER_A..... - - - -
SPACEVLBI ....
GOLARACTIVITYMONITOR ....
SUBMILLIMETERTELESCOPE ....
A klLARGE_NTEN,,ASYS TECHNOLOGY - - ,00 -
.,,_-:n'_,,^:ARRAYMISSION - - 16 -
_ ?i'l I:.:UIDPROPELLANTHANDLING - B 8 -
PDLCATS B 8' 8' 8'
LONGBAG ,:w,:_,,,.ARRAY ¢ - - -
UV ATMOSP_CRZC..,,_. LIMB ._.A,IN.R ,,_ 16 -
T ] TII ,SPACES,RUC,_RES 40 6 6
TOTAL 992
96
8.
97 98 _o
616 ",A '
~
¢0_
,_.A, ....
.I.-*
*T.--
14 2 2 2 2
- 2.4 - - -
.... 24
- - - 26
- - 2¢ I
8 8 8 8, B
8¢6 2940 2198, 26.389_A ..,07,_1762 2090 1640
" C-4-2
TABLE C-5
MAY 1985 LANGLEYDATA BASE
BASED ON MDACSURVEY
MISSIONS PAYLOADNAME
USA
SAAX 0004 SIRTF PLATFORMMISSION
SAAX 0005 TRANS. RAD & ION CAL
SAAX 0006 STARLAB
SAAX 0007 HI THROUGHPUTMISSION SERV
SAAX 0008 HIGH ENERGYISO EXP
SAAX 0011ASO II/POF + SOT
SAAX 0012 HUBBLE SPACE TEL SERV
SAAX 0013 GAMMARAY OBSERSERV
SAAX 0016 SOLAR MAX MISSION SERV
SAAX 0017 AXAF SERVICING
SAAX 0020 LARGE DEPLOYREFLECTOR
SAAX 0021 SUPER CONDMAGFAC
SAAX 0202 EARTH OBSER SYS.
SAAX 0208 MODRES IMAG SPECT
SAAX 0209 HIGH RES IMAG SPECT
SAAX 0_0 HI RES MULTI MWRAD
SAAX 0211 LASER ATMOSOUNDER& ALT
SAAX 021 __SYNTHETIC APER RADAR
SAAX 0213 ALTIMETER
SAAX 0214 SCATTEROMETER
SAAX 0215 CORRELATIONRADIOMETER
SAAX 0216 EARTH RAD BUDGETEXP
SAAX 0219 ENVIRONMENTALMONITORS
SAAX 0220 AUTOMATEDDATA COLLECT
SAAX 0221 LARGE MICROWAVEANTENNA
SAAX 0222 INFRARED SOUNDING
SAAX 0223 LARGE IMAGER
SAAX 0225 SOLAR TERRES POLARPLAT
SAAX 0227 CONTAINEDPLASMAEXP
SAAX 0228 THERMAL IR MAPPINGSPECT
SAAX 0229 CRYOGENICINTERFER/SPECT
SAAX 0230 FABRY PEROT INTERFEROMETER
SAAX 0231 VIS/UV SPECTOMETER
SAAX 0232 MICROWAVE LIMB SOUNDER
SAAX 0233 SUBMILLIMETER SPECT
SAAX 0234 INTERFEROMETER/SPECT/UPPER ATM
SAAX 0235 UPPER ATM IR RADIOMETER
SAAX 0236 DOPLER LIDAR
SAAX 0237 DIFFERENTIAL ABSORP LIDAR
SAAX 0238 NADIR CLIMATE INTERFER/SPECT
SAAX 0306 CELSS PALLET
SAAX 0309 SETI GEO ANTENNA MISSION
SAAX 0402 MICRO G VARIABLE "G" FREE FLYER
SAAX 0501 EXP GEO PLATFORM
SAAX 0502 SPACE BASED ANTENNA TEST RANGE
FIRMNESS MATURITY
3 4
4 5
3 5
4 5
4 4
3 4
,o zl
4
1 5
3 4
3 4
4 4
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
I 3
3 3s
3 3
3 3
3 3.o.
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
4 3
4 3
3 3
3 3°
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3• .o
3 3
3 -_• ..a
3 3
3 3
3 3
4 4
4 4
3 4
3 4-o
4
C " "_ C-5-I
TABLE C-5
FIRMNESS AND MATURITY
MAY 1985 LANGLEY DATA BASE
BASED ON MDACSURVEY
MISSIONS PAYLOADNAME
COMM1304 OMV/TMS
COMM1309 ORBITAL TRANSFERVEHICLE
TDMX 2011 SPACECRAFTMATERIALS & COATINGS
TDMX 2022 GROWTHOF CONDSEMICONDCRYSTALS
TDMX 2061 LARGE SPACE STRUCTURES
TDMX 2062 SPACE STATION MODIFICATIONS
TDMX 2063 ON ORBIT SPACECRAFTASSY/TEST
TDMX 2064 ADVANCEDANT ASSY/PERFORM
TDMX 2071 FLIGHT DYNAMICS IDENTIFACTION
TDMX 2072 S/C STRAIN AND ACOUSTIC SENSORS
TDMX 2111 DEPLOY & TEST LARGE SOLAR CONCEN
TDMX 2121 TEST SOLAR PUMPEDLASER
TDMX 2122 LASER-ELECTRIC ENERGYCONVERSION
TDMX 2132 ADVANCEDRADIATOR CONCEPTS
TDMX 2152 LARGE SPACE POWERSYSTEMS
TDMX 2153 SOLAR DYNAMIC POWER
TDMX 2211 MULTI FTN SPACE ANTENNARNG TECH
TDMX 2212 MULTI ANTENNABEAM PATTERNS
TDMX 2213 MULTI FREQUENCYANTENNATECH
TDMX 2221 LASER COMM& TRACKING DEVELOP
TDMX 2224 DEEP SPACE OPTICAL DSN TERMINAL
TDMX 2261 SENSORSYSTEMSTECHNOLOGY
TDMX 2263 C02 LIDAR WIND AND TRACE GASES
TDMX 2265 SATELLITE DOPPLERMETEROLRADAR
TDMX 2311 LONG TERM CRYOFLUID STORAGE
TDMX _._3_ LASER PROPULSION
TDMX 2411 ADVANCEDADAPTIVE CONTROL
TDMX 2412 DISTRIBUTED ADAPTIVE CONTROL
TDMX 2413 DYNAMIC DISTURBANCECONTROL
TDMX 2421 ACTIVE OPTIC TECHNOLOGY
TDMX 2431 ADVANCEDCONTROLDEVICE TECH
TDMX 2441 GUIDED WAVEOPTICS DATA SYS EXP
TDMX 2461 STRUCT ASSEMBLYW/TELEOPERATOR
TDMX 2462 TELEOPERATORSENSOREVAL & TEST
TDMX 2511 SPACE POWERSYS ENVIRO INT
TDMX 2542 TETHEREDCONSTELLATION
TDMX 2543 TETHEREDTRANSPORTATION
TDMX 2544 TETHEREDFLUID STOWAGETRANSFER
TDMX 2561 SATELLITE SERVICING & REFURB
TDMX 2562 SATELLITE MAINTENANCE& REPAIR
TDMX 2563 MATERIALS RESUPPLY
TDMX 2565 THERMAL INTERFACE TECHNOLOGY
TDMX 2571 OTV/PAYLOAD INTERFACING/TRANSFER
TDMX 2574 OTV MAINTENANCETECHNOLOGY
FIRMNESS MATURITY
3 3
3 4
4 5
4 4
4 3
4
4 4
4 3
4 4
4 4
4 3
4 4
4 5
4 5
4 4
4 3
4 3
4 3
4
4
4 3
4 4
4 3
4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4
4 4
4 5
4 3
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 3
4 3
4 3
4 3
4
4 4
4
4 3
C-5-2
TABLE C-5
FIRMNESS AND MATURITY
MAY 1985 LANGLEYDATA BASE
BASEDON MDACSURVEY
MISSIONS
ESA
MAT 130
SPA 801
TOS 401
JAPAN
C-002
C-003
C-004
E-O01
E-O02
E-O03
E-O05
S-O01
S-002
S-005
S-006
S-008
S-009
S-OIO
T-O02
T-O07
T-O09
CANADA
PAYLOAD NAME
Tm R t vM_ROG, A_IT,
FAR INFRARED/SUBMM SPACE TELE
ADV TECH TEST SATELLITE
LARGE COMM ANTENNA
ADV COMM & DATA HANDLING SYS
SRAV STABILD DEPLOY ANT TEST
LASER RANGING SYSTEM
TEST OF SENSOR TECHNOLOGIES
OBSERV OF UPPER ATMOSPHERE
DPS FOR EARTH OBSERVATION
ASTRONOMICAL PLATFORM
INFRARED TELESCOPE IN SPACE
LINE GAMMA DETECTION
X-RAY ASTRONOMY OBSERVATION
SPACE VLBI
SOLAR ACTIVITY MONITOR
SUBMILLIMETER TELESCOPE
LARGE ANTENNA SYS TECHNOLOGY
2D-SOLAR ARRAY MISSION
LIQUID PROPELLANT HANDLING
SAAX 4002 POLCATS
SAAX 4004 LONG BAS LINE ARRAY
SAAX 4006 UV ATMOSPHERIC LIMB SCANNER
TDMX 4006 SPACE STRUCTURES
NOAA
NOAA 0001 GEO SYNTHETIC APERTURE RADAR
NOAA 0002 SEA SYNTHETIC APERTURE RADAR
NOAA 0003 MULTISPECTRAL LINEAR ARRAY
NOAA 0004 SEARCH AND RESCUE
NOAA 0005 SPACE ENVIRONMENT MONITOR
NOAA 0006 ADV MICROWAVE SOUNDING UNIT
NOAA 0007 ADV MICROWAVE RADIOMETER
NOAA 0008 MED RES IMAGING RADIOMETER
NOAA 0009 RADAR ALTIMETER
NOAA 0010 ALONG TRACK SCAN PAD MICROWAVE
NOAA 0011 HIGH RES IR RADIATION SOUNDER
NOAA 0012 N-ROSS SCATTEROMETER
NOAA 0013 SPECIAL SENSOR MICROWAVE IMAGING
NOAA 0014 DATA COLLECTION SYSTEM
NOAA 0015 SPACE ENVIRONMENT MONITOR
NOAA 001b SEARCH AND RESCUE
NOAA 0017 ADV MICROWAVE SOUNDING UNIT
NOAA 0018 ADV MICROWAVE RADIOMETER
NOAA 0019 MED RES IMAGING RADIOMETER
FIRMNESS MATURITY
..5
4
4
4 .3
4 4
4 3
4
4 4
4 4
4
4 3
4 3
4 4
4 2
4 3
4 2
4 3
4 3
4 3
4 3
4 4
5 3
3 4
5 4
3 3
3 3.°.
1 3
1 3°-
1 3
3
1 3
3 3
1 3
1 3
1 3
-_ 3
1 3
1 3
1 3
1
...e
1 3
3 3
C-5-3
TABLE C-5
FIRMNESS AND MATURITY
MAY 1985 LANGLEY DATA BASE
BASED ON MDACSURVEY
MISSIONS PAYLOADNAME FIRMNESS MATURITY
NOAA 0020 ALONS _" P",RA_K SCAN RAD MICROWAVE 1 3
NOAA 0021 HIGH RES IR RADIATION SOUNDER 1 3
NOAA 0022 RADARALTIMETER 1 3
NGAA 0023 N-ROSS SCATTEROMETER 2 3
NOAA 0024 SPECIAL SENSORMICROWAVEIMAGING 1 3
NOAA 0025 DATA COLLECTION SYSTEM 1 3
NOAA 0026 GLOBAL OZONEMONITORING RADIQM 3 3
NOAA 00_7 EARTH RADIATION BUDGETSENSOR 1 3
NOAA 0028 OCEANCOLOR I MAGER 1 3
FIRMNESS
I. OPERATIONAL
• APPROVED
3. PLANNED
4. CANDIDATE
5. OPPORTUNITY
MATURITY
_1 _ _ T _ T _L_ _, T _L-"I. NEEDS DEV_O, M_,J,-,_._,, .......
2. NEEDS DEVELOPMENT-MODERATE RISK
t _ • IT__I .i.l DTCb _3. NEEDS DEJ_LOFMEN, _0 ........•
4. STATE OF THE ART
5 WELL WITHIN n,,=,=,cM_ _aC, A_T, _TY
C-5-4
TABLE C-6
TYPES OF MANEUVERING
MAY 1985 LANGLEYDATA BASE
BASEDON MDACSURVEY
-. , ,.,_a_r _UAL_'y
MISSIONS PAYLOAD NAME
USA
SAAX 0004 SIRTF PLATFORM MISSION
SAAX 0005 TRANS. RAD & ION CAL
SAAX 0006 STARLAB
SAAX 0007 HI THROUGHPUT MISSION SERV
SAAX 0008 HIGH ENERGY ISO EXP
SAAX 0011ASO II/POF + SOT
SAAX 0012 HUBBLE SPACE TEL SERV
SAAX 0013 GAMMA RAY OBSER SERV
SAAX 0016 SOLAR MAX MISSION SERV
SAAX 0017 AXAF SERVICING
SAAX 0020 LARGE DEPLOY REFLECTOR
SAAX 0021 SUPER COND MAG FAC
SAAX 0202 EARTH OBSER SYS.
SAAX 0208 MOD RES IMAG SPECT
SAAX 0209 HIGH RES IMA6 SPECT
SAAX 0210 HI RES MULTI MW RAD
SAAX 0211 LASER ATMO SOUNDER & ALT
SAA× 0212 SYNTHETIC APER RADAR
SAAX 0213 ALTIMETER
SAAX 0214 SCATTEROMETER
SAA× 0215 CORRELATION RADIOMETER
SAAX 0216 EARTH RAD BUDGET EXP
SAAX 0219 ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORS
SAA× 0220 AUTOMATED DATA COLLECT
SAAX 0221 LARGE MICROWAVE ANTENNA
SAAX 0222 INFRARED SOUNDING
SAAX 0223 LARGE IMAGER
SAAX 0225 SOLAR TERRES POLAR PLAT
SAAX 0227 CONTAINED PLASMA EXP
SAA× 0228 THERMAL IR MAPPING SPECT
SAAX 0229 CRYOGENIC INTERFER/SPECT
SAAX 0230 FABRY PEROT INTERFEROMETER
SAAX 0231VIS/UV SPECTOMETER
SAAX 0232 MICROWAVE LIMB SOUNDER
SAA× 0233 SUBMILLIMETER SPECT
SAAX 0234 INTERFEROMETER/SPECT/UPPER ATM
SAAX 0235 UPPER ATM IR RADIOMETER
SAAX 0236 DOPLER LIDAR
SAAX 0237 DIFFERENTIAL ABSORP LIDAR
SAAX 0238 NADIR CLIMATE INTERFER/SPECT
SAA× 0306 CELSS PALLET
SAAX 0309 SETI GEO ANTENNA MISSION
SAAX 0402 MICRO G VARIABLE "G" FREE FLYER
SAAX 0501 EXP GEO PLATFORM
SAAX 0502 SPACE BASED ANTENNA TEST RANGE
MANEUVERING
EEU RMS TUG
C ÷ -;-
C + --
-- + C
-- + C
-- C --
-- ÷ C
- + C
C + -
C + -
-- C --
-- C --
- C --
-- C -
-- C -
-- _-L --
-- C --
-- C --
-- C --
- C -
C + -
C C -
C C -
C + C
- + C
C ? C
C-6-I
TABLE C-6
,.4! _YF'ES OF MANEUVERING
MAY 1985 LANGLEY DATA BASE
BASED ON MDACSURVEY
MISSIONS PAYLOADNAME
COMM1304 OMV/TMS
COMM1309 ORBITAL TRANSFERVEHICLE
MANEUVERING
EEU RMS TUG
TDMX 2011 SPACECRAFTMATERIALS & COATINGS -
TDMX 2022 GROWTHOF COND SEMICONDCRYSTALS +
TDMX 2061 LARGE SPACE STRUCTURES
TDMX 2062 SPACE STATION MODIFICATIONS
TDMX 2063 ON ORBIT _,_-_,,_.,__ ASSY/TEST
TDMX i_64 ADVANCEDANT ASSY/PERFORM C
TDM× 2071 FLIGHT DYNAMICS IDENTIFACTION
,D,,^ 2072 S/C STRAIN AND ACOUSTIC SENSORS -
TDMX 2111 DEPLOY& TEST LARGE SOLAR CONCENC
TDMX 2121 TEST SOLAR PUMPEDLASER C
TDMX 2122 LASER-ELECTRIC ENERGYCONVeRsiON -
TDMX 2132 ADVANCEDRADIATOR CONCEPTS C
TDMX _4_ LARGE SPACE POWERSYSTEMS
TDMX 2153 SOLAR DYNAMIC POWER
_n_v _44,_ ........ MULTI FTN SF'ACE ANTENNA RNG TECM -
TDMX 2212 MULTI _,_^_'_l_I^,_,_,_ BEAM ._'^_'_Ic_,,.,_ ,_
TDMX 2213 MULTI FREQUENCY ANTENNA TECH C
TDMX 2221 LASER COMM & TRACKING DEVELOP
TDMX 2224 DEEP SPACE OPTICAL DSN TERMINAL -
TDMX 2261 SENSOR SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY
TDMX 2263 C02 LIDAR WIND AND TRACE GASES -
TDMX 2265 SATELLITE DOPPLER METEROL RADAR -
TDMX 2311 LONG TERM CRYO FLUID STORAGE
TDMX _._li LASER PROPULSION
TDMX 2411 ADVANCED ADAPTIVE CONTROL
TDM× 2412 DISTRIBUTED ADAPTIVE CONTROL
TDMX 2413 DYNAMIC DISTURBANCE CONTROL
TDMX 2421 ACTIVE OPTIC TECHNOLOGY C
TDMX 2431 ADVANCED CONTROL DEVICE TECH
TDMX 2441 GUIDED WAVE OPTICS DATA SYS EXP -
TDMX 2461STRUCT ASSEMBLY W/TELEOPERATOR -
TDMX 2462 TELEOPERATOR SENSOR EVAL & TEST -
TDMX 2511 SPACE POWER SYS ENVIRO INT ?
TDMX 2542 TETHERED CONSTELLATION
TDMX 2543 TETHERED TRANSPORTATION
TDMX 2544 TETHERED FLUID STOWAGE TRANSFER -
TDMX 2561 SATELLITE SERVICING & REFURB ?
TDMX 2562 SATELLITE MAINTENANCE & REPAIR -
TDMX 2563 MATERIALS RESUPPLY C
TDMX 2565 THERMAL INTERFACE TECHNOLOGY
TDMX 25710TV/PAYLOAD INTERFACING/TRANSFER -
TDMX 2574 OTV MAINTENANCE TECHNOLOGY
I
m
m
m
m
D
m
m
m
i
w
m
w
m
C
C
C
C
?
?
C
?
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TABLE C-6
TYPES OF MANEUVERING
MAY 1985 LANGLEYDATA BASE
BASEDON MDACSURVEY
MISSIONS
ESA
MAT 130
SPA 801
TOS 401
JAPAN
C-002
C-003
C-004
E-O01
E-O02
E-O03
E-O05
S-O01
S-002
S-005
S-006
S-008
S-009
S-OIO
T-O02
T-O07
T-O09
CANADA
PAYLOAD NAME
MICROGRAVITY
FAR INFRARED/SUBMM SPACE TELE
ADV TECH TEST SATELLITE
LARGE COMM ANTENNA
ADV COMM & DATA HANDLING SYS
BRAV STABILD DEPLOY ANT TEST
LASER RANGING SYSTEM
TEST OF SENSOR TECHNOLOGIES
OBSERV OF UPPER ATMOSPHERE
DPS FOR EARTH OBSERVATION
ASTRONOMICAL PLATFORM
INFRARED TELESCOPE IN SPACE
LINE GAMMA DETECTION
X-RAY ASTRONOMY OBSERVATION
SPACE VLBI
SOLAR ACTIVITY MONITOR
SUBMILLIMETER TELESCOPE
LARGE ANTENNA SYS TECHNOLOGY
2D-SOLAR ARRAY MISSION
LIQUID PROPELLANT HANDLING
SAAX 4002 POLCATS
SAAX 4004 LONG GAS LINE ARRAY
SAAX 4006 UV ATMOSPHERIC LIMB SCANNER
TDMX 4006 SPACE STRUCTURES
NOAA
NOAA 0001GEO SYNTHETIC APERTURE RADAR
NOAA 0002 SEA SYNTHETIC APERTURE RADAR
NOAA 0003 MULTISPECTRAL LINEAR ARRAY
NOAA 0004 SEARCH AND RESCUE
NOAA 0005 SPACE ENVIRONMENT MONITOR
NOAA 0006 ADV MICROWAVE SOUNDING UNIT
NOAA 0007 ADV MICROWAVE RADI0METER
NOAA 0008 WED RES IMAGING RADIOMETER
NOAA 0009 RADAR ALTIMETER
NOAA 0010 ALONG TRACK SCAN RAD MICROWAVE -
NOAA 0011 HIGH RES IR RADIATION SOUNDER
NOAA 0012 N-ROSS SCATTEROMETER
NOAA 0013 SPECIAL SENSOR MICROWAVE IMAGING -
NOAA 0014 DATA COLLECTION SYSTEM
NOAA 0015 SPACE ENVIRONMENT MONITOR
NOAA 0016 SEARCH AND RESCUE
NOAA 0017 ADV MICROWAVE SOUNDING UNIT
MANEUVERING
EEU RMS TUG
C ? +
C m
- C
C _ -
C C -
C -
C C -
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TABLE C-6
TYPES OF MANEUVERING
MAY 1985 LANGLEY DATA BASE
BASED ON MDACSURVEY
MANEUVERING
MISSIONS PAYLOADNAME EEU RMS TUG
NOAA 0018 ADV MICROWAVERADIOMETER - - -
NOAA 0019 MED RES IMAGING RADIOMETER - - -
NOAA 0020 ALONG TRACK SCAN RAD MICROWAVE - - -
NOAA 0021 HIGH RES IR RADIATION SOUNDER - - -
NOAA 0022 RADAR ALTIMETER - - -
NOAA 0023 N-ROSS SCATTEROMETER - - "
NOAA 0024 SPECIAL SENSORMICROWAVEIMAGING - - -
NOAA 0025 DATA COLLECTION SYSTEM - - -
NOAA 0026 GLOBAL OZONEMONITORINGRADIOM - - -
NOAA 0027 EARTH RADIATION BUDGETSENSOR - - -
NOAA 0028 OCEANCOLOR IMAGER - - -
KEY:
+ MUST HAVE
C CANDIDATE
? MAYBEREQUIRED
- DOES NOT REQUIRE
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Table C-7
POTENTIAL EVA ACCIDENT SCENARIOS
o SCENARIOS DEVELOPED IN THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES
o EVAS FAILURES (LSS_ CREW ENCLOSURE_ PROPULSION SYSTEM)
o ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS
o HUMAN FACTORS
o SCENARIOS ANALYZED TO DETERMINE DESIGN AND OPERATIONAL FACTORS
TO BE CONSIDERED IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE THE PROBABILITY OF
OCCURENCE
ACCIDENT PROFILE ANALYSES
o EACH FAILURE SCENARIO WAS ANALYZED AS FOLLOWS:
o DEFINITION OF SCENARIO
o POTENTIAL CAUSES
o POTENTIAL RESULTS
o PREVENTIVE MEASURES (DESIGN_ OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS)
o CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN
o LIKELIHOOD OF OCCURENCE*
* DEFINED, FOR PURPOSED OF THIS ANALYSIS_ AS FOLLOWS:
ll
1 =
2 =
3 =
4 =
5 =
NOT CREDIBLE
REMOTELY POSSIBLE
PROBABLY WILL NOT OCCUR
MAY OCCUR
PROBABLY WILL OCCUR
ALMOST CERTAIN TO OCCUR
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Tabl e C-7
POTENTI AL EVA ACCI DENT SCENARI OS (CONTI NUED)
EVA SYSTEMSFAILURES
o LIFE SUPPORTSYSTEM (LSS)
o LSS PRESSURENOT MAINTAINED BETWEENLIMITS (HIGH OR LOW)
o LOSS OF THERMAL/HUMIDITY CONTROL
o LOSS OF DATA MANAGEMENT/COMM/DATAPROCESSING
o LOSS OF C02 CONTROL
o PROPULSIONSYSTEM
o LOSS OF THRUST
o LOSS OF CONTROLAUTHORITY
o LOSS OF SYSTEMMONITORING CAPABILITY
o CREWENCLOSURESYSTEM
o LOSS OF PRESSUREINTEGRITY
o LOSS OF MOBILITY
o LOSS OF PASSIVE THERMALPROTECTION
o LOSS OF VISIBILITY
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Table C-7
POTENTIAL EVA ACCIDENT SCENARIOS (CONTINUED)
Scenario # SYSTEMS-l: EMU pressure is not maintained between limits
(high or low)
Possible Causes: Regulator shift/failure
Depletion of supply 02
Loss of pressure integrity of crew enclosure(hole/tear)
Potential Results: Hypoxia (low press, case)
Decompression sickness (low press, case)
02 venting - - high use rate (high press.
case)
Structural failure of crew enclosure (high
press, case)
Corrective Actions: Recharge 02 tanks (primary)
Activate back-up pressure control system
Seek safe (pressurized) haven
Relieve excess pressure
Likelihood: 3
Preventive measures: Eliminate sharp edges
Provide recharge stations in convenient
locations
Design redundant pressure control systems
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Table C-7
POTENTIAL EVA ACCIDENT SCENARIOS (CONTINUED)
Scenario # SYSTEMS-2: Loss of thermal/humidity control
Possible Causes: Saturation of heat sink
Failure of cooling loop
Potential Results: Mild discomfort
Overheating - - high 02 use rate
Loss of visibility (helmet visor fogging)
Moisture (perspiration) in ventilation
loop/electronics
Corrective Actions: Minimize physical activity
Activate back-up heat sink/rejection system
(purge, etc.)
Access station cooling (unbilical)
Likelihood: 4
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Table C-7
POTENTIAL EVA ACCIDENT SCENARIOS (CONTINUED)
Scenario # SYSTEMS-3: Loss of data management/comm/data processing
Possible Causes: Sensor failures
Electrical component failure (shorts_ etc.)
Battery/power source discharge
"Blockage" zones (comm)
Potential Results: Inability to communicate with other
crewmembers
Inability to monitor suit parameters
Inability to access FDF documentation and
other real-time data
Corrective Actions: Charge/recharge battery
Access on external power source
Monitor redundant sensors
Hand signals (comm failure)
Move to location having clear line-of-sight
Access external comm (voice/data) connection
Likelihood: 3
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Table C-7
POTENTIAL EVA ACCI DENT SCENARI OS (CONTI NUED)
SCENARIO # SYSTEMS-4: Inspired C02 is not maintained within limits
POTENTIAL CAUSES: - Saturation of C02 removal media
- Failure of ventilation system
POTENTIAL RESULTS: - Discomfort
Incapacitation
Asphyxiation
PREVENTIVE MEASURES: - Design C02 removal system and
ventilation system with adequate
safety margin/redundancy
- Limit physical workload
CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR OCCURENCE: - Minimize physical activity
- Activate back up C02 removal
system (purge, etc.)
- Seek safe haven
LIKELIHOOD OF OCCURENCE: 4
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Table C-7
POTENTIAL EVA ACCIDENT SCENARI OS (CONTINUED)
Scenario # SYSTEMS- 5: Loss of propulsion system thrust
(assume station maneuver to rescue not possible)
Possible Causes: Depletion of propulsion system fuel
Failure of propulsion system regulators
Total failure of propulsion system control
electronics
Potential Results: Stranded crewmember with possible opening DV
Corrective Actions: EVA Rescue
Backup propulsion system activation
Likelihood: 2
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Table C-7
POTENTIAL EVA ACCIDENT SCENARIOS (CONTINUED)
Scenario # SYSTEMS- 6: Loss of populsion system control authority
Possible Causes: Failed on/off thrusters
Control electronics failures (failed "on"/"off"
command)
Control system hardware failure (hand
controller)
Potential Results: Damage to worksite equipment
Depletion of prop as a result of
fighting/isolating failure
Damage to EVAS
Corrective Actions: Isolate failed on/off thruster
Use of backup thrust system
Redundant control paths
Likelihood: 4
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Table C-7
POTENTIAL EVA ACCIDENT SCENAR IOS (CONT INUED)
Scenario # SYSTEMS- 7: Loss of propulsion system monitoring capability
Possible Causes: Loss of MMU CWS
Loss of power
Loss of sensors
Potential Results: Inability to monitor MMU status
Corrective Actions: Use of redundant sensors to monitor
parameters (pressure, etc. )
Li kel ihood : 4
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Table C-7
POTENTI AL EVA ACCI DENT SCENARIOS (CONTI NUED)
Scenario # SYSTEMS- 8: Loss of pressure integrity of crew enclosure
Possible Causes: Hole/tear in the crew enclosure
Potential Results: o Hype×ia
o Depletion of LSS 02 at a high rate
o Decompression sickness
Preventive Measures: o Rip/tear puncture-resistant crew
enclosure
o Elimination of sharp edges at crew
worksite
o shielding from micrometeroids
o Take special care around potential
hazards
Corrective Actions: o Activation of secondary source of 02
o "Repair" tear
o Seek pressurized safe-haven
Likelihood: 3
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Table C-7
POTENTIAL EVA ACCI DENT SCENARI OS (CONTI NUED)
Scenario # SYSTEMS- 9: Loss of mobility of crew enclosure
Possible Causes: o Mechanical (bearing or restraint) failure
o Electrical or pneumatic failure (power-
assisted joints_ end effectorsv etc.)
Potential Results: o Inability to translate to/from worksite
o Inability to complete task
o "Incapacitation" of crewmember
Preventive Measures: Preventive maintenance_ pre-EVA checks of
crew enclosure
Corrective Actions: EVA Rescue
Overpower frozen joints
Li kel ihood: 2
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Table C-7
POTENTIAL EVA ACCIDENT SCENARIOS (CONTINUED)
Scenario # SYSTEMS- 10: Loss of passive thermal protection a
the crew enclosure
Possible Causes: o
0
Destruction of or damage to the thermal
protection layer(s) of the crew enclosure
oo hot lights/sun
oo chemicals
oo tear/abrasion
Work in hostile thermal environments
oo Solar array focal points
Potential Causes: "hot spots" in the crew enclosure
Preventive Measures: Same as loss of pressure integrity
Corrective Actions: o Activate or increase active thermal
protection from LSS
o Don thermal gloves, blankets,
protective covers
o Set out of hostile environment
Likelihood: 4
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Table C-7
POTENTI AL EVA ACCI DENT SCENARI OS (CONTI NUED)
Scenario # SYSTEMS- 11: Loss of visibility from within crew enclosure
Possible Causes: o Fogging of visor or window (internal)
o Contamination of visor or window (external)
o (Thermally) Mechanically jammed sunshade or visor
over inner visor
o View restrictions associated with worksite
Potential Results: o Inability to accomplish task
o inability to translate ("blind")
Corrective Actions: o Anti-fog and ventilation for internal
fogging
o Capability to wipe up dirt, chemicals,
etc., which contaminate external
surface
o Tear-away visors
Likelihood: 4
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Table C-7
POTENTIAL EVA ACCIDENT SCENARIOS (CONTINUED)
HUMAN FACTORS-RELATED EVENTS
o ACCIDENTS INVOLVING AN INCAPACITATED OR SICK EVA CREW MEMBER
o EVA CREW MEMBER FREE-FLOATING
o EVA CREW MEMBER TRAPPED/ENTANGLED
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Table C-7
POTENTIAL EVA ACCIDENT SCENARIOS (CONTI NUED)
Scenario # HUMANFACTORS-l:
Possible Causes:
Potential Results:
O
0
O
Preventive Measures:
Corrective Actions:
Likelihood: 2-3
EVA Crewman becomes sick or
incapacitated
Bends
Space sickness
High C02/hypoxia
o Inability to reach safe haven/airlock
o Loss of LSS functions (vomitus)
"Physical exam" prior to EVA
o Minimize physical activity
o Rescue by other EVA crewmember
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Table C-7
POTENTIAL EVA ACCIDENT SCENARIOS (CONTINUED)
SCENARIO # HUMANFACTORS-2: EVA crewmember turns loose from
Space Station
POSSIBLE CAUSES:
- Improper tether protocol
- Hardware (tether, foot restraint, etc.)
failure
POTENTIAL RESULTS: Stranded crew member with possible opening
delta-v with respect to SS
PREVENTIVE MEASURES: - Lock-lock design on hardware
- Use of proper tether protocol
CORRECTIVE ACT IONS FOR OCCURENCE:
- Rescue by other EVA crew
member
- "Push-off"
- MMU
- Lifeline
- Rescue by OMV/Teleoperator
- Rescue by Shuttle
- Rescur by MRMS
- "Life vest" MMU
LIKELIHOOD OF OCCURENCE: 2
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Table C-7
POTENTIAL EVA Arc I DENT SCENARI OS (CONTINUED)
Scenario # HUMANFACTORS-3: EVA crewmember becomes tangled or
trapped
Possible Causes: o Exess safety tether
o SS structure
oo trusses
oo cables/wires
oo "cracks and crevices"
Preventive Measures:
Corrective Actions: o Cut cable, wire, tethers
o Rescue by other crewmen
o "Pull out" using MRMS?
o Decrease crew enclosure
unwedge
pressure to
Li kel ihood: 2
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Table C-7
POTENTIAL EVA ACCIDENT SCENARIOS (CONTINUED)
SPACE STATION ENVIRONMENTALHAZARDS
o RADIATION (RF, SOLAR, THERMAL, ETC.)
o CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION
o ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS
o MECHANICALSYSTEMS
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Table C-7
POTENTIAL EVA ACCIDENT SCENARIOS (CONTINUED)
SCENARIO # ENVIRONMENT-l: Exposure to dangerous levels of
radiation in the SS environment (RF,
thermal, solar_ etc.)
POTENTIAL CAUSES: - Inadequate UV protection in crew enclosure
- EVA crewmember crossing in front of
transmitting antennas
- Solar flares
POTENTIAL RESULTS: - Radiation sickness
PREVENTIVE MEASURES:
- Use of sun visors/UV protection in crew
enclosure
- Proper shielding of antennas
- Operational constraints on use of
antennas when crew member EVA
- Limit EVA during high solar activity
- Schedule EVA to avoid South Atlantic
Anomaly
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR OCCURENCE - Seek safe haven/shielded area
- Medical attention
LIKELIHOOD OF OCCURENCE: 3
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Table C-7
POTENTIAL EVA ACCIDENT SCENARIOS (CONTINUED)
Scenario # ENVIRONMENT-2: Chemical contamination in the SS
environment
Potential Causes: o Hardware failure
oo leaking valves, thrusters on satellites
oo leaking fuel storage resovoirs
o Operational errors
oo fuel transfer
Potential Results: o Damage to crew enclosure
o Contamination of sensitive payloads
o Contamination of airlock and pressurized SS
environment
Preventive Measures: o Redundant valves
(design_ operations) o Leak detection systems (i.e., on fuel
transfer umbilicals)
Corrective Action: o "Bake off" contaminants from crew enclosure
o Purge airlock
o Clear off payloads, optical surfaces, etc.
Li kel ihood: 3
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Tabl e C-7
POTENTIAL EVA ACCIDENT SCENARIOS (CONTINUED)
Scenario # ENVIRONMENT-3: Exposure of EVA crewmember to
electrical hazards in the SS
environment
Potential Causes: o Power sources in satellites being repaired
o Static discharges
o EVA activity in the aurural zones on night
passes *
o SS power sources and transmission time
failures
Potential Results: o Electrical shock to crewmember
o Loss of electronically-controlled components
in LSS
o Fire in crew enclosure
Preventive Measures: o Properly shield/ground power sources
o Veri_y power sources safed/unpowered prior
to repairs
Corrective Action: o Seek sa_e haven
o Activate back-ups to failed components
o Aid injured crewmember
Likelihood: 3
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Table C-7
POTENTIAL EVA ACCIDENT SCENARIOS (CONTINUED)
Scenario # ENVIRONMENT-4: Exposure of EVA crewmember to
mechanical hazards in SS environment
Potential Causes: o Run-away MRMS
o Failure of SS structure
o Airlock hatch problems?
o Failure of stored mechanical energy systems
(springs, flywheels_ etc.)
Potential Results: o Damage to crew enclosure/LSS
o Crew entrapment
o Crew injury
Preventive Measures: o Design structure with factors of safety
taking into account dynamics of crew
activity around them (MMU_ shuttle_ etc.)
o Redundant hatch sealing techniques
Corrective Action:
Likelihood:
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TABLE C-8
3.2.2 TECHNOLOGYSURVEYS (SUMMARY)
SECTION
3.2.2.1
3.2.2.2
3.2.2.3
TI TLE/APPROACH
HIGH PRESSURESUIT
GLOVES
A. SOFT GLOVES (DAVID CLARK)
B. SOFT GLOVES (ILC)
C. HARD GLOVES
OTHERTHAN GLOVES
A. VARIABLE GEOMETRYHARD
SECTIONS W/BEARINGS
B. ROLLING CONVOLUTE
C. TOROIDAL-EXTERNALLINKAGE
D. TOROIDAL-INTERNAL LINKAGE
E. SOFT JOINT TRIAXIAL MATERIAL
CONFIG PROVIDING RAPID DON/DOFF
WITHOUT ASSISTANCE
A. DIAGONAL PLANE CLOSURE
B. BI-PLANE CLOSURE
C. HORIZONTAL SINGLE PLANE
CLOSURE
D. REAR ENTRY CLOSURE
HIGH MOBILITY AND LONGTERM WEAR
COMFORT
LEVEL
CURRENT
6
3
3
6
&
6
6
3
6
6
8
3
8
IOC
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
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TABLE C-8
3.2.2 TECHNOLOGYSURVEYS (SUMMARY) (CONTINUED)
SECTI ON
3.2.2.4
3.2.2.5
3.2.2.6
TITLE/APPROACH
IMPROVED INFORMATION/EVA DATA
DISPLAY, STORAGE AND COMMAND
SYSTEM
DISPLAY SYSTEMS
A. MINATURE CRT DISPLAY
B. VISUALLY-COMPLED DISPLAYS
C. AUDIO SYSTEMS
D. FIXED READOUT
DATA STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES
A. BUBBLE MEMORY
B. COMMAND STORAGE (READ ONLY)
C. RANDOM ACCESS
D. ROTATING MEMORIES
1. LASER DISK
2. MAGNETIC
COMMAND/CONTROL
A. VIRTUAL CONTROL (HAND
POSITION SENSING)
B. VOICE RECOGNITION
DATA PROCESSING/INTEPRETATION
TECHNOLOGIES
A. AUTOMATED CHECKLISTS
B. DIAGNOSIS/REPAIR PROCEDURES
C. EXPERT SYSTEMS
HARD STRUCTURE THERMAL INSULATION
A. OVERGARMENT
B. GOLD COATING
C. ALUMINUM COATING
ON ORBIT MAINTENANCE, SERVICE,
REPAIR AND REPLACEMENT
A. CREW ENCLOSURE
B. LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
REGENERABLES REPLACEMENT
SCHEDULED REPLACEMENT OF
LIMITED LIFE ITEMS
UNSCHEDULED REPLACEMENT OF
LONG LIFE ITEMS
CHANGE OUT OF ENTIRE LSS
C. PROPULSION SYSTEM
LEVEL
CURRENT
5
4
8
7
5
8
8
4
4
2
7
8
8
b
3
3
3
6
8
4
4
4
1
IOC
8
TBD
8
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
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TABLE C-8
3.2.2 TECHNOLOGYSURVEYS (SUMMARY) (CONTINUED)
SECTION
3.2.2.7
3.2.2.8
TI TLE/APPROACH
ON ORBIT FIT CHECK/RESIZING
LEVEL
CURRENT IOC
6 8
AUTOMATIC SERVICE AND CHECKOUT
EMU
CREWENCLOSURE
CLEANING/STERILIZATION
A. MANUALWIPING OF INTERIOR 8
SURFACES
B. STEAMCLEANING 4
DRYING
A. MANUALDRYING OF INTERIOR 8
SURFACES
B. FLEXIBLE DUCT 4
C. SAME AS B EXCEPTVENT TUBES
INTEGRAL TO CREWENCLOSURE 1
LIFE SUPPORTSYSTEM
RECHARGE
OXYGEN(GASEOUS)
OXYGEN(LIQUID)
ENERGYSTORAGE
BATTERY
FLY WHEEL
AUTO CHECKOUT
PROPULSIONSYSTEM
BATTERYRECHARGE
PROPELLANTRECHARGE
CHECKOUT
8
4 8
3 8
8
2 4
4 8
8
4 8
2 8
TBD
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TABLE C-8
3.2.2 TECHNOLOGYSURVEYS (SUMMARY) (CONTINUED)
SECTION
3.2.2.9
3.2.2. I0
T I TLE/APPROACH
LEVEL
CURRENT
AUTOMATIC THERMAL CONTROL
A. THERMOSTATIC BYPASS OF COOLANT
FLOW AROUND HEAT SINK USING
REGULATION METHODS
METHODS BELOW
B. VARIABLE SPEED COOLANT PUMP
USING REGULATION METHODS
BELOW
METHOD 1: CM SELECTS DESIRED 4
LCG INLET TEMP
CONTROL SETPOINT
METHOD 2: SAME AS METHOD I 2
EXCEPT CONTROL
SETPOINT AUTOMA-
TICALLY VARIES TO
MAINTAIN COMFORT AS
METABOLIC LOAD
CHANGES
C. VARIABLE THERMOELECTRIC LIFT
BETWEEN LIQUID COOLANT LOOP
AND HEAT SINK 2
CONTROLLED EFFLUENT EMU
A. THERMOELECTRIC ICE CHEST
COUPLED VIA A VAPOR CYCLE
TO A RADIATOR
B. THERMOELECTRICALLY PUMPED
LIQUID LOOP TO INTEGRATED_
HIGH TEMPERATURE HEAT SINK
AND RADIATOR
2
2
IOC
8
8
8
8
8
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TABLE C-8
TECHNOLOGY SURVEYS (SUMMARY) (CONTINUED)
SECTION
3.2.2.11
3.2.2.14
LEVEL
T ITLE/APPROACH CURRENT IOC
BASICALLY REGENERABLE EMU
HUMIDITY
A. CONDENSATION
METHOD 1: EXISTING HEAT SINK
METHOD 2: LOCAL HEAT SINK
METHOD 3: COMPRESSION /
EXPANSION
Bll ABSORPTION
METHOD 1:
METHOD 2:
METHOD 3:
C02
SILICA GEL
MOLECULAR SIEVES
CHEMICAL (ETHYLENE
GLYCOL)
LIQUID SORBENTS
A. POTASSIUM CARBONATE
B. CESIUM CARBONATE
C. TETRA METHYL AMMONIUM
CARBONATE
D. ALKAZID M
SOLID SORBENTS
A. SOLID AMINE, WATER
B. SILVER OXIDE
C. MAGNESIUM OXIDE
D. ZINC OXIDE
ELECTROCHEMICAL REMOVAL
8
1 1
2 TBD
4 4
8
4 5
4 8
4 8
1 8
3 8
4 8
3 8
1 8
2 8
2 2
MECHANICAL END-EFFECTOR SEE MDAC IR&D
GENERIC WORKSTATION
A. SHUTTLE MANIPULATOR FOOT
RESTRAINT
B. ATTACH SHUTTLE PORTABLE
FOOT RESTRAINT
C. HAMILTON STANDARD GENERIC
WORK STATION
D. VOUGHT MANEUVERING WORK
PLATFORM
8
8
3
1
8
1
MMU CAUTION/WARNING SYSTEM WITH EMU INTERFACE
A. OPTICAL DATA LINK 5
B. RADIO FREQUENCY LINK 4
C. HARDWARE LINK 4
8
8
8
C-8-5
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3.2.4.1.21 Medical Care. This section wlll address the medical conditions
lnduced by or associated with EVA and w111 Identify the facilities, equipment,
and procedures required for their prevention, diagnosis, and treatment.
Medical Conditions Associated with EVA
Medical conditions that occur as a direct result of a crewman's Involvement In
EVA include the following:
A. Barotrauma - A condition which results from an expansion of gases trapped
within a body cavity or unequal pressures across a tissue, produced by a
significant pressure change in the crewman's environment. In the EVA
situation, barotrauma would most llkely occur when the pressure ambient to
an EVA crewman ls being reduced from cabin pressure (e.g., 14.7 psla) to
EMU pressure (e.g. 43 psla) within the space station alrlock; or in the
reverse situation, increasing from EMU pressure to cabin pressure, also in
the alrlock. The most common locations of barotrauma tnclude:
(1) Mlddle ear - The occurrance of middle ear barotrauma is almost
completely restricted to increases In ambient pressure such as that
which an EVA crewman would encounter when repressurtzlng from suit to
cabin pressure in the alrlock. Although cases have been reported
which resulted from decreases in ambient pressure, these must be
considered rare. Barotrauma of the middle ear may also occur in a
delayed form, resulting from the reabsorptlon of 02 from the middle
ear some hours following prolonged breathing of I00% 02 by a crewman.
(2) Sinuses - Sinus barotrauma results from a pressure differential
between the inside and outside of a sinus cavity. Similar to but
less common than middle ear barotrauma, sinus barotrauma may occur
during either reductions or increases In ambient pressure but Is more
common during an increase. This condition can also be manifested In a
delayed form.
(3) Alimentary Tract - Gases trapped within the stomach, large, or small
intestine may expand and produce abdominal pain during reductions in
ambient pressure.
C-9-i
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(4) Other sites of barotrauma are significantly less common that the three
Identified above and may Include air pockets in filled teeth and
pulmonary blebs. These may usually be eliminated as potential sttes
by appropriate crew selection.
B. Evolved Gas Oysbarism - This condltlon is characterized by the formation
of gas bubbles in the blood and tissue fluids. These bubbles result from
nitrogen or other diluent gases in the crewman's breathing mixture. These
biologically inert gases are dissolved in body fluids under normal cabin
pressures and tend to come out of solution when the ambient pressure ls
sufficiently reduced. Various types of evolved gas dysbarlsm have been
described relative to the location and severity of bubble formation.
These include:
(1) Joint and Limb Pains (Type I Decompression Sickness) - More commonly
referred to as "Bends", these pains are the most frequently observed
manifestation of evolved gas dysbarlsm. Paln can range from a mild
feeling of stiffness in the Joint to a severe, debilitating distress.
Grades of bends from I to IV have been defined for more easily
assessing the severity of the symptoms.
(2) Pulmonary Disturbances (Type II Decompression Sickness) - Symptoms for
this condition, also termed "Chokes", include substernal distress, a
dry cough, and a restricted Insplratory capacity, are thought to
result from irritation of pulmonary tissue when gas emboli cause
obstruction of pulmonary arterioles and caplllarles. Chokes must be
considered a dangerous condition which may lead to neuroclrculatory
collapse.
(3) Central Nervous System Disturbances (Type III Decompression Sickness)
- Central nervous system disturbances are manifested as visual field
defects, disturbances of equilibrium and coordination, weakness of arm
or leg, numbness, tingling, paralysis, disorientation, amnesia,
dizziness, nausea, headache, and other general neurological symptoms.
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There Is a consensus that the occurrence of bubbles causlng lschemlc
hypoxla Is the actual mechanism. Central nervous system disturbances
are viewed as serious symptoms.
(4) Skin Disturbances - Symptoms _n this category _nclude rashes,
mottling, paraesthesia, and edema. Such disturbances most frequently
occur In association wlth Joint pains and probably s_gnify the
presence of gas emboll in vessels of the subcutaneous tissues, or an
effect on the autonomic nervous system, or both. Although skin
disturbances are usually not painful and do not appear as a threat to
the patient, they should be considered dangerous symptoms.
C. Gas Embolism - Gas embolism is caused by the expansion of gas which has
been taken into the lungs while breathing under a pressure and held in the
lungs during a reduction in the ambient pressure. If enough gas is held,
and if it expands sufficiently, the pressure will tend to force the gas
through the alveolar walls and into the bloodstream and surrounding
tissues. These gas bubbles may lodge in the arteries to the brain,
cutting off blood circulation and producing convulsions, loss of
consciousness, and, if not treated promptly, death. Gas embolism is a
significant hazard in diving; it's occurrence In association with EVA
, operations should, however, be rare. Operations tending to expose a
crewman to the danger of gas embolism include the following.
(1) EMU Pressure Tests in the Airlock - A pressure/leak check of the EMU
after it has been donned and prior to reduction of alrlock pressure
will expose the crewman to the EMU pressure some 4.3 or more higher
than alrlock pressure. A sudden reduction in EMU pressure, such as
that which may result from the loss of a glove, could produce air
embolism if the crewman inadvertently held his breath during the
transition from suit to alrlock pressure.
(2) Loss of Suit Pressure During EVA - A sudden, catastrophic loss of suit
pressure during EVA could potentially produce gas embolism in reducing
the crewman's ambient pressure from EMU pressure to zero. In this
situation, the greatest threat to the crewman's survival would, of
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course, be exposure to vacuum rather than the development of gas
embolism.
O. Conditions Resulting from Inadequate Environmental Control - Hypoxla,
hypercapnla, hyperthermla and hypothermia are potential conditions that
could potentially result from malfunctions or inadequate capabilities of
the EMU environmental control system. These conditions have been
addressed In Sections 3.2.4.1.6, 3.2.4.1.7, and 3.2.4.1.8 and will not be
further discussed In this section.
E. Mechanical Trauma - Injuries, such as fractures, sprains, dislocations,
and crushing injuries, suffered as a result of EVA accidents will require
medical care. Rescue of an injured EVA crewman was discussed in Section
3.2.4.2.8 and rescue equipment requirements wlll be discussed In Section
3.2.4.3.9. Following rescue of the crewman and removal of the EMU,
mechanical trauma resulting from EVA wlll be treated in an identical
manner to that resulting from injuries resulting from intravehlcular
operations.
F. Oxygen Toxicity - This condition can result from the inhalation of oxygen
at higher than normal partial pressures. The inspired gas may be pure
, oxygen or a gas mixture containing oxygen. The two most important factors
which determine whether oxygen toxicity will occur are the magnitude of
the oxygen partial pressure and the length of tlme that the gas is
inhaled. As the oxygen pressure is increased, the permissible time of
exposure is shortened. There are two forms of oxygentoxlclty, a central
nervous system (CNS) form which is manifest most commonly by convulsions,
and a pulmonary form which Is manifest by substernal distress, Coughing,
and breathing difficulty. CNS toxicity will usually require oxygen
pressures about 1.5 atmospheres and will, consequently, be encountered In
space only during hyperbaric treatment. At 2.8ATA, for example, the early
signs of CNS involvement (facial twitching) wlll appear In about 30
minutes In persons breathing 100% 02 . Convulsions wlll usually occur
shortly thereafter. For thls reason, the Inhalatlon of pure oxygen during
hyperbaric treatment is limited to periods of 20 minutes duration, wlth 5
minute intervals of breathing chamber air between successive periods. CNS
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D effects are not of concern at operational suit pressures and for
practicable exposure times and symptoms of pulmonary oxygen toxicity will
probably not be manifest at suit pressures anticipated for Space Station
for periods up to slx or seven hours a day, three days a week.
Health Maintenance Considerations for EVA - Associated Medical Conditions
The capabilities and approaches required for the prevention, diagnosis, and
treatment of the various medical conditions, identified above, associated with
EVA operations are addressed In thls section.
A. Barotrauma
(1) Riddle Ear Barotrauma
a. Prevention
• Selection of personnel wlth demonstrated ablllty to perform
Valsalva maneuver wlth ease.
• Training In the performance of the "Valsalva" maneuver for
middle ear repressurlzatlon.
• Avoidance of EVA operations by crewmen wlth upper respiratory
infections.
• Use of nasal decongestants prior to EVA, when needed.
• Removal of EHU helmet tn atrlock during repressurizat_on at
approximately I0 psla in order to permit middle ear
pressurization maneuvers to be conducted more easily.
b. Diagnosis
• Subjective report of symptoms of ear fullness or pain by the
EVA crewman.
• Examination of tympanic membrane wlth otoscope
c. Treatment
• Asslst/encourage crewman in near clearing °` techniques (e.g.,
Valsalva maneuver, swalilowlng)
• Use of polltzer bag (introduce pressure through nostril while
patient Is swallowing a sip of water)
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Use of atrlock - reduce pressure until middle ear pressure
equalizes, carefully return to normal cabin pressure, use
pressure equalization procedures assisted by medical crewman
(2) Sinus Barotrauma
a. Prevention
• Judicious selectlon of crewmen without sinus abnormalities
• Abstaining from EVA during chronic or acute
respiratory Infections
• Use of nasal decongestants prior to EVA, as required
upper
b. Diagnosis
• Complaint of paln in EVA crewman
• Identification of tenderness on pressure over frontal sinuses
or over an antrum
• Radlologlcal imaging of sinuses
• Relief of pain upon ascent in alrlock
c. Treatment
• Use of nasal decongestants
• Ascent In airlock and treatment wlth decongestants
• Sinus lavage
(3) Delayed Middle Ear Barotrauma (02 absorption)
a. Prevention
• Use of diluent gas In EMU PLSS
• Removal of EMU helmet In alrlock at approximately lO psl during
return to cabin pressure (14.7 psi). Middle ear will then be
repressurlzed wlth 02-N 2 mixture rather than pure 02
• Frequent clearing of middle ear after return to cabin pressure
to replace high 02 concentrations In middle ear with air.
b. Diagnosis
• Same as that described In middle ear barotrauma
c. Treatment
o Same as that described in middle ear barotrauma
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(4) Abdominal Barotraum
a. Prevention
• Judicious dietary practices prior to EVA
b. Diagnosis
• Complaint of abdominal pain during alrlock pressure reduction
c. Treatment
• Abdominal massage
B, Evolved Gas Dysbarlsm
(1) Joint and Limb Pains (Type I Decompression Sickness)
a. Prevention
l. Do not exceed on R value of 1.22 for EVA
Establish an EMU pressure high enough to achieve the
required R value, or
Prebreathe sufficiently long to achieve the required R value
Equilibrate at a lower cabin pressure, low enough to produce
the required R value
(R = Po/PEMu)
where
P = tissue nitrogen pressure at initiation of EVA
o
PEMU = EMU pressure
NOTE: An R value of 1.4, while not preventing bends, is
currently considered to reduce the risk of bends to an
acceptable level.
b. Diagnosis
• Subjective reports of Joint pains during EVA
• Alleviation of pain upon return to cabin pressure
• Alleviation of pain upon inflation of pressure
painful area
• Detection of bubbles in blood stream
detector
cuff over
with doppler bubble
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c. Treatment
1. Repressurlzatton to normal cabin pressure
• Terminate EVA mission and return crewman to the Space
Station following Initial report of Joint or limb pains.
Immediately repressurlze alrlock to cabin pressure
If pain clears within 10 minutes of repressurlzatlon, place
crewman on 100% 02 by mask for two hours, follow this by
24 hours of close observation, and prohibit EVA or exercise
for 72 hours
If pain persists after 10 minutes at cabin pressure, treat
In hyperbaric treatment facility.
. Hyperbaric treatment
• Place crewman (patient) and medical observer In hyperbaric
treatment facility (chamber)
• Place patient on I00% oxygen by mask and medical observer
on chamber air
• Pressurize chamber to the pressure equivalent to 60 feet of
sea water (approximately 2.8 ATA)
• If pain clears within lO minutes at 2.8 ATA, continue to
treat In accordance wlth "Air Force Treatment Table 5",
shown In Figure 3.2.4.1.21-I
• If pain persists after lO minutes at 2.8 ATA, continue to
treat In accordance wlth schedule used for Type II
decompression sickness.
, Type II Decompression Sickness (CNS symptoms, pulmonary
symptoms, collapse)
a. Prevention
• Utilize preventative procedures identical to those used
for the prevention of Type I bends, Joint and limb pains
b. Diagnosis
• Subjective reports of symptoms characteristic of Type
II disturbances particularly when coupled wlth
complaints of Joint or llmb pains
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Observation of signs characteristic of any of the Type
II disturbances (e.9., collapse, poorly coordinated
movements, resplratory difficulties)
c. Treatment
• Place crewman (patient) and medical observer in
hyperbaric treatment faclllty (chamber)
• Place patient on 100% oxygen by mask and medical
observed on chamber air
• Pressurize chamber to the pressure equivalent of 60
feet of sea water (approximately 2.8 ATA)
• Continue treatment In accordance wlth "Air Force
Treatment Table 6", shown In Figure 3.2.4.1.21-2
• If symptoms persist after 70 minutes of treatment at
218 ATA, treatment at this pressure may be extended for
a longer duration at the discretion of the senior
medical supervisor involved In the treatment
C. Gas (Air) Embolism
(1) Alr embolism without pneumothorax
a. Prevention
• Crew training to avoid breath holding during ambient pressure
reduction
b. Diagnosis
• Collapse following a situation conducive to the development of
alr embolism
c. Treatment
•Remove EMU from collapsed crewman and place hlm in hyperbaric
treatment faclllty wlth medical observer
• Rapidly pressurize chamber to the pressure equivalent of 165
feet of sea water (approximately 6.0 ATA)
• Continue treatment in accordance wlth "Air Force Treatment
Table 6A u, shown In Figure 3.2.4.1.21-3
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A breathing gas mixture of 50% oxygen/50_ nitrogen administered
to the patient upon reaching 6.0 ATA lnstead of chamber air has
been used successfully at vartous hyperbaric treatment
facilities. This treatment procedure has not, however, become
a standard therapy
The patient's ECG should be monitored as soon a the ECG leads
can be feasibly applied
As illustrated In Table 6A, 100% oxygen ls not admlnlstered to
the patient until the chamber pressure has been reduced to 2.8
ATA.
Should the patient, while breathing 100% oxygen, develop
symptoms of oxygen toxlclty, he should be immediately switched
from 100% 02 to chamber alr. The patient may be returned to
100% 02 after the symptoms subside. Thls procedure should be
followed for any of the speclfled hyperbaric treatment regimens
(Tables 5, 6, and 6A)
(2) Alr embolism wlth pneumothorax
a. Prevention
• Some training as in la, above.
b. Diagnosis
• Patient develops cardio-resplratory distress when hyperbaric
chamber pressure is reduced from 6.0 ATA toward 2.8 ATA
c. Treatment
• Repressurlze chamber to a level that alleviates patient's
distress and insert a tube through the chest wall Into the alr
accumulation
D, Conditions Resulting from Inadequate Environmental Control.
These conditions are addressed in Sections 3.2.4.1.6,
3.2.4.1.8.
3.2.4.1.7 and
E. Mechanical Trauma
(1) Prevention
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a. Crew training In safety procedures
b. Design of EVA procedures to reduce safety hazards
(2) Diagnosis
a. Physical examination
(3) Treatment
a. Treatment Identical to that used for mechanical
occurring during lntravehlcular activities.
trauma injuries
Fo Oxygen Toxicity
(I) CNS toxicity
a. Prevention
• Restrict oxygen partial
levels below 1.5 ATA
pressure In breathing mixtures to
b. Diagnosis
• Convulsions and unconsciousness In affected crewman
c. Treatment
• Immediate removal of crewman from breathing mixture containing
high oxygen partial pressure
(2) Pulmonary Toxicity
a. Prevention
• Restrict oxygen partial pressure in breathing
levels below_,_psla _i,,,y
b. Diagnosis
mixtures to
Substernal pain reported by crewman
Development of cough
Respiratory distress
Reduced vital capacity shown In pulmonary function tests
co Treatment
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Restrict cre_nan from breathing mixture with oxygen parttal
pressures htgher than 6.0 psta.
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